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Abstract 
Temporally Designing the Consumer Experience: Three Essays Examining the Influence of 
Time Architecture on Consumer Behavior 
 
Jillian Leigh Hmurovic, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
 
 
 
How can the temporal aspects of the consumer experience be strategically constructed and 
communicated to improve consumer behavior and decision-making? This dissertation advocates 
for the explicit and systematic integration of time as a determining factor in consumer experiences, 
presenting three essays investigating different dimensions of time architecture, the temporal 
design of a consumer experience: temporal sequencing of planning prompt nudges (Essay 1), 
temporal partitioning of initial charitable contributions (Essay 2), and temporal duration of 
contemporary online promotions (Essay 3).  
Essay 1 explores how the timing of planning nudge delivery impacts intervention 
effectiveness in tasks containing an optimal “early bird” deadline (i.e., after which benefits of task 
completion diminish). Results from three studies find that planning prompt nudge reminders 
delivered after the optimal deadline are significantly more effective than control reminders but 
offer little benefit when implemented before the optimal deadline. These findings call for 1) 
strategic temporal management of planning prompts and 2) increased research exploring the ideal 
timing of nudge delivery.  
Essay 2 investigates how temporal aspects of giving perpetuate donor support. Consistent 
with an anchoring account, results from five studies demonstrate that prior donors who initially 
give a recurring time-dispersed gift (e.g., monthly $10 gift for 12 months) subsequently donate 
less than those who initially give a one-time lump-sum gift of the equivalent total amount (e.g., 
v 
single $120 gift). Several approaches for offsetting recurring donors’ later reduced giving are 
tested and implications for charities are discussed.  
Essay 3 questions the degree to which contemporary instantiations of online time scarcity 
promotions (e.g., one-hour flash sales with countdown timers) can be presumed to operate in ways 
theoretically and empirically consistent with foundational demonstrations of time scarcity 
marketing tactics, which largely predate modern online retailing and predominantly involve offline 
contexts (e.g., printed newspaper ad). Results from 26 new studies find that present-day online 
time scarcity promotions may not be as effective as generally assumed, consistent with the 
argument that these promotions represent a novel theoretical and empirical phenomenon.  
Together, these essays demonstrate that the temporal design of a consumer experience can 
promote or undermine traditionally accepted marketing practices, thereby warranting systematic 
investigation and proactive management. 
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1.0 Introduction 
“Explain time? Not without explaining existence. 
Explain existence? Not without explaining time.” 
⸺ John Archibald Wheeler (1986) 
 
Time is a fundamental aspect of the human experience—inherently embedded within 
everything we do, think, and feel. Likewise, time is a fundamental feature of the consumer 
experience—malleable, yet completely inseparable from, all aspects of consumption. Consumer 
experiences do not occur in a temporal vacuum. Time represents not only an economic commodity 
for consumers to manage and allocate, but also an instrumental force shaping consumers’ 
psychological experience (Jacoby, Szybillo, and Berning 1976). Time, however, remains largely 
unrecognized as an independent substantive content domain within marketing. Historically, time 
has been treated as incidental, rather than integral, to the consumer experience, with much of the 
prior work involving time focusing on its subjective perception (e.g., Gorn et al. 2004; Monga and 
Bagchi 2012; Siddiqui, May, and Monga 2014) or comparison to money (e.g., Macdonnell and 
White 2015; Mogilner and Aaker 2009; Okada and Hoch 2004).  
This dissertation advocates for the explicit, systematic, and thoughtful integration of time 
as a determining factor in consumer experiences, seeking to answer the following overarching 
research question: How can institutions, firms, and policy-makers strategically construct and 
communicate temporal aspects of the consumer experience to maximize the value of traditional 
marketing practices? The current work is part of an ongoing program of research investigating 
how time can be strategically used to improve consumer behavior and decision-making. The three 
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essays presented in this dissertation examine time architecture, the temporal design of consumer 
experiences.  
Time architecture involves the construction and communication of time-related aspects of 
consumer experiences. I conceptualize time architecture as consisting of six dimensions: 
sequencing, partitioning, duration, velocity, framing, and signaling (summarized in Table 1). 
Although time architecture may go unnoticed, it is never neutral. Each dimension characterizes a 
temporal feature innate to the consumer experience. Consequently, each dimension represents a 
potential mechanism by which marketers can shape consumer behavior. Sequencing refers to order 
and frequency associated with consumer experiences, such as serial arrangement, variety, or 
simultaneity. Positioning represents the temporal separation and categorization of aspects of 
consumer experiences, such as consumption delays, spacing, and temporal divisions. Duration 
involves the temporal length of an experience, including monitoring time elapsed and generating 
time pressure. Velocity captures aspects of an experience related to rate and intensity, such as 
speed and acceleration occurring over the course of a consumption episode. Framing broadly refers 
to the presentation and perception of temporal features of an experience, such as how to display 
timing elements or discuss temporal comparisons. Signaling represents the meaning and inference-
making caused by and resulting from temporal features of an experience, such as lay theories and 
social-signaling value regarding the length of a consumer experience. 
Table 1 Dimensions of Time Architecture 
Dimension Definition Select Content Examples 
Duration length and constraint temporal boundaries, deadlines, scheduling, time pressure/slack 
Sequencing ordering and frequency serial arrangement, variety, repetition, simultaneity, synchrony 
Partitioning separation and categorization temporal markers, interruptions, delays, spacing, mental accounting 
Velocity rate and intensity acceleration/deceleration, inertia, speed, pacing, peak-end effects 
Framing presentation and perception numerosity, time styles, opportunity costs, temporal construal, nostalgia 
Signaling meaning and inferences symbolism, lay theories, self-signaling value, temporal inferences 
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Each essay in this dissertation touches on a different dimension of time architecture (i.e., 
sequencing, partitioning, and duration), examining how these temporal features can promote or 
undermine the influence of traditional marketing practices: temporal sequencing of planning 
prompt nudges (Essay 1), temporal partitioning of initial charitable contributions (Essay 2), and 
temporal duration of contemporary online promotions (Essay 3). 
Essay 1 (“Prompts with Punch: Timing Planning Nudges for Maximum Effectiveness”), 
examines how the efficacy of planning prompt nudges depends on the timing of delivery relative 
to an optimal deadline. Although prompting plan making can offset procrastination and increase 
task completion for traditional terminal deadline tasks (e.g., those with a single “last chance” 
deadline), we know little about its effects for the many tasks that also contain an optimal deadline, 
after which benefits of task completion diminish (e.g., “early bird” deadline). This paper explores 
how the timing of planning prompt nudge delivery impacts intervention effectiveness in such 
cases. Results from three studies, including a consequential online lottery and a large-scale field 
experiment involving students filing the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), 
suggest that although planning nudges implemented before an optimal deadline appear to offer 
little benefit over simple reminders, these prompts are significantly more effective than control 
messages if delivered after the optimal deadline. These findings call for 1) strategic temporal 
management of planning prompt nudges and 2) increased research exploring the ideal timing of 
nudge delivery, as understanding how time-related decisions alter the efficacy of established 
behavioral interventions enriches both our theoretical and practical use of these tools. 
Essay 2 (“Giving Again: Temporal Structure of Initial Contribution Impacts the Size of 
Donors’ Subsequent Gift”) investigates how temporally partitioning consumers’ initial charitable 
contributions as a recurring time-dispersed gift (e.g., monthly $10 gift for 12 months) versus a 
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one-time lump-sum gift of the equivalent total amount (e.g., single $120 gift) impacts the size of 
subsequent support. Charities often approach prior donors with additional charitable requests. How 
should they do this? What factors influence prior donors’ later generosity? Whereas much of the 
existing charitable giving literature focuses on the initiation of charitable giving, not its 
continuation, the current paper identifies time architecture of an initial donation experience 
(specifically, the temporal structure of donors’ first contribution) as a critical factor shaping 
subsequent charitable support. Consistent with an anchoring account, but inconsistent with 
predictions based on hedonic editing or self-signaling, results from five studies demonstrate that 
when asked to make a second contribution to the same charity, prior donors whose initial charitable 
contribution was structured as a recurring time-dispersed gift subsequently give less than prior 
donors who initially donated the same amount structured as a one-time lump-sum gift. Several 
approaches for offsetting recurring donors’ later reduced giving are tested, including explicitly 
cueing a more favorable anchor during the second appeal (Study 3), weakening the informational 
value of the unfavorable anchor (Study 4), and designing the initial donation experience to 
encourage lump-sum giving (Study 5A and 5B). Taken together, this work highlights the 
importance of examining how temporal aspects of giving perpetuate donor support and offers 
charities possible tools for maximizing donors’ continued giving. 
Essay 3 (“Time’s Out: Examining the Effectiveness of Contemporary Online Time Scarcity 
Promotions”) broadly examines the use and effectiveness of time scarcity tactics as they appear in 
contemporary online retail contexts. With foundational demonstrations of time scarcity marketing 
tactics (e.g., limited time offers) largely predating modern online retailing and predominantly 
involving offline marketing (e.g., newspaper ads), to what degree can contemporary instantiations 
of online time scarcity promotions (e.g., flash sales) be presumed to operate in theoretically and 
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empirically consistent ways? This paper presents a systematic approach to answering this question. 
First, we identify theoretically important differences between the contexts in which original time-
scarcity theories were developed and the current marketplace where they are applied. Second, we 
conduct a retrospective analysis of offline empirical work, finding limited generalizable insight 
relevant to modern online time scarcity appeals. Finally, we report 26 new studies sampling from 
a range of products, timeframes, digital domains, formats, and indicators of product valuation. 
Both single-study analyses and single-paper meta-analyses suggest that although a few isolated 
studies find favorable online time scarcity effects for select measures, contemporary online time 
scarcity promotions primarily have negligible (or adverse) effects. Together, these findings suggest 
that present-day online time scarcity tactics may not be as effective as previous offline time 
scarcity research and pervasive marketplace usage might suggest, offering a grounded argument 
for treating online time scarcity promotions as a new theoretical and empirical phenomenon.   
Together, these essays advance our understanding of time and consumer behavior, showing 
that without considering the time architecture of consumers’ experience of marketing actions, 
marketers run the risk of profoundly miscalculating or overestimating their anticipated efficacy. 
Essay 1 demonstrates that the timing of planning prompt nudges can alter the intervention’s 
effectiveness, suggesting evaluations of behavioral economic nudges should advance beyond 
questions of whether a tool is effective to assessments of when a tool may be maximally effective. 
Essay 2 identifies a previously unrecognized aspect of early donation experiences (i.e., temporal 
structure of donation payment) that can shape later patterns of giving, highlighting how temporal 
aspects of giving perpetuate donor support and offering charities possible tools for maximizing 
donors’ continued giving. Essay 3 identifies several reasons to question the applicability of 
previous assumptions underlying offline time scarcity marketing tactics to the modern-day online 
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marketplace, modeling a novel approach to revisiting past theory and determining the robustness 
of a given effect across temporal and market changes. Together, these essays argue that the 
temporal design of a consumer experience can promote or undermine traditionally accepted 
marketing practices, thereby warranting systematic investigation and proactive management. 
 
7 
2.0 (Essay 1) Prompts with Punch: Timing Planning Nudges for Maximum Effectiveness 
Embedding plan-making prompts in messages offers a light-touch way to nudge 
individuals toward task completion, especially when individuals face time-sensitive tasks (e.g., 
Mazar, Mochon, and Ariely 2018; Milkman et al. 2011; Nickerson and Rogers 2010). However, 
individuals often encounter tasks that involve a more complex deadline structure, in which taking 
action prior to an “optimal” deadline (the final opportunity to take maximally beneficial action) 
offers greater benefit than waiting to act until a later “terminal” deadline (the final opportunity to 
take any beneficial action). These optimal-deadline tasks are ripe for procrastination. We can put 
off taking action until after the optimal deadline passes, but such procrastination can have 
substantial costs. For example, though college students can access a larger pool of financial aid by 
submitting applications earlier, many students procrastinate, reducing the amount of aid they can 
access. Potential conference attendees can register before an early bird deadline to receive a 
discounted price, but many find themselves paying higher prices at or near the final registration 
deadline–despite intending, months in advance, to attend. Individuals who enter lotteries for 
schools or housing may benefit from entering sooner but may delay application processes – though 
they are aware of the needs they face and the declining availability. How can firms and policy 
makers use planning prompt nudges to encourage behavioral follow-through for tasks containing 
optimal deadlines? When will planning prompt nudges be more effective: before or after the 
optimal deadline? 
Rationally, one might presume that nudging plan-making prior to the optimal deadline 
would most effectively reduce procrastination. Such early nudges would offer the greatest benefit 
of action as well as more time to make and enact a plan. However, we find that the benefit of 
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planning prompts relative to control messages primarily emerges after an optimal deadline has 
passed. In both a controlled lottery experiment and a large-scale field study, we observe null or 
weak effects of planning nudges implemented prior to optimal deadlines, relative to identical 
control messages without planning prompts. By contrast, encouraging plan-making after the 
optimal deadline is more effective than control messages delivered at the same time.  
In showing these effects, the present paper offers both theoretical and practical 
contributions. First, despite general acknowledgement that behavioral interventions are sensitive 
to timing (McBride, Emmons, and Lipkus 2003), research is only more recently beginning to 
identify specific circumstances that alter the effectiveness of planning prompt nudges (e.g., Bayuk, 
Janiszewski, and LeBoeuf 2010); to our knowledge, no prior work considers how the temporal 
structure of planning nudge delivery shapes decision making. Second, although planning nudges 
are widely recommended as a tool to facilitate behavioral task completion, firms and policy makers 
intending to use these behavioral interventions receive little guidance regarding when to 
implement them. Our findings indicate that organizations seeking to harness the power of planning 
prompts could benefit from managing the temporal context in which nudges operate. This may 
involve, for example, deliberately scheduling nudges to follow optimal deadlines or constructing 
task deadline structure to accommodate pre-existing timetables. 
More broadly, this research raises questions about the time sensitivity of various behavioral 
economics tools, particularly those that involve tasks that include deadlines, temporal landmarks, 
or multi-part processes. We hope that in showing the importance of timing, we advance the 
evaluation of nudge interventions beyond questions of whether a tool is effective to assessments 
of when a tool may be maximally effective, and for what types of tasks. 
9 
2.1 Planning Prompt Nudges and Optimal Deadlines 
Given a tendency for present-biased preferences, people often delay action (O'Donoghue 
and Rabin 1999), even for important and enjoyable tasks (Shu and Gneezy 2010). Although 
deadlines can help (e.g., Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002), they may not overcome procrastination 
for a host of reasons: the planning fallacy may lead us to be overconfident about our likelihood to 
complete a task (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994; Kahneman and Tversky 1979); intertemporal 
discounting may lead us to focus on short-term gains, undermining the potential for long-term 
behavioral change (e.g., Kirby and Herrnstein 1995); multiple goals or plans may weaken our 
commitment to any given objective (Dalton and Spiller 2012); or the gain enjoyed from taking 
action may simply lack motivational power, as we have adapted to our current state (Frederick and 
Loewenstein 1999). 
Planning, however, can offset procrastination and increase task completion. The benefits 
of creating concrete plans have been demonstrated in a broad range of domains, including 
positively influencing drug adherence (Brown, Sheeran, and Reuber 2009), smoking cessation 
(Armitage and Arden 2008), appointment attendance (Sheeran and Orbell 2000), safe driving 
(Brewster et al. 2016), and healthy food consumption (Armitage 2004). Perhaps most notably, 
Nickerson and Rogers (2010) showed that encouraging plan-making during a “get out the vote” 
voter-mobilization phone campaign increased voter turnout in the 2008 presidential election by 
4.1 percentage points. 
Since then, efforts have been made to use a similar planning mechanism to promote 
behavior enactment using low-cost, scalable interventions. These interventions, which we broadly 
refer to as planning prompt nudges, are light-touch tactics that simply promote plan-making. 
Planning prompt nudges include, for example, emails containing phrasing encouraging people to 
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engage in planning-related actions (e.g., “make a plan,” “planning ahead can help,” “schedule time 
in your calendar”), as well as reminder postcards providing designated space for recipients to 
generate specific plans by writing down the precise date and time they will perform a behavior 
(e.g., “write your plan here: ________ (day of the week), _______(month) ___ (day) at 
_____(time)”). Another example includes prerecorded phone messages in outbound reminder calls 
that prompt the listener to interactively indicate a timeframe for engaging in a behavior (e.g., “if 
you plan on enrolling in the next 24 hours, press 1; if you plan on enrolling in the next week, press 
2; if you plan on enrolling in the next month, press 3”).  
We know from prior research that planning prompt nudges tend to work. Exposure to 
planning prompts tends to increase the likelihood of task completion. Planning nudges 
implemented in field contexts, for example, have been shown to reduce credit card delinquency 
(Mazar et al. 2018), boost flu vaccination rates (Milkman et al. 2011), and increase preventative 
health screenings (Milkman et al. 2013). These studies have shown a positive impact on desired 
behavior between approximately .95 to 4.2 percentage points (see Table 2), improvements that are 
particularly impressive considering the minimal added cost required for implementation.  
Notably, planning prompt nudges generally do not require people to actually engage in 
plan-making. In Nickerson and Rogers (2010), potential Pennsylvania voters actively responded 
to planning-related questions when speaking with a live agent on the phone (e.g., “where do you 
expect to be coming from when you go to the polls?”), allowing for the direct observation of plan-
making behavior. Unlike that intervention, however, many planning prompts are more passively 
experienced, encountered as a unidirectional communication from a marketer, firm, or institution 
(e.g., embedded within a postcard), in which direct observation of plan-making behavior is often 
not possible or not measured. Indeed, much of the prior research on planning prompt nudges, 
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especially work with large-scale field experiments, focuses less on verifying actual engagement in 
planning behavior and more on assessing the intervention’s efficacy with respect to the target 
outcome behavior (e.g., voted, received flu shot, completed health screening). In demonstrating a 
positive impact of planning prompts on target behavior without empirical evidence confirming 
planning behavior occurred, existing research suggests that merely presenting planning prompts 
may be sufficient for stimulating consumer action. 
Table 2 (Essay 1) Summary of Effects from Select Studies since Nickerson and Rogers (2010) Using Planning 
Prompt Interventions 
Article DV 
Intervention 
Mechanism 
Impact 
    
Nickerson and Rogers (2010) 
Psychological Science 
Voter  
Turnout 
Phone Call with Live 
Agent to Facilitate  
Plan Making 
• Increased voter turnout in U.S. election by 
4.1 percentage points  
Milkman et al. (2011) 
PNAS 
Flu 
Vaccination 
Reminder Mailer with 
Planning Prompt 
• Increased flu immunization rate by 4.2 
percentage points  
Milkman et al. (2013) 
Preventive Medicine 
Colonoscopy 
Screening 
Reminder Mailer with 
Planning Prompt 
• Increased screenings by .95 percentage 
points 
Brewster et al. (2016) 
Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied 
Speeding Implementation 
Intention Task at End  
of Questionnaire  
• Decreased instances of speeding in 
driving simulator by 16.73 percentage 
points 
Anderson et al. (2018)  
Political Psychology 
Voter  
Turnout 
Planning Prompt 
Questions after Online 
Ad Exposure 
• Increased self-reported turnout in 
Canadian election by 4.12 percentage 
points 
Mazar et al. (2018) 
Journal of Consumer 
Psychology 
Credit card 
Delinquency 
Interactive Voice 
Response Call with 
Planning Prompt 
• Increased likelihood of paying account 
current by 2.26 percentage points 
• Reduced time to cure account by .23 days 
 
Despite the benefits of planning nudges documented in the literature, to date, extant 
empirical evidence has examined behavioral tasks involving a single, terminal deadline. Terminal 
deadlines (visualized in Figure 1, Panel A) represent the time after which action is no longer 
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possible or beneficial. With in-person voting, for example, the terminal deadline is when a polling 
location closes. After that time, individuals cannot cast a ballot in the current election. With 
marketing promotions, the terminal deadline is when the discount ends, after which consumers pay 
full price. Shoppers can only take advantage of one-day Cyber Monday deals, for example, by 
placing online orders before sales end at midnight. With commercial airline boarding, the terminal 
deadline is when the gate closes, after which passengers miss their flight. With free influenza 
vaccination workplace events, the terminal deadline is when the on-site clinic closes. 
Many tasks, however, involve more complex deadline structures. Many tasks additionally 
contain an optimal deadline (Figure 1, Panel B). For tasks with benefits that diminish over time, 
optimal deadlines identify the time after which action is less beneficial. Consider, for example, 
conference registration fees. Often, the registration price increases as the conference date nears, 
with discounted pricing available if you enroll before an early registration deadline (e.g., 25% 
discount if register at least 3 months before the event date, 5% discount if register at least 1 day 
before the event date, full price if register on-site the day of the event). In such cases, the early 
registration deadline marks the end of the largest available discount and the final opportunity to 
register for the conference with maximum price savings, although individuals can still register 
(often with a discount) after the early registration period ends. As such, the early registration 
deadline represents an optimal deadline with respect to registration fees. 
When defining optimal deadlines, it is noteworthy to emphasize that use of the term benefit 
is not synonymous with total utility. Rather than indicating the single ideal time for a consumer to 
act, an optimal deadline indicates the best opportunity for a consumer to obtain a specific marketer-
defined advantage. With the conference registration scenario, for example, the focal advantage of 
enrolling before the early bird offer ends is price savings. Discount size represents the defining 
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feature on which the registration deadlines are temporally structured for and communicated to 
potential registrants. To maximize this specific benefit (i.e., receive the largest discount), therefore, 
you must register before the early bird promotion–the optimal deadline–ends. You may personally 
experience greater total utility, however, by waiting to register until after the early bird offer 
expires, such as if you have not yet determined whether you can attend the conference. The 
“optimal” in optimal deadline, therefore, refers to a specific marketer-defined advantage, not to a 
global assessment of utility.  
In contrast to a terminal deadline, which indicates the final opportunity to take any 
beneficial action, an optimal deadline indicates the final opportunity to take maximally beneficial 
action. Undergraduate students, for example, face both an optimal deadline and a terminal deadline 
when an instructor accepts, but penalizes, late assignments (e.g., 20% grade reduction per day). 
The stated due date represents the optimal deadline for assignment submission, offering students 
the opportunity to earn the highest possible grade. Students, however, can still benefit from 
submitting a late assignment and potentially receive partial credit if the late submission occurs 
before the terminal deadline, the date at which the grade penalty for late assignments leaves 
students with no opportunity to earn partial credit. Missing the optimal deadline, therefore, does 
not wholly eliminate the benefit of taking action. 
Additional examples of optimal deadlines include marketers tempting consumers with 
extra savings or free gifts that exclusively occur during the first few hours of an online sale (e.g., 
“early-bird” promotions), after which the “regular” promotional discount applies; banks providing 
interest-free credit if balance is paid before a predetermined date, after which interest is imposed; 
and municipalities offering early payment discounts for property taxes and parking tickets paid 
weeks before their stated due date, after which the full amount is owed and late-payment penalties 
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can accrue. In each of these examples, it is preferable to act by the optimal deadline; however, 
action may still be taken after the optimal deadline, with diminished benefit.  
 
A. 
 
B. 
 
C. 
 
 
Note. Darkest shading on timeline signifies when the (marketer-defined) benefits of action are greatest.  
Figure 1 (Essay 1) Example Deadline Structure and Planning Prompt Nudge Delivery 
2.2 When to Implement Planning Prompts? 
For tasks containing an optimal deadline, when should marketers implement planning 
prompt nudges (Figure 1, Panel C)? Are planning prompts more effective than simple reminders 
before or after the optimal deadline? Answering this question offers both theoretical and practical 
insights. Practically, this can improve firms’ existing and future implementation of planning 
prompt nudges and identify potential timeframes during which alternative (non-planning) 
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interventions may effectively influence behavior. Theoretically, this can advance understanding of 
the temporal dynamics of planning prompts (as well as behavioral nudges, more generally) and 
reveal the relevance of investigating more complex consumer deadline structures—specifically, 
optimal deadlines.  
As no prior work has characterized optimal deadlines, we next discuss the consumer 
experience that unfolds surrounding them. This description allows us to identify when—before or 
after the optimal deadline—the unique characteristics of planning prompts could make them 
particularly effective in motivating task completion. 
2.2.1 Reminders With (vs. Without) Planning Prompts Before Optimal Deadline 
Rationally, one might presume that delivering planning prompts prior to the optimal 
deadline would most effectively reduce procrastination. Simply, implementing planning nudges 
prior to an optimal deadline offers the greatest possible marketer-defined benefit. In addition, 
delivering planning prompt nudges before an optimal deadline provides extra time for individuals 
to create and enact a plan, thereby minimizing issues arising from underestimating the time 
required to complete a task (Buehler et al. 1994) and overestimating our ability to remember to 
complete a task (Ericson 2011). Moreover, research suggests that planning prompt nudges may be 
more effective when opportunities for enacting behavior are temporally restricted (Dholakia and 
Bagozzi 2003; Milkman et al. 2011), as happens when the optimal deadline creates a time-limited 
window of maximally beneficial opportunity. Also, planning prompts are argued to reduce 
forgetfulness (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006; Milkman et al. 2013), the consequences of which are 
more severe during the pre-optimal deadline period (when individuals face greater procrastination 
costs). 
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However, there are reasons to doubt that planning nudges will be more effective than 
simple reminders before an optimal deadline. First, planning prompt nudges may be unnecessary 
during this time. By highlighting the maximum benefit possible and increasing the salience of 
procrastination costs, the optimal deadline itself may increase one’s motivation and commitment 
to enact the intended behavior (e.g., Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002; Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999; 
Gollwitzer 1999; Heath, Larrick, and Wu 1999; Locke and Latham 1990). Because strong initial 
intentions already exist, individuals may underestimate the benefits of plan making and 
implementation strategies (Koehler, White, and John 2011), thus failing to respond to planning 
cues. Alternatively, the motivating nature of optimal deadlines may increase the likelihood that 
individuals organically engage in plan-making behavior (to facilitate obtaining the maximum 
possible benefit of action). However, because planning prompt nudges are ineffective for those 
who have already generated plans (Nickerson and Rogers 2010), encouraging plan making prior 
to an optimal deadline is redundant (Rogers et al. 2015) and, consequently, no more beneficial 
than a simple reminder (without planning prompts).  
The more complex nature of optimal deadline tasks relative to terminal deadline tasks may 
also reduce the effectiveness of planning prompts in the early phase. Optimal deadline tasks may 
involve multiple dates, information about pre- and post-deadline benefits, and guidance as to task 
completion. If planning prompt nudges administered prior to an optimal deadline draw attention 
to this greater complexity, they may also raise perceived task difficulty and undermine goal 
commitment (Dalton and Spiller 2012). Pre-optimal deadline delivery of planning prompts may 
also weaken behavioral intentions by encouraging individuals to construct failure contingencies. 
Because action can still be taken after the optimal deadline, planning nudges occurring during the 
pre-optimal deadline period may promote a specific type of plan-making—the development of 
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backup plans (Shin and Milkman 2016). Merely thinking through a backup plan can undermine 
motivation for and probability of successfully enacting behavioral intentions (Shin and Milkman 
2016), suggesting that planning prompt nudges implemented before the optimal deadline may even 
lead to less task completion than simple reminders (without planning prompts) delivered at the 
same time. 
2.2.2 Reminders With (vs. Without) Planning Prompts After Optimal Deadline 
When the optimal deadline passes, the maximum benefit of action ends. Failing to complete 
behavioral intentions before the optimal deadline, therefore, means foregoing the most beneficial 
outcome. Consequently, motivation to complete the focal task is anticipated to decay following 
the passage of the optimal deadline, ultimately deteriorating the likelihood that people will act on 
their intentions (e.g., Bandura and Cervone 1986; Bandura and Simon 1977; Cochran and Tesser 
1996; Soman and Cheema 2004). It is during this post-optimal deadline period that we expect 
planning prompts to reveal their value.  
On one hand, it could be argued that both simple reminders and planning prompts would 
be more effective after an optimal deadline than before it, but their efficacy relative to each other 
would not differ. In this way, the optimal deadline constitutes a goal-based reference point, with 
positive outcomes representing “gains” and negative outcomes representing “losses” (Heath et al. 
1999). Missing the optimal deadline equates to missing out on the best possible benefits of action 
(e.g., largest discount); any subsequent action, by comparison, is suboptimal in that it exclusively 
offers diminished benefits (e.g., smaller discount). Thus, failing to enact behavioral intentions prior 
to the optimal deadline would be coded as a loss. If this mechanism were at play, any post-optimal 
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deadline message may increase loss salience, making planning prompts no more effective than 
simple reminders. 
We propose, however, that the unique characteristics of planning prompts preserve 
motivation after an optimal deadline has passed to a greater extent than do simple reminders. First, 
although any reminder after missing optimal deadline provides negative goal performance 
feedback (Bandura and Cervone 1986; Garland 1985; Locke et al. 1981), planning prompts can 
increase task involvement and elaboration (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2009), which may renew the 
motivation necessary for task completion. Furthermore, by increasing perceived goal attainability 
(Gollwitzer 1999; Gollwitzer and Oettingen 2011), planning can restore a sense of self-efficacy, 
bolstering motivation to complete the task (Bandura and Cervone 1986).  
Motivation may also be bolstered if planning nudges trigger “fresh start” effects (Dai, 
Milkman, and Riis 2014, 2015) in a way that simple reminders do not. Planning nudges encourage 
concrete thinking (Gollwitzer 1999), which tends to increase perceived differences versus 
commonalities (Goodman and Malkoc 2012; Lamberton and Diehl 2013; Förster, Liberman, and 
Kuschel 2008; Malkoc, Zauberman, and Ulu 2005). Applied to the task completion process, this 
concrete thinking may highlight the difference between the pre- and post-optimal deadline periods. 
In doing so, planning nudges draw attention to the optimal deadline as a temporal landmark (Peetz 
and Epstude 2016; Shum 1998) to a greater degree than simple reminders. Such clear temporal 
landmarks can trigger a “fresh start effect,” increasing goal commitment and pursuit (Dai et al. 
2014, 2015). Therefore, in raising the profile of the optimal deadline as temporal marker, planning 
nudges may make the post-optimal deadline period a fresh start, enhancing motivation more than 
simple reminders. 
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Taken together, we predict that implementing planning prompt nudges after the optimal 
deadline will more effectively promote task completion than simple reminder messaging delivered 
at the same time. During the pre-optimal deadline period, however, planning nudges are likely 
undervalued as an implementation tool, dismissed as redundant, or regarded as (performance-
eroding) backup-plans, suggesting that planning prompts may be minimally beneficial prior to the 
optimal deadline. Motivation is argued to decay after missing the optimal deadline and, 
consequently, the likelihood of task completion is reduced. However, during the post-optimal 
deadline period, we predict that planning nudges can offset this decrement, boosting task 
completion to a greater degree than messaging without plan-making prompts.  
2.2.3 Overview 
We test this prediction in three studies. Using a promotional discount scenario, Study 1 
provides a preliminary examination of the temporal sensitivity of planning prompt nudges in a 
marketing context and tests several alternative mechanisms that may account for consumers’ post-
optimal deadline motivational boost. Study 2, which consists of a field experiment involving 
nudging online lottery enrollment behavior, tests our predictions within a behaviorally 
consequential, yet decontextualized, domain. Study 3, a field experiment that involves nudging 
prospective students to complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), offers a 
large-scale test of our predictions for a more effortful task within a far-reaching financial domain.  
In each study, individuals receive a target marketing message before or after the optimal 
deadline, the content of which either includes or excludes planning prompts. These marketing 
communications specify the focal benefits of task completion, which diminish over time: the size 
of a promotional discount in Study 1, the likelihood of winning a lottery in Study 2, and the 
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accessibility of college financial aid in Study 3. The optimal deadline for each study, therefore, 
consists of the final opportunity for consumers to obtain the maximal benefit identified in the 
marketing message.  
Results from all three studies suggest that including planning prompts in marketing 
messages effectively boosts consumer motivation more than messages that exclude planning 
prompts, when those messages are delivered after the optimal deadline. For messages received 
prior to the optimal deadline passing, however, including planning prompts did not boost 
motivation more than messages without planning prompts. We conclude with a discussion of 
possible implications for firms, policy makers, and individuals. 
2.3 Study 1: Marketing Promotion 
Study 1 provides a preliminary test of our prediction that planning prompts are more 
effective than simple reminders after the optimal deadline. Study 1 examines evidence of 
motivation decay in terms of reduction in the perceived benefit of taking action. Participants 
imagine receiving email marketing communications highlighting a promotional discount that 
decreases over time (from 45% to 25%). The optimal deadline, therefore, represents the final 
opportunity for consumers to obtain the largest discount. Participants imagine receiving two 
emails: the first email notifies consumers of the promotion before the sale starts and the second 
email reminds consumers of the promotion after the sale starts. We manipulated the presence of 
planning prompts within the content of these notifications, such that the emails either included or 
excluded phrasing that encouraged plan-making. We manipulated the timing of the second 
notification, such that the individuals received the second email during the promotional period 
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before or after the optimal deadline (i.e., largest discount period). We predict a message content 
(including vs. excluding planning prompts) by message timing (before vs. after optimal deadline) 
interaction, such that consumers will perceive promotions with planning prompts as more 
beneficial than promotions without planning prompts to a greater degree after the optimal deadline.  
If motivation decays after the optimal deadline passes, as we suggest, then consumers 
would be expected to perceive the promotion to be less beneficial after the optimal deadline (when 
the discount is smaller) compared to before the optimal deadline (when the discount is largest). 
We argue that reminders that include planning prompt content, compared to reminders without 
planning prompt content, will offset this post-optimal deadline motivation decay. The motivational 
boost from including (vs. excluding) planning prompt content in marketing reminders, however, 
is argued to be comparatively lower prior to the optimal deadline passing (i.e., when consumer 
motivation would likely be higher overall). Thus, we predict that, for communications delivered 
after the optimal deadline, messages containing planning prompts will increase the perceived 
benefit of the discount more than messages without planning prompts. We do not anticipate, 
however, a similar level of increase for communications delivered before the optimal deadline.  
In addition to changes to perceived benefit of the target behavior (i.e., buying the promoted 
product at a discount), Study 1 examines other potential mechanisms that may account for 
consumers’ post-optimal deadline motivational boost (i.e., enhancing self-efficacy or self-esteem, 
restoring a sense of control, amplifying fresh start effects) and one alternative explanation (i.e., 
perceived fairness of the promotional offer). Furthermore, Study 1 also explores implications for 
consumer planning behavior. This study examines whether the previously predicted interactive 
effect of message content and timing subsequently impacts the likelihood that consumers will 
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engage in planning actions intended to facilitate completion of target behavior, such as setting a 
reminder or scheduling time in a calendar.  
2.3.1 Method 
We tested our predictions using a 2 (timing: before optimal deadline, after optimal 
deadline) x 2 (message framing: planning, control) between-subjects design, pre-registered on 
Open Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/5rknw). Prior to analysis, and consistent with OSF 
pre-registration, we excluded participants who reported technical problems or identified as a non-
native American English speaker (n = 19), resulting in a final analysis sample of 681 participants 
(55.51% female;1 Mage = 37.39 yrs, SDage = 10.90 yrs). Prior to data collection, individuals 
indicated whether they were considering getting a new phone in the next six months. Only those 
considering a new phone purchase continued with the study. This pre-registered exclusion criteria 
was used to enhance participant involvement in the fictional promotion scenario used in this study. 
In this study, participants imagined receiving two emails from Apple promoting an online 
iphone sale. The promotion consisted of a two-week sale in which Apple offers a discount that 
decreases over time: 45% off during the first week of the promotion and 25% off during the second 
week of the promotion. Consumers buying an iphone before the end of the first week of the sale 
would receive the largest possible promotional discount (i.e., 45% off), whereas consumers buying 
an iphone during the second week would receive a smaller discount (i.e., 25% off). Thus, the end 
of the first week of the sale represents the optimal deadline; this is the point at which the most 
beneficial pricing to the consumer ends. After this optimal deadline, consumers can still receive 
 
1 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 301; 44.20%), “female” (n = 378; 55.51%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 2; .29%).  
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discounted pricing (although smaller in magnitude), meaning purchase during the post-optimal 
deadline period offers more beneficial pricing than not purchasing during the sale (see Figure 4).   
All participants imagined receiving the first promotional email days before the two-week 
sale began. This first email displayed a generic calendar to visually depict the timing of the 
promotion. The first week of the calendar was blank, except to denote the current day marking 
when participants received the first email (i.e., “Today!”). We marked the second week of the 
calendar as the first week of the sale (i.e., “Week 1: 45% off”), and we marked the third week of 
the calendar as the second week of the sale (i.e., “Week 2: 25% off”). After viewing the first 
promotional email, participants imagined deciding to purchase a new iphone during this sale and 
wanting to make their purchase before the first week of the sale ends.  
Participants then imagined several days passing. The sale starts, but the participant has not 
yet purchased the iphone. At this point, participants imagine receiving a second promotional email 
message from Apple reminding them about the ongoing iphone sale. This second email displayed 
a calendar nearly identical to that presented in the first email, with the current date altered to reflect 
the timing of the second email (see Appendix A for stimuli).  
To manipulate message timing relative to the optimal deadline, this second promotional 
email was received two days before or two days after the end of the first week of the sale. Thus, 
participants randomly assigned to the before optimal deadline condition received their second 
email during the first week of the sale, meaning their maximum discount was 45%. Participants 
randomly assigned to the after optimal deadline condition, however, received their second email 
during the second week of the sale, meaning their maximum discount was 25%.  
To manipulate message framing, in both emails the promotional offer were presented with 
or without planning content. Similar to prior planning prompt research promoting plan-making 
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and scheduling (e.g., Mazar et al. 2018; Milkman et al. 2011), the first and second emails viewed 
by participants randomly assigned to the planning message condition included prompts explicitly 
encouraging consumers to engage in planning behavior (e.g., “plan ahead,” “make a plan,” and 
“pick a time and put it in your calendar now”). By contrast, the first and second emails viewed by 
those randomly assigned to the control condition did not include such planning prompts.  
After reviewing both the first and second promotional emails, participants then completed 
several close-ended rating scales within the scenario context (items provided in Appendix B). To 
assess perceived benefit of the promotional discount (that they could obtain given timing of the 
second email), participants responded to three items on close-ended, seven-point rating scales (e.g., 
“How would you rate the benefit of getting this discount?” 1 = Not at All Beneficial, 7 = Very 
Beneficial). Calculating the average of these items generates a single index of perceived benefit (α 
= .934). Participants then completed one item measuring likelihood to engage in planning-related 
behaviors, such as setting a phone reminder or scheduling time in one’s calendar (“How likely 
would you be to engage in any planning behavior in order to make your purchase?” 1 = Not at All 
Likely, 7 = Very Likely). 
Afterwards, participants completed items assessing potential motivational mechanisms of 
planning prompts. To measure the possible influence on self-esteem and self-efficacy, participants 
additionally completed the ten-item Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem (RSE) scale (α = .913) and a 
four-item self-efficacy scale (adapted from Judge, Locke, Durham, and Kluger 1998; α = .922). 
Each scale was computed into an average index prior to analysis. Participants also responded to a 
reduced-item measure of internal locus of control (used by Hoffman, Novak, and Schlosser 2003) 
containing five items that were averaged into a single index (α = .726). The “fresh start” effect 
suggests that consumer motivation increases as the psychological separation between one’s current 
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self and one’s past (imperfect) self grows (Dai et al. 2015). Thus, to assess potential fresh start 
effects, participants completed a three-item (mean-composite) index of psychological distance 
(adapted from Dai et al. 2015; α = .810). In addition to these mechanisms, we also assessed the 
alternative account that differences in perceived fairness of the deal may be driving consumers’ 
motivational response. Participants completed six items measuring perceived fairness of the deal 
(adapted from Darke and Dahl 2003), which were computed into an average index (α = .864).  
Participants then completed an item regarding current product usage (“Do you currently 
have an Apple iphone (any model/year)?” 1 = Yes, 0 = No) and liking of online shopping (“I like 
shopping online,” 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) for inclusion as pre-registered 
covariates. Finally, participants reported any technical difficulties with the survey and provided 
basic demographic data (e.g., age, gender, household income). 
2.3.2 Results 
Consistent with our pre-registration, all analyses control for current product usage (1 = 
currently has iphone, 0 = does not have iphone) and liking of online shopping (mean-centered). 
All subsequent results reflect covariate-adjusted estimates.  
2.3.2.1 Perceived Benefit 
Conducting a linear regression analysis predicting perceived benefit as a function of 
message framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control reminder) and timing (1 = after 
optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), controlling for current product usage (1 = currently 
has iphone, 0 = does not have iphone) and liking of online shopping (mean-centered), we found 
no main effect of message framing (b = .095, SE = .086, t = 1.11, p = .266; Table 3, model 2). 
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Promotional messages with planning prompts, relative those without planning prompts, did not 
increase perceptions of the promotion’s benefit (5.50 vs. 5.40). We did, however, observe a main 
effect of timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = -1.603, SE = .086, t = -18.74, p < .0001; Table 
3, model 2). Individuals perceived the promotional offer as less beneficial when they received the 
second marketing communication after (vs. before) the optimal deadline (4.64 vs. 6.25).  
These were both qualified, however, by a marginal framing x timing interaction (b = .320, 
SE = .171, t = 1.87, p = .062; Table 3, model 4).2 For email reminders received after the optimal 
deadline, the presence of planning prompts increased the perceived benefit of the promotional offer 
relative to reminders that did not include planning prompts (4.77 vs. 4.52; t = 2.11, p = .035; Figure 
2). However, for email reminders received before the optimal deadline, including planning 
prompts in the reminder did not increase perceived benefit of the promotional offer compared to 
reminders without planning prompts (6.21 vs. 6.28; t = -.53, p = .596).  
 
2 No interaction effects with demographics emerged (p’s ≥ .204). Likewise, results showed no interaction effects with demographics for the 
behavioral outcomes in Studies 2 (p’s ≥ .267) and 3 (p’s ≥ .353). For brevity, this will not be discussed further. 
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Table 3 (Essay 1) Study 1: Regression Results Predicting Perceived Benefit 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) 
Timing of Prompt x Message Framing   .307~ .320~ 
   (.173) (.171) 
     
Message Framing  .117 .095 -.036 -.064 
(1 = planning prompt, 0 = control) (.087) (.086) (.122) (.121) 
     
Timing of Prompt  -1.618*** -1.603*** -1.770*** -1.761*** 
(1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline) (.087) (.086) (.122) (.120) 
     
Constant 6.197*** 6.092*** 6.272*** 6.164*** 
 (.075) (.086) (.086) (.095) 
     
Controls N Y N Y 
Number of Cases 681 681 681 681 
R2 .340 .362 .343 .365 
Adj. R2 .338 .358 .340 .360 
F 174.491 95.744 117.741 77.579 
df 2 4 3 5 
p < .000001 < .000001 < .000001 < .000001 
Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Control variables include the following: current 
product usage (1 = currently has iphone, 0 = does not have iphone) and mean-centered liking of online shopping. 
2.3.2.2 Planning Likelihood 
We conducted a linear regression analysis predicting self-reported planning likelihood as 
a function of message framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control reminder) and timing 
(1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), controlling for previously stated 
covariates (i.e., current product usage, mean-centered liking of online shopping). Results show no 
main effect of message framing (b = .083, SE = .111, t = .75, p = .452; Web Appendix A Table 2, 
model 3), such that those receiving promotional email reminders with planning prompt content 
were no more likely to engage in planning behaviors, as compared to those receiving the reminders 
without planning prompts (5.72 vs. 5.64). However, we did observe a significant main effect of 
timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = -.692, SE = .111, t = -6.26, p < .0001; Web Appendix 
A Table 2, model 3). Individuals who received the promotional email reminders after the optimal 
deadline, compared to those who received the email reminders before the optimal deadline, were 
less likely to engage in planning behaviors (5.33 vs. 6.02).  
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These results are qualified, however, by a marginally significant interaction between 
message framing and timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = .370, SE = .221, t = 1.67, p = 
.095; Web Appendix A Table 2, model 5). For promotional emails messages after the optimal 
deadline, including planning prompt content in the reminder (vs. not including planning content in 
reminder) marginally increased the likelihood of engaging in planning behavior (5.46 vs. 5.20; t = 
1.72, p = .087). No difference emerged, however, for email reminders sent before the optimal 
deadline (5.97 vs. 6.07; t = -.65, p = .519; see Figure 2). 
 
Study 1: Perceived Benefit Study 1: Self-Reported Planning Likelihood 
  
Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for covariates (i.e., current product usage, mean-centered liking of online 
shopping) 
Figure 2 (Essay 1) Study 1 Results Summary 
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.010; Web Appendix A Table 3, model 3) and of timing relative to the optimal deadline. (b = -
.252, SE = .073, t = -3.45, p = .001; Web Appendix A Table 3, model 3). 
Those who received promotional email reminders with planning prompts reported greater self-
efficacy compared to those who received reminders without planning prompts (5.95 vs. 5.76). In 
addition, those who received a reminder after the optimal deadline reported lower self-efficacy 
than those who received the reminder before the optimal deadline (5.73 vs. 5.98). Results show no 
interaction between message framing and timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = .067, SE = 
.147, t = .45, p = .649; Web Appendix A Table 3, model 5).  
2.3.2.4 Self-Esteem 
Results from a linear regression analysis with self-esteem as the outcome variable and 
message framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control reminder), timing relative to the 
optimal deadline (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), current product usage 
(1 = currently has iphone, 0 = does not have iphone), and liking of online shopping (mean-
centered) as predictors found no main effect of message framing (b = .035, SE = .097, t = .36, p = 
.722; Web Appendix A Table 4, model 3) nor of timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = -.082, 
SE = .097, t = -.84, p = .399; Web Appendix A Table 4, model 3). Individuals receiving 
promotional email reminders with planning prompt content reported similar levels of self-esteem 
as those receiving reminders without planning prompt content (5.26 vs. 5.22). Likewise, 
individuals receiving a promotional email after the optimal deadline did not differ from those 
receiving the email reminder before the optimal deadline (5.20 vs. 5.28). Moreover, results showed 
no framing x timing interaction (b = -.118, SE = .194, t = -.61, p = .542; Web Appendix A Table 
4, model 5). 
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2.3.2.5 Internal Locus of Control 
We ran a linear regression analysis predicting internal locus of control as a function of 
message framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control reminder) and timing relative to the 
optimal deadline (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), controlling for the 
previously stated covariates (i.e., current product usage, mean-centered liking of online shopping). 
No main effect of timing emerged (b = .022, SE = .072, t = .30, p = .762; Web Appendix A Table 
5, model 3), with those receiving a reminder after the optimal deadline reporting an internal locus 
of control to a similar degree as those receiving a reminder before the optimal deadline (5.21 vs. 
5.19). However, results found a main effect of message framing (b = .157, SE = .072, t = 2.17, p 
= .030; Web Appendix A Table 5, model 3). Those who received messages with planning prompts 
reported a higher internal locus of control than those who received messages without planning 
prompts (5.28 vs. 5.12). No interactive effect between message framing and timing relative to the 
optimal deadline emerged (b = .068, SE = .145, t = .47, p = .641; Web Appendix A Table 5, model 
5). 
2.3.2.6 Psychological Distance 
Running the same linear regression analysis to predict psychological distance revealed no 
main effect of message framing (b = .022, SE = .110, t = .20, p = .841; Web Appendix A Table 6, 
model 3), but did find a significant a main effect of timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = 
.508, SE = .110, t = 4.61, p < .0001; Web Appendix A Table 6, model 3). Although psychological 
distance did not differ between those exposed to a promotional email reminder with (vs. without) 
planning prompt content (3.59 vs. 3.57), those who received the email reminder after the optimal 
deadline reported greater psychological distance than those who received the reminder before the 
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optimal deadline (3.83 vs. 3.33). The framing x timing interaction was not significant (b = .219, 
SE = .220, t = 1.00, p = .320; Web Appendix A Table 6, model 5). 
2.3.2.7 Deal Fairness 
Conducting a linear regression analysis predicting deal fairness as a function of message 
framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control reminder) and timing (1 = after optimal 
deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), controlling for current product usage (1 = currently has 
iphone, 0 = does not have iphone) and liking of online shopping (mean-centered) revealed no main 
effect of message framing (b = -.009, SE = .089, t = -.11, p = .916; Web Appendix A Table 7, 
model 3), but a significant main effect of timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = -.640, SE = 
.089, t = -7.17, p < .0001; Web Appendix A Table 7, model 3). Consumers receiving a reminder 
with planning content perceived the deal as similarly fair compared to consumers receiving a 
reminder without planning content (5.15 vs. 5.16). However, consumers who received the 
promotional email reminder after the optimal deadline perceived the deal as less fair than those 
who received the reminder before the optimal deadline (4.83 vs. 5.47). No message framing x 
timing interaction effect emerged (b = .247, SE = .179, t = 1.38, p = .168; Web Appendix A Table 
7, model 5).  
2.3.2.8 Moderated Mediation 
Using PROCESS 3.0 (Model 8; 10,000 bootstrap samples; Hayes 2018), we conducted a 
conditional process analysis to examine whether the interactive effect of message framing and 
timing on perceived benefit subsequently impacts likelihood of plan-making. Specifically, we 
tested whether the indirect effect of message framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control 
reminder) on planning likelihood through perceived benefit is moderated by the timing of the 
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message relative to the optimal deadline (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline; 
see Web Appendix A Table 8).  
The index of moderated mediation was marginally significant (b = .181, SE = .099, CI90[.025, 
.353], CI95[-.005, .383]). For those who received the reminder before the optimal deadline, no 
indirect effect of message framing emerged (b = -.036, SE = .052, CI90[-.123, .049], CI95[-.139, 
.066]). By contrast, for those who received the reminder after the optimal deadline, results showed 
a positive indirect effect of message framing on planning likelihood through perceived benefit (b 
= .145, SE = .084, CI90[.011, .288], CI95[-.016, .316]; see Figure 3).  
As a follow-up, we conducted the same moderated mediation analysis as a parallel multiple 
mediator model. Using PROCESS 3.0 (Model 8; 10,000 bootstrap samples; Hayes 2018), we tested 
whether the indirect effect of message framing (1 = planning prompt reminder, 0 = control 
reminder) on planning likelihood through each of the potential mediators (perceived benefit, self-
efficacy, self-esteem, internal locus of control, psychological distance, and deal fairness) is 
moderated by timing of the message (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline; see 
Web Appendix A Table 9).  
Consistent with prior results, the index of moderated mediation for perceived benefit was 
marginally significant (b = .144, SE = .080, CI90[.020, .282], CI95[-.004, .310]). However, no 
effects emerged through self-efficacy (b = .017, SE = .040, CI90[-.046, .086], CI95[-.059, .100]), 
self-esteem (b = .012, SE = .023, CI90[-.022, .054], CI95[-.031, .065]), internal locus of control (b 
= -.0002, SE = .010, CI90[-.015, .016], CI95[-.020, .021]), psychological distance (b = .019, SE = 
.022, CI90[-.012, .059], CI95[-.020, .070]), or deal fairness (b = .040, SE = .033, CI90[-.006, .101], 
CI95[-.014, .118]). 
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Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.001. Analysis conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 8; 
10,000 bootstrapped samples) and with the following pre-registered covariates: current product usage and mean-centered liking of online 
shopping. Index of moderated mediation was marginally significant (b = .181, SE = .099, CI90[.025, .353], CI95[-.005, .383]), with a conditional 
indirect effect emerging after the optimal deadline (b = .145, SE = .084, CI90[.011, .288], CI95[-.016, .316], but not before the optimal deadline (b 
= -.036, SE = .052, CI90[-.123, .049], CI95[-.139, .066]). See Web Appendix A Table 8 for analysis details.  
Figure 3 (Essay 1) Study 1: Moderated Mediation 
2.3.3 Discussion 
Study 1 provides preliminary evidence that the efficacy of planning prompts is temporally 
sensitive. For communications delivered after the optimal deadline (when consumers could obtain 
a reduced discount), marketing messaging with planning prompts increased consumer motivation 
more than marketing messaging without planning prompts, as evidenced by greater perceived 
benefit of engaging in the target behavior (i.e., buying the product at discounted price). However, 
for communications delivered before the optimal deadline (when consumers could obtain the 
largest possible discount), marketing messaging with planning prompts was no more effective than 
marketing messaging without planning prompts in boosting consumer motivation. In sum, the 
benefit of adding planning prompt phrasing to promotional messaging (vs. excluding it) only 
emerged after the optimal deadline had passed. No observable lift resulted from adding planning 
prompt phrasing (vs. excluding such phrasing) in pre-optimal deadline messaging.    
The interactive effect, however, does not emerge for several alternative accounts (i.e., self-
efficacy, self-esteem, control, psychological distance, deal fairness). This result suggests that 
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planning prompts may preserve motivation after the optimal deadline passes more effectively by 
influencing how individuals perceive the target behavior more than how individuals perceive 
themselves. Study 1 results additionally show that this temporally sensitive effect subsequently 
impacts the likelihood that consumers will enact planning behaviors. Although the focus of this 
paper is not on the influence of engaging in plan-making—but rather the influence of promoting 
plan-making—this result suggests that planning prompts’ influence on consumer motivation can 
translate into behavioral intentions. One potential issue, however, concerns the scenario-based 
design of Study 1. Although the sample consisted of consumers actively considering purchasing 
the focal product of the scenario, participants did not actually engage in the target behavior of the 
marketing messages (i.e., buying the product at a discount). To address this, in the next two studies, 
both field experiments, we examine whether this effect impacts real, consequential behavior.  
2.4 Study 2: Lottery Enrollment 
Whereas Study 1 examines changes to consumer motivation as evidenced by greater 
perceived benefit of engaging in target behavior, Study 2 and Study 3 examine changes to 
consumer motivation as indicated by increased enactment of target behavior: lottery enrollment 
(Study 2) and FAFSA submission (Study 3). Study 2 presents participants with the opportunity to 
enter a lottery in which the likelihood of winning decreases over time (visually depicted in Figure 
4). The optimal deadline indicates the last chance to enroll with the greatest chance of winning, 
although participants can still win the lottery by enrolling after the optimal deadline (and prior to 
the terminal deadline, after which participants can no longer enroll). We manipulated both the 
presence of planning prompts (planning nudge vs. control) and the timing of messaging (before 
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vs. after optimal deadline) within the lottery’s description. We framed the next possible 
opportunity for participants to enroll in the lottery as occurring either before or after the optimal 
deadline (i.e., the entry period offering the greatest likelihood of winning). We anticipated an 
interactive effect of message content and message timing, with planning nudges increasing the 
likelihood of lottery enrollment compared to control messaging to a greater degree when 
participants believe they missed the optimal deadline. 
Although the specific lottery design of Study 2 is decontextualized, note that individuals 
often face some kind of lottery when attempting to access critical resources, such as low-cost 
housing and school-choice preferences. For example, with the New York City Charter School 
system, applying earlier can allow parents to enter lotteries for a greater number of schools, since 
deadlines for each school can vary (New York City Charter School Center 2019). 
36 
Study 1 Design 
A. 
 
B. 
 
Study 2 Design 
A. 
 
B. 
 
Study 3 Design 
A. 
 
B. 
 
Note. For each study, Panel A displays the before optimal deadline condition and Panel B displays the after optimal deadline condition. 
Horizontal arrows represent passage of time, and vertical arrows represent when consumer messaging occurs. Darkest shading of the timeline 
(i.e., horizontal arrow) signifies when the benefits of action are greatest (e.g., largest discount, Study 1). Darkest shading of consumer messages 
(i.e., vertical arrows) signifies when message content was manipulated. 
Figure 4 (Essay 1) Study Design 
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2.4.1 Method 
We tested our predictions using a 2 (timing: before optimal deadline, after optimal 
deadline) x 2 (message framing: planning, control) x 2 (incentive size: $5, $20) between-subjects 
design, pre-registered on OSF (https://osf.io/8kjvf). The study sample consisted of MTurk workers 
(n = 920) who were compensated a nominal amount for participating. Despite requesting 1,400 
participants, only 920 MTurkers completed the HIT before the final day of data collection. Because 
we decided a priori to restrict data collection to one week and wanted to avoid introducing any 
confounding influence of collecting data during a holiday, we did not extend recruitment beyond 
our planned data collection period of one week. Prior to analysis, and consistent with the OSF pre-
registration, we excluded participants who reported technical problems or identified as a non-
native American English speaker (n = 16), resulting in a final analysis sample of 904 participants 
(60.84% female; Mage = 39.66 yrs, SDage = 12.11 yrs). 
At the end of an unrelated study and after providing basic demographic data (e.g., age, 
gender, household income), participants learned that they were eligible for a bonus lottery. Each 
participant received an alphanumeric code and had eight days (starting the next day) to enroll in 
the lottery, which consisted of entering the code on a separate website between a specific 
timeframe. Participants could only enter the lottery once, but earlier enrollment earned participants 
extra entries. In four entry phases (each lasting two days), participants could receive 15, 10, 5, or 
1 total lottery entries (see Appendix C for lottery schedule). Participants, however, could not enter 
the lottery until the following day, making the next opportunity identical for all participants (i.e., 
15 total entries). Thus, it benefited the individual to enter the lottery early, but entering at any time 
was better than not entering at all.  
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The lottery was presented with or without planning prompts, depending on random 
assignment. Similar to Study 1, the planning prompts encouraged participants to purposefully 
engage in planning actions, such as setting aside time to enter the lottery (e.g., “Schedule time on 
your calendar”) and making a plan (e.g., “Make a plan now to enter the lottery”). The control 
condition lottery, however, did not include these planning prompts and merely emphasized action 
execution (see Appendix D for stimuli).  
We manipulated timing relative to the optimal deadline by shifting perceptions of when 
the optimal entry period occurs, holding constant all participants’ specific action opportunity (i.e., 
enrolling the next day for 15 entries). Those randomly assigned to the before optimal deadline 
condition received no additional entry information, such that the next available entry opportunity 
(i.e., the next day) is perceived to offer the best opportunity to increase their chances of winning 
the lottery (i.e., with 15 total entries). Those randomly assigned to the after optimal deadline 
condition, however, learned that they had just missed the period in which they would have earned 
20 total lottery entries. Thus, despite having the exact same entry opportunity as those in the before 
optimal deadline condition—everyone could earn 15 entries by enrolling the next day—those in 
the after optimal deadline condition believed that the best opportunity for lottery enrollment (i.e., 
with 20 total entries) had already passed.3 
With respect to the lottery winnings, participants were randomly assigned to either the 
higher-stakes ($20) or lower-stakes ($5) lottery. The lottery’s incentive size was explicitly 
presented to participants when they learned of the lottery. After data collection, we randomly 
selected one winner for both the $20 and $5 lotteries and distributed bonus payments. A pilot test 
 
3 Immediately after learning of the lottery, participants completed two binary choice items assessing general loss aversion, unrelated to the lottery 
(i.e., a gain-framed and a loss-framed risk decision). Results did not show an interactive effect of planning prompts and message timing on 
participants’ general loss aversion (Web Appendix C). Given the timing and generality of measurement, this result suggests that a broad gain-loss 
mindset shift may not occur immediately following the intervention. 
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using the same paradigm (n = 699 MTurk workers; detailed in Web Appendix B) demonstrated 
that the proposed moderating effect of prompt delivery timing did not depend on incentive size (t 
= -.81, p = .419). Consistent with these prior results, we do not anticipate that the moderating effect 
of prompt timing in the current study will depend on incentive size (i.e., no three-way interaction 
between planning prompt, prompt timing, and incentive size). Nevertheless, we retained the 
incentive size factor in the current experimental design for replication purposes and will test for 
the interactive effect of planning framing by prompt timing by incentive size on enrollment.    
Note that the initial survey that manipulated lottery planning prompt framing and timing 
relative to the optimal deadline was administered over seven days. Consequently, we modified any 
dates displayed to participants, as appropriate. As previously stated, we decided a priori to restrict 
data collection to one week. Thus, all subsequent analyses control for the pre-registered covariates 
of day of survey administration (weekend vs. weekday) as well as participant-reported household 
income.  
2.4.2 Results 
Overall, 29.65% of participants enrolled in the lottery (n = 268). We first conducted a 
logistic regression predicting lottery enrollment (1 = enrolled, 0 = did not enroll), testing for a 
three-way interaction between lottery framing (1 = planning, 0 = control), timing relative to 
optimal deadline (1 = after, 0 = before), and incentive size (1 = $20, 0 = $5), controlling for 
participant income (mean-centered) and day of survey administration (1 = weekend, 0 = weekday). 
As anticipated based on pilot results, no significant three-way interaction between incentive size, 
timing, and message framing emerged (b = -.485, SE = .601, t = -.81, p = .419; Web Appendix C 
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Table 1, model 5). Thus, we controlled for incentive size in all subsequent analyses. In addition, 
all reported values reflect covariate-adjusted estimates.  
Conducting a logistic regression predicting lottery enrollment, controlling for the 
previously described covariates (income, day of survey administration, and incentive size), we 
found no main effect of lottery framing (b = .155, SE = .147, t = 1.05, p = .292; Table 4, model 2), 
but a significant main effect of timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = -.443, SE = .148, t = -
2.99, p = .003; Table 4, model 2). Lottery information with planning prompts, relative to 
information without planning prompts, did not increase the likelihood of entering the lottery 
(31.32% vs. 28.14%); however, participants were significantly less likely to enter the lottery after 
(vs. before) the optimal deadline had passed (25.02% vs. 34.13%). 
These were both qualified, however, by a framing x timing interaction (b = .565, SE = .298, 
t = 1.90, p = .058; Table 4, model 4). For participants in the after optimal deadline condition (who 
believed the optimal deadline had passed), the inclusion of planning prompts significantly 
increased the likelihood of entering the lottery (29.55% vs. 20.84%; t = 2.11, p = .035; Figure 5), 
consistent with our predictions. For participants in the before optimal deadline condition (who 
believed the optimal deadline had not yet passed), however, exposure to planning prompts when 
learning of the lottery did not increase likelihood of enrollment (32.97% vs. 35.14%; t = -.49, p = 
.624).  
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Table 4 (Essay 1) Study 2: Binary Logistic Regression Results Predicting Likelihood of Lottery Enrollment 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) 
Timing of Prompt x Message Framing .000 .000 .575~ .565~ 
 .000 .000 (.296) (.298) 
     
Message Framing  .151 .155 -.105 -.097 
(1 = planning prompt, 0 = control) (.147) (.147) (.198) (.198) 
     
Timing of Prompt  -.456** -.443** -.742*** -.725*** 
(1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline) (.147) (.148) (.210) (.212) 
     
Constant -.723*** -.894*** -.602*** -.775*** 
 (.121) (.149) (.134) (.160) 
     
Controls N Y N Y 
Number of Cases 904 904 904 904 
Wald χ2 10.659 15.88 14.441 19.499 
df 2 5 3 6 
p .0048 .0072 .0024 .0034 
Log Likelihood -544.154 -541.543 -542.263 -539.734 
Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.001. Control variables include the following: incentive 
size (1 = $20, 0 = $5), mean-centered income, day of week (1 = weekend, 0 = weekday). 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Study 2’s results suggest that planning prompts delivered after, but not before, an optimal 
deadline, raise the likelihood of completing an economically-consequential task. Specifically, for 
those individuals who believed they had missed the maximally beneficial lottery enrollment 
period, exposure to planning prompts in the lottery’s initial description increased the regression-
adjusted lottery enrollment rate by 8.71 percentage points4 as compared to the description 
excluding such planning prompts. By contrast, exposure to planning prompts in the lottery 
description prior to the optimal deadline offered no added benefit: the planning prompt 
intervention did not influence the likelihood of later enrollment. 
These Study 2 results replicate those of a pilot test using the identical experimental 
paradigm with a different sample of MTurk workers (n = 699; 50.36% female; Mage = 38.04 yrs, 
 
4 Unadjusted estimate increased 8.75 percentage points. 
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SDage = 12.66 yrs; Web Appendix B). Conducting the same logistic regression analyses as Study 
2, the pilot study similarly showed no three-way interaction with incentive size (b = -.485, SE = 
.601, t = -.81, p = .419) but a significant interaction between planning prompt framing and timing 
relative to the optimal deadline (b = .694, SE = .351, t = 1.98, p = .048). In this data, planning 
prompts (compared to reminders without planning prompts) also increased the likelihood of lottery 
enrollment after the optimal deadline (28.50% vs. 17.72%; t = 2.39, p = .017) but not before the 
optimal deadline (29.37% vs. 30.84%; t = -.30, p = .763). Results from a single-paper meta-
analysis (McShane and Böckenholt 2017) using unadjusted values from both Study 2 and the Study 
2 Pilot estimates the aggregate interactive effect to be positive and significant, at .1178 (SE = 
.0447, CI95[.0303, .2054]; I
2 = 0%, CI95[0%, 63%]): although no benefit of planning prompts 
emerges before the optimal deadline (-.0199, SE =.0329; CI95[-.0844, .0445], after the optimal 
deadline planning prompts are estimated to significantly and positively impact enrollment relative 
to simple reminders delivered at the same time (.0979, SE = .0302; CI95[.0387, .1572]). 
An alternative explanation for the results of Study 2 and its pilot, however, could be that 
the optimal deadline manipulation unintentionally impacted understanding of the next enrollment 
opportunity, rather than shifting subjective perceptions of benefit of the next enrollment 
opportunity, as assumed. Results from a follow-up study, however, suggests this is likely not the 
case (Web Appendix D). An independent sample of Mturk participants (n = 865;5 52.60% female;6 
Mage = 38.93 yrs, SDage = 12.30 yrs) imagined the same lottery paradigm from Study 2, in which 
the next action opportunity is objectively equally beneficial for everyone (15 total entries) but 
framed either as being the largest possible number of entries (before optimal deadline condition) 
 
5 Consistent with Study 2, we excluded participants who reported technical problems or identified as a non-native American English speaker (n = 
34), resulting in a final analysis sample of 865 participants. 
6 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 402; 46.47%), “female” (n = 455; 52.60%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 8; .92%). 
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or the second-largest possible number of entries (after optimal deadline condition).7 Consistent 
with the predicted manipulation effect, results show that participants in the after optimal deadline 
condition (compared to those in the before optimal deadline condition) perceived the next 
opportunity to enroll in the lottery as significantly less beneficial (6.29 vs. 6.63; b = -.345, SE = 
.064, t = -5.40, p < .0001; “How beneficial would it be for you to enroll in the lottery the next day 
[DATE]?” 1 = Not at All Beneficial, 7 = Very Beneficial), despite the opportunity being 
objectively equivalent (earning 15 total entries). In addition, this result does not seem to be due to 
systematic differences in participants’ understanding of their next enrollment opportunity: those 
in the after optimal deadline condition and those in the before optimal deadline condition did not 
differ in their understanding of when they could next enroll in the lottery (89.18% vs. 90.45%; b 
= -.140, SE = .226, t = -.62, p = .536; “Because of when you learn of the lottery in the scenario 
([TIME] on [DATE]), you can't enroll in the lottery until the next day [DATE];” 1 = True, 0 = 
False) nor of the objective outcome that could be gained from their next enrollment opportunity 
(85.47% vs. 85.18%; b = .023, SE = .192, t = .12, p = .905; “Because of when you learn about the 
lottery in this scenario ([TIME] on [DATE]), the greatest number of entries YOU could possibly 
get is 15;” 1 = True, 0 = False). Thus, this follow-up study suggests the manipulation used in Study 
2 for timing relative to the optimal deadline was effective in shifting subjective perceptions of 
benefit, without unintentionally impacting understanding of the next enrollment opportunity.  
Taken together, Study 2 suggests that the effectiveness of planning prompts can differ 
depending on whether the intervention occurs before or after an optimal deadline. Although Study 
2 involved an economically consequential outcome and actual behavior, participants may have 
perceived the lottery as somewhat contrived given the broader context in which the lottery occurred 
 
7 For the purpose of this manipulation check, the two additional factors from Study 2 (message framing and incentive size) are held constant in 
this study, such that all participants are exposed to the control messaging (without planning prompts) for a $5 lottery.  
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(e.g., following an unrelated study). Moreover, the act of enrolling in the lottery is relatively 
simplistic. We required participants to navigate a relatively minor procrastination obstacle by 
restricting the specific timeframe during which people could enroll, however, the action itself was 
straightforward. These factors may raise concerns regarding the generalizability of these effects to 
more complex or impactful tasks. Indeed, much of the most compelling prior work on planning 
prompts has been conducted using field experiments in inherently consequential domains that 
involve more complicated action, such as voting (Nickerson and Rogers 2010), preventative health 
(Milkman et al. 2011, 2013), and financial payments (Mazar et al. 2018). Although Study 2 
participants did not know they were part of a research study, an essential characteristic of a robust 
field experiment (Morales, Amir, and Lee 2017), in Study 3 we test our predictions using a large-
scale field study conducted in a naturally-occurring consequential context involving a more 
complex task: applying for student financial aid. 
Study 2: Percentage of Participants  
Enrolling in Lottery 
Study 3: Percentage of Students  
Submitting FAFSA 
  
Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for covariates. Study 2 control variables include the following: incentive size (1 
= $20, 0 = $5), mean-centered income, day of week (1 = weekend, 0 = weekday).Study 3 control variables include the following: in-state status (1 
= in-state, 0 = not in-state), gender (1 = female, 0 = not female), GPA, mean-centered income, and a separate indicator of missingness (1 = 
missing, 0 = not missing) for each covariate (i.e., in-state status missing, gender missing, GPA missing, income missing). 
Figure 5 (Essay 1) Study 2 and Study 3: Binary Logistic Regression Results 
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2.5 Study 3: Financial Aid 
Study 3 aims to replicate the results of Study 2 in a large-scale field experiment involving 
university financial aid email communications and completion of the FAFSA. For many students, 
FAFSA completion is a critical step in the college-going process, as it is used to determine a 
student’s eligibility for federal student aid (e.g., loans, grants, work-study programs), as well as 
state and institutional postsecondary financial aid. Further, many students who might benefit from 
FAFSA completion fail to submit this information: 36% of Pell-grant eligible students, in fact, lost 
an estimated $2.3 billion in financial aid as a result of unfiled FAFSA applications in 2016-2017 
application cycle (Helhoski 2017). Although students can benefit from submitting the FAFSA any 
time during an application cycle, early submission increases access to more financial aid. Funds 
are awarded on a first-come first-served basis, meaning less aid is available for distribution as the 
application cycle progresses, with later FAFSA filers receiving less aid (McKinney and Novak 
2015). 
We partnered with a public higher education institution that processes approximately 
30,000 freshman undergraduate applications per year. The university sent prospective students for 
the 2019-2020 academic year two university financial aid email communications encouraging 
submission of the FAFSA. The institution identified an “early bird” recommended FAFSA filing 
deadline as the optimal deadline, encouraging students to complete the FAFSA prior to this date 
to not miss out on available aid.   
The timing and content of the first email was identical for all students. Sent on the first day 
students could file FAFSA (October 1, 2018), this email not only encouraged FAFSA submission, 
but also notified students of the optimal deadline for doing so (i.e., the university’s “earliest bird” 
recommended FAFSA filing deadline of October 21, 2018). Unlike the first email, in the second 
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email we randomized the inclusion of planning prompts (i.e., planning prompts present vs. absent) 
and the timing of email delivery (i.e., sent before vs. after the optimal deadline; visually depicted 
in Figure 4). We predicted that the benefit of implementing planning prompts will be stronger 
when the optimal deadline has already passed. Specifically, we hypothesize that the timing of the 
second email relative to the optimal deadline will moderate the effectiveness of the planning 
prompts on both FAFSA completion and email engagement, with students receiving planning 
prompts more likely to open the second email and to federally file the FAFSA than those who do 
not receive planning prompts to a greater degree when those prompts are implemented after the 
optimal deadline. 
2.5.1 Method 
This field experiment followed a 2 (timing of second email: before optimal deadline, after 
optimal deadline) x 2 (message framing: planning prompt, no planning prompt) between-subjects 
design, pre-registered on OSF (https://osf.io/htxav). In October of 2018, the Office of Admissions 
and Financial Aid at a large public university sent two emails encouraging prospective 
undergraduate students to complete the FAFSA for the 2019-2020 academic year.  
The first email was sent of October 1, 2018, which coincided with the first date students 
could file the FAFSA. The email reminded students that they could now complete their FAFSA 
and notified them of university-specific FAFSA resources (e.g., financial aid advisor). 
Importantly, this first email additionally informed students of an optimal deadline for FAFSA 
submission. Specifically, the email described the university’s “earliest bird” recommended 
FAFSA filing deadline (October 21, 2018) using both text (e.g., “[UNIVERSITY] strongly 
recommends that you submit the FAFSA by Sunday, October 21, 2018”) and visual (e.g., calendar 
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highlighting the recommended deadline) content (see Web Appendix E for email 1 stimuli). The 
optimal deadline was exclusively presented in the body of the first email and not through any other 
modality (e.g., email subject line, university website), meaning students who did not read the first 
email remained unaware of the optimal deadline. Consequently, prior to analysis, we retained only 
those students with a valid email address8 who opened the first email (n = 12,592). 
The second email contained the same basic FAFSA information as the first email, 
reminding all students of the recommended filing deadline and the resources available to assist 
with FAFSA submission. For those students randomly assigned to the planning prompt condition, 
however, the second email contained a slightly modified subject line and email body that 
additionally included planning prompts encouraging students to engage in planning behaviors 
(e.g., “Make a plan now,” “Put a reminder in your phone or calendar,” and “If you can’t start today, 
then schedule a day when you will;” see Appendix E for email 2 stimuli).  
Delivery of the second email and, therefore, the planning prompt occurred relative to the 
optimal filing deadline identified in the first email (October 21, 2018). Students received the 
second email either the Wednesday before (October 17, 2018) or the Wednesday after (October 
24, 2018) the optimal deadline. The email’s content and subject line reinforced whether students 
missed the optimal deadline, with statements noting whether they “haven’t missed” (before 
condition) or “just missed” (after condition) the early bird deadline, a calendar visually 
highlighting the current date relative to the optimal deadline, and a table of deadlines using 
strikethrough text to denote those that have passed. 
 
8 We removed those with invalid email addresses (n = 85). 
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2.5.2 Data 
Student-level data for both of our primary outcomes of interest, opening email 2 and 
FAFSA submission, were provided by the university’s office of admissions and financial aid in 
February 2019. In total, the data spans from October 1, 2018 until February 3, 2019. Originating 
from the university’s CRM platform, data regarding student email behavior was coded as a binary 
indicator (1 = opened email, 0 = did not open email). FAFSA completion data included whether a 
student formally filed the FAFSA (1 = submitted FAFSA, 0 = did not submit FAFSA) and, if so, 
when they filed the FAFSA.9 Using the date of FAFSA submission, we calculated the number of 
days that elapsed from the first opportunity to file FAFSA (October 1, 2018) until the student’s 
FAFSA submission.   
The university additionally provided demographic data about each student’s state of 
residence, 5-digit zip code, gender, and high-school grade point average (GPA), from which we 
generated covariates for pre-registered inclusion in all subsequent analyses. In addition to student 
gender, which has been traditionally controlled for in work on FAFSA completion, we also 
controlled for high school GPA (e.g., McKinney and Novak 2015). We reasoned that prospective 
students with a higher GPA may perceive a greater likelihood of admission than those with a lower 
GPA and, consequently, influence their responsiveness to emails and recommendations from the 
institution, regardless of content. Prior to obtaining student information, the university converted 
all GPA scores to a four-point scale to allow for comparison across students with different GPA 
formats. 
 
9 During the process of FAFSA filing, students select the postsecondary institutions to which they would like the federal government to provide 
their application. One potential limitation, therefore, is that if a student in our sample filed the FAFSA but did not report the data to our partnering 
institution, we would not observe it in this dataset. 
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Furthermore, we additionally controlled for factors associated with financial need that 
could impact FAFSA-related behaviors, including residency status and household income. 
Because non-resident students pay a higher tuition rate than in-state residents at this university, 
the different financial burden of college enrollment could plausibly influence engagement with 
and responsiveness to university financial aid email communications. Thus, using the student’s 
residency information, we categorized students residing in the same U.S. state as our partnering 
institution (1 = in-state resident, 0 = not in-state resident). To control for household income, despite 
not having student-level income information, we employed a proxy measure based on the student’s 
five-digit zip code. Specifically, we used median household income associated with the zip code 
of residence (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2017) to estimate income.  
2.5.3 Results 
All analyses control for each student’s GPA (on a 4-point scale), in-state status (1 = in-
state student, 0 = not in-state student), gender (1 = female, 0 = not female), and estimated income 
(mean-centered). To retain all student data, analyses additionally included a dummy-coded 
indicator of missingness for each covariate. All subsequent analyses reflect covariate-adjusted 
estimates. 
2.5.3.1 Survival Analysis 
Unlike traditional a logistic regression approach, which only models event incidence, a 
survival analysis approach additionally accounts for the time elapsed until an event of interest. In 
this case, the event of interest was FAFSA filing. With survival analysis, event timing is the 
dependent variable, which we calculated as the number of days that elapsed from the first 
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opportunity to file FAFSA (October 1, 2018) until the student’s FAFSA submission. We right-
censored data for those who did not file FAFSA during our observation period, coding time until 
filing as the maximum number of days observed in our dataset.  
We conducted a Cox proportional hazard regression (Cox, 1972), with days until FAFSA 
submission as the dependent variable and timing of second email (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = 
before optimal deadline), presence of planning prompts (1 = planning prompt, 0 = control), and 
their interaction as primary predictors, while accounting for the previously stated time-invariant 
covariates. Proportional hazard regression analysis estimates students’ propensity to submit the 
FAFSA at a given point in time, conditional on “survival” in the sample up to that timepoint (i.e., 
having not already submitted FAFSA). Resulting hazard ratios greater than one indicate an 
increased risk of the event occurring (e.g., HR of 1.10 represents a 10% greater likelihood of 
FAFSA submission), whereas hazard ratios less than one indicate a decreased risk of the event 
occurring (e.g., HR of .80 represents a 20% lower likelihood of FAFSA submission).  
 In our analysis, we found no main effect of planning prompt (b = .020, SE = .043, t = .46, 
p = .648; Table 5, model 2); student exposure to planning prompts increased probability of 
submission by a non-significant 1.97% (HR= 1.0197). We also found no main effect of nudge 
timing (b = -.016, SE = .043, t = -.38, p = .706; Table 5, model 2); receiving the second email 
reminder after the optimal deadline reduced the probability of FAFSA submission by a non-
significant 1.60% (HR = .9840). 
Although no main effects emerged, we did observe a significant interaction between 
presence of planning nudge content and timing relative to the optimal deadline (b = .187, SE = 
.086, t = 2.18, p = .029; Table 5, model 4). Before the optimal deadline there was no significant 
difference in hazard rates between students who received planning prompts and those who did not 
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(t = -1.15, p = .249). Planning prompts had similar probability of FAFSA submission as no 
planning prompts, with a relative hazard ratio of .9341, indicating that students exposed to 
planning prompts had a non-significant 6.59% lower probability of FAFSA submission than those 
not exposed to planning prompts. After the optimal deadline, however, we found a marginal 
difference in hazard rates between planning prompts and no prompts (t = 1.92, p = .055). The 
hazard ratio was 1.1216, indicating planning prompts increased the probability of FAFSA 
submission by 12.16%. This suggests that when encouraging FAFSA completion after the optimal 
deadline has passed, including planning prompts in email messaging increases the probably of 
FAFSA completion. Before the optimal deadline has passed, however, the inclusion of planning 
prompts does not increase likelihood of FAFSA submission (Web Appendix F Table 2 and Web 
Appendix F Figure 1). 
Additional analysis suggests that this pattern of results may be due to the ability of planning 
prompts to offset the reduced probability of submitting the FAFSA that occurs after students miss 
the optimal deadline. Examining the interaction, results show that students receiving the control 
message after the optimal deadline had a marginally significant 10.65% lower probability of 
submitting the FAFSA compared to students receiving the message before the optimal deadline 
(HR = .8937; t = -1.83, p = .067). By comparison, we found no significant difference in hazard 
rates between planning prompts elicited before versus after the optimal deadline (t = 1.25, p = 
.212). Students exposed to planning prompts after the optimal deadline had a non-significant 
7.75% higher probability of filing the FAFSA than students exposed to planning prompts before 
the optimal deadline (HR = 1.0775). This suggests that reminding students to complete the FAFSA 
after the optimal deadline reduces the probability of task completion (relative to reminding 
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students before the optimal deadline). Post-optimal deadline reminders that include planning 
prompts, however, don’t reduce the probability of FAFSA completion. 
Table 5 (Essay 1) Study 3: Survival Analysis (Cox Proportional Hazard) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) 
Timing of Prompt x Message Framing .000 .000 .175* .187* 
 .000 .000 (.086) (.086) 
     
Message Framing  .056 .020 -.026 -.068 
(1 = planning prompt, 0 = control) (.043) (.043) (.059) (.059) 
     
Timing of Prompt  -.089* -.016 -0.179** -.112~ 
(1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline) (.043) (.043) (.062) (.061) 
     
Includes Controls N Y N Y 
Number of Cases 12592 12592 12592 12592 
Wald χ2 6.215 2284.527 9.894 2287.234 
df 2 10 3 11 
p .0447 < .0001 .0195 < .0001 
Log Likelihood -20150.322 -18525.782 -20148.271 -18523.442 
Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Control variables include the following: in-state 
status (1 = in-state, 0 = not in-state), gender (1 = female, 0 = not female), GPA, mean-centered income, and a separate indicator of missingness (1 
= missing, 0 = not missing) for each covariate (i.e., in-state status missing, gender missing, GPA missing, income missing). 
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Table 6 (Essay 1) Study 3: Binary Logistic Regression Results Predicting Likelihood of Submitting FAFSA (Cumulatively by Week) 
Week 
Submission Date  
Range 
Timing of Prompt x 
Message Framing 
Message Framing 
1 = planning prompt  
0 = control 
Timing of Prompt 
1 = after optimal deadline 
0 = before optimal 
deadline 
Constant 
Controls Wald χ2 p 
Log 
Likelihood 
b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
1 10/01/18 – 10/07/18 .190 (.189) -.005 (.127) -.167 (.137) -6.120*** (.711) Y 596.673 < .0001 -1804.707 
2 10/01/18 – 10/14/18 .121 (.149) -.016 (.101) -.142 (.108) -6.432*** (.578) Y 1123.344 < .0001 -2568.564 
3 10/01/18 – 10/21/18 .130 (.131) -.017 (.087) -.241* (.094) -6.287*** (.501) Y 1658.65 < .0001 -3181.767 
4 10/01/18 – 10/28/18 .132 (.123) .009 (.084) -.141 (.089) -6.267*** (.466) Y 2039.709 < .0001 -3487.615 
5 10/01/18 – 11/04/18 .186 (.119) -.021 (.081) -.153~ (.086) -6.287*** (.450) Y 2298.32 < .0001 -3658.952 
6 10/01/18 – 11/11/18 .246* (.117) -.075 (.080) -.185* (.084) -6.257*** (.439) Y 2511.133 < .0001 -3748.661 
7 10/01/18 – 11/18/18 .265* (.115) -.095 (.079) -.203* (.083) -6.155*** (.428) Y 2676.757 < .0001 -3868.876 
8 10/01/18 – 11/25/18 .264* (.115) -.093 (.079) -.168* (.082) -6.298*** (.426) Y 2817.135 < .0001 -3895.415 
9 10/01/18 – 12/02/18 .275* (.114) -.088 (.078) -.168* (.082) -6.139*** (.419) Y 2908.394 < .0001 -3953.150 
10 10/01/18 – 12/09/18 .320** (.113) -.116 (.078) -.193* (.081) -6.009*** (.414) Y 2962.281 < .0001 -3985.484 
11 10/01/18 – 12/16/18 .286* (.113) -.105 (.077) -.168* (.081) -6.028*** (.412) Y 3039.314 < .0001 -4010.494 
12 10/01/18 – 12/23/18 .284* (.112) -.105 (.077) -.163* (.081) -6.083*** (.411) Y 3072.571 < .0001 -4023.657 
13 10/01/18 – 12/30/18 .260* (.112) -.108 (.077) -.143~ (.080) -6.084*** (.410) Y 3124.622 < .0001 -4032.148 
14 10/01/18 – 01/06/19 .267* (.112) -.111 (.077) -.145~ (.080) -6.089*** (.408) Y 3184.855 < .0001 -4062.224 
15 10/01/18 – 01/13/19 .260* (.112) -.105 (.077) -.146~ (.080) -6.025*** (.406) Y 3198.197 < .0001 -4081.337 
16 10/01/18 – 01/20/19 .250* (.111) -.099 (.077) -.145~ (.080) -6.078*** (.406) Y 3234.963 < .0001 -4083.797 
17 10/01/18 – 01/27/19 .246* (.111) -.105 (.077) -.139~ (.080) -6.185*** (.406) Y 3294.572 < .0001 -4087.458 
18 10/01/18 – 02/03/19 .240* (.111) -.093 (.076) -.144~ (.080) -6.200*** (.406) Y 3311.905 < .0001 -4107.278 
Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Control variables include the following: in-state status (1 = in-state, 0 = not in-state), gender (1 = female, 0 
= not female), GPA, mean-centered income, and a separate indicator of missingness (1 = missing, 0 = not missing) for each covariate (i.e., in-state status missing, gender missing, GPA missing, income 
missing). See Web Appendix G for details. 
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2.5.3.2 Week-by-Week Analysis 
Supplementing the survival analysis, we also conducted a week-by-week analysis of 
FAFSA submission. For each of the 18 weeks of data collected, we coded the total number of 
people filing the FAFSA between the first possible submission day (October 1, 2018) and the end 
of week w (1 = submitted between October 1, 2018 and end of week w, 0 =  did not submit between 
October 1, 2018 and end of week w). Recall that the first email was sent on the first day students 
could submit the FAFSA (October 1, 2018), representing the start of week 1. The optimal deadline 
occurred during week 3 (October 21, 2018). The second email was sent the Wednesday before the 
optimal deadline (October 17, 2018; week 3) or the Wednesday after the optimal deadline (October 
24, 2018; week 4). See Table 6 for the specific dates associated with each week.  
Conducting a series of logistic regression analyses predicting cumulative submission rates 
for each week (w) of the study timeframe (1 = submitted by end of week w, 0 = did not submit by 
end of week w) as a function of timing of second email (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before 
optimal deadline), presence of planning prompts (1 = planning prompt, 0 = control), and their 
interaction, controlling for the previously stated covariates. Because the information provided to 
students was identical prior to the receipt of the second email, we would not expect to observe any 
differences prior to the second email but would anticipate differences after the second email. 
Consistent with this anticipated pattern of results, findings show that a significant planning prompt 
by timing interaction does not emerge in weeks 1 through 5 (p ranges from .120 to .417) but does 
emerge in weeks 6 through 18 (p ranges from .005 to .036; see Tables 6 and 7). For each week 
from week 6 through week 18, which is after the optimal deadline, those students receiving 
planning prompt nudges were more likely to submit the FAFSA than those who did not receive 
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planning prompt nudges. No difference in FAFSA submission emerged before the optimal 
deadline (see Tables 6 and 7). 
Table 7 (Essay 1) Study 3: FAFSA Submission (Cumulative by Week) 
Week Submission Date Range 
 Before Optimal Deadline  After Optimal Deadline 
 Control 
(n = 3,201) 
Planning Prompt 
(n = 3,231) 
 Control 
(n = 3,081) 
Planning Prompt 
 (n = 3,079) 
 % (n) % (n)  % (n) % (n) 
1 10/01/18 – 10/07/18  4.15% (133) 4.27% (138)  3.31% (102) 4.12% (127) 
2 10/01/18 – 10/14/18  7.19% (230) 7.30% (236)  5.91% (182) 6.79% (209) 
3 10/01/18 – 10/21/18  10.56% (338) 10.74% (347)  8.11% (250) 9.32% (287) 
4 10/01/18 – 10/28/18  12.00% (384) 12.44% (402)  10.03% (309) 11.69% (360) 
5 10/01/18 – 11/04/18  13.31% (426) 13.53% (437)  11.07% (341) 13.09% (403) 
6 10/01/18 – 11/11/18  14.43% (462) 14.14% (457)  11.78% (363) 13.93% (429) 
7 10/01/18 – 11/18/18  15.50% (496) 15.01% (485)  12.56% (387) 14.78% (455) 
8 10/01/18 – 11/25/18  15.78% (505) 15.32% (495)  13.11% (404) 15.39% (474) 
9 10/01/18 – 12/02/18  16.21% (519) 15.82% (511)  13.50% (416) 15.98% (492) 
10 10/01/18 – 12/09/18  16.65% (533) 15.97% (516)  13.66% (421) 16.34% (503) 
11 10/01/18 – 12/16/18  16.87% (540) 16.31% (527)  14.09% (434) 16.56% (510) 
12 10/01/18 – 12/23/18  16.99% (544) 16.43% (531)  14.25% (439) 16.73% (515) 
13 10/01/18 – 12/30/18  17.15% (549) 16.56% (535)  14.57% (449) 16.79% (517) 
14 10/01/18 – 01/06/19  17.46% (559) 16.84% (544)  14.83% (457) 17.12% (527) 
15 10/01/18 – 01/13/19  17.59% (563) 17.02% (550)  14.93% (460) 17.21% (530) 
16 10/01/18 – 01/20/19  17.68% (566) 17.18% (555)  15.03% (463) 17.28% (532) 
17 10/01/18 – 01/27/19  17.87% (572) 17.30% (559)  15.25% (470) 17.41% (536) 
18 10/01/18 – 02/03/19  17.99% (576) 17.55% (567)  15.32% (472) 17.54% (540) 
Note. These estimates are not adjusted for covariates. The first email was sent in week 1 (October 1, 2018). The optimal deadline occurred in 
week 3 (October 21, 2018), with the before optimal deadline condition receiving the second email in week 3 (October 17, 2018) and the after 
optimal deadline condition receiving the second email in week 4 (October 24, 2018). A significant interaction between presence of planning 
nudge content and timing of delivery emerged in weeks 6 through 18.  
2.5.3.3 Likelihood of FAFSA Submission 
Overall, 17.11% of students completed the FAFSA and reported their FAFSA information 
to the university (n = 2,155). We also conducted a logistic regression analysis predicting FAFSA 
submission (1 = submitted, 0 = not submitted) as a function of timing of second email (1 = after 
optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), presence of planning prompts (1 = planning 
prompt, 0 = control), and their interaction, controlling for the previously stated covariates used in 
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prior analyses. No main effects emerged for planning framing (b = .020, SE = .055, t = .37, p = 
.714; Table 8, model 2), such that reminders with planning prompts (vs. control reminders) did not 
increase likelihood of FAFSA submission (17.22% vs. 17.01%). Similarly, we observed no main 
effect for timing (b = -.021, SE = .056, t = -.37, p = .709; Table 8, model 2), with students receiving 
the second email before the optimal deadline being equally likely to submit FAFSA as those 
receiving email after the optimal deadline (17.22% vs. 17.00%).  
Results, however, showed a significant planning x timing interaction (b = .240, SE = .111, 
t = 2.16, p = .031; see Table 8, model 4). Prior to the optimal deadline, we found no difference in 
likelihood of FAFSA submission between students exposed to planning prompts and those who 
were not (16.74% vs. 17.71%; t = -1.22, p = .221). After the optimal deadline, however, those 
exposed to planning prompts were marginally more likely to submit the FAFSA (17.74% vs. 
16.23%; t = 1.82, p = .069). This suggests that planning prompts deployed after, but not before, 
the optimal deadline increased FAFSA submission (Figure 5).  
Analyzing the interaction by message content, we find that students receiving email 
reminders without planning prompts were marginally less likely to submit the FAFSA when the 
message was received after (versus before) the optimal filing deadline (t = -1.81, p = .071). 
Messages with planning prompts, however, did not exhibit this pattern. Students were equally 
likely to submit the FAFSA when planning prompts were sent before and after the optimal deadline 
(t = 1.24, p = .213), suggesting planning prompts mitigate the decrement in FAFSA submission 
rates that occurs for messaging sent after the optimal deadline.   
2.5.3.4 Likelihood of Opening Email 2  
Overall, 58.67% of students opened the second email (n = 7,388). Because the timing and 
planning prompt manipulations were embedded within the subject line of the second email, it is 
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possible that planning prompts may differentially impact open rates depending on the timing in 
which the email was deployed relative to the optimal deadline. To test this, we conducted a logistic 
regression predicting student opening of the second email (1 = opened, 0 = not opened) as a 
function of timing of second email (1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline), 
presence of planning prompts (1 = planning prompt, 0 = control), and their interaction, controlling 
for the previously stated covariates.  
We found a significant main effect of message timing (b = .126, SE = .037, t = 3.40, p = 
.001; Table 8, model 6), with students more likely to open the second email when it was delivered 
after (vs. before) the optimal deadline (60.17% vs. 57.23%). There was no significant main effect 
of planning prompt framing (b = -.058, SE = .037, t = -1.57, p = .117; Table 8, model 6);  students 
exposed to planning prompts were similarly likely to open the second email as those not exposed 
to planning prompts (58.00% vs. 59.35%, respectively).  
We found no significant timing x framing interaction (b = -.097, SE = .074, t = -1.32, p = 
.187; see Table 8, model 8), indicating that the inclusion (vs. exclusion) of planning prompt content 
similarly influenced the likelihood of opening the email when received before (57.11% vs. 
57.35%) and after (58.92% vs. 61.42%) the optimal deadline. 
58 
Table 8 (Essay 1) Study 3: Binary Logistic Regression Results Predicting Likelihood of Submitting FAFSA and Likelihood of Opening Email 2 
 Likelihood of Submitting FAFSA  Likelihood of Opening Email 2 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE)  b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) b/(SE) 
Timing of Prompt x Message Framing .000 .000 .192* .240*  .000 .000 -.094 -.097 
 .000 .000 (.095) (.111)  .000 .000 (.072) (.074) 
          
Message Framing  .060 .020 -.030 -.093  -.041 -.058 .005 -.010 
(1 = planning prompt, 0 = control) (.047) (.055) (.065) (.076)  (.036) (.037) (.050) (.051) 
          
Timing of Prompt  -.095* -.021 -.193** -.144~  .101** .126*** .148** .174*** 
(1 = after optimal deadline, 0 = before optimal deadline) (.047) (.056) (.068) (.080)  (.036) (.037) (.051) (.052) 
          
Constant -1.563*** -6.254*** -1.517*** -6.200***  .322*** -1.049** .299*** -1.073** 
 (.041) (.405) (.046) (.406)  (.031) (.336) (.036) (.337) 
          
Controls N Y N Y  N Y N Y 
N 12592 12592 12592 12592  12592 12592 12592 12592 
Wald χ2 5.630 3307.222 9.74 3311.905  8.993 449.051 10.667 450.792 
df 2 10 3 11  2 10 3 11 
p .0599 < .0001 .0209 < .0001  .0111 < .0001 .0137 < .0001 
Log Likelihood -5760.416 -4109.62 -5758.361 -4107.278  -8533.251 -8313.222 -8532.414 -8312.352 
Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Control variables include the following: in-state status (1 = in-state, 0 = not in-state), gender (1 = female, 0 
= not female), GPA, mean-centered income, and a separate indicator of missingness (1 = missing, 0 = not missing) for each covariate (i.e., in-state status missing, gender missing, GPA missing, income 
missing). 
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2.5.4 Discussion 
The results of this field experiment replicate those of Study 2, demonstrating that the 
effectiveness of planning prompt nudges on FAFSA submission differs depending on whether the 
nudge is delivered before or after an optimal deadline. No effect emerged for email open rates; 
however, for FAFSA submission, the interaction between planning prompt nudge and nudge 
timing repeatedly emerged. A basic binary logistic regression analysis found no influence of 
planning prompt nudge prior to the optimal deadline, although including (vs. excluding) planning 
prompts in the post-optimal deadline reminder increased the regression-adjusted FAFSA 
submission rate by 1.51 percentage points10 after the optimal deadline. Survival analysis showed 
no influence of planning prompt nudges before the optimal deadline, but after the optimal deadline 
planning prompts increased the probability of FAFSA submission by 12.16%. A series of week-
by-week logistic regression analysis found that the interactive effect does not emerge until after 
optimal deadline passes (in weeks 6 through 18), further demonstrating the robustness of the 
intervention. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate the differential efficacy of planning prompts 
depending on the timing of their delivery. It is particularly notable that these effects emerge within 
a naturally occurring behavioral context involving highly consequential implications. Moreover, 
the types of financial aid communications modified in this field study are distributed annually by 
the vast majority of US institutions, which suggests that the potential impact of implementing this 
intervention is not only meaningful, but also low-cost and easily scalable. 
 
10 Unadjusted estimate increased 2.22 percentage points. 
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2.6 General Discussion 
Planning prompts can effectively nudge people towards completion of tasks with a terminal 
“final” deadline (Mazar et al. 2018; Milkman et al. 2011; Nickerson and Rogers 2010). Many 
tasks, however, involve a more complex deadline structure that includes an optimal “early bird” 
deadline, indicating the final opportunity to take maximally beneficial action. For tasks containing 
an optimal deadline, when should firms and policy-makers nudge people to engage in plan-making 
behavior: before or after the optimal deadline?  
This paper demonstrates that planning prompt nudges are more effective than simple 
reminders at prompting behavior enactment when delivered after an optimal deadline. Prior to an 
optimal deadline, however, reminders with planning prompts are no more effective than reminders 
without planning prompts. In all studies, the benefit of adding planning prompt phrasing to 
promotional messaging (vs. excluding it) only emerged after the optimal deadline had passed. No 
observable lift resulted from adding planning prompt phrasing (vs. excluding planning prompts) 
in pre-optimal deadline messaging. Results from one experiment and two field studies suggest that 
post-optimal deadline marketing messaging with planning prompts offsets motivation decay to a 
greater degree than marketing messaging without planning prompts delivered at the same time, as 
evidenced by greater perceived benefit of engaging in the target behavior (Study 1) and greater 
enactment of target behavior (Study 2 and Study 3). Study 1 provided preliminary evidence that 
the efficacy of planning prompts is temporally sensitive, showing that post-optimal deadline 
marketing messages containing planning prompts increased consumers’ perceived benefit of the 
retailer’s promotional discount offer. Study 2 showed that post-optimal deadline planning prompts 
boosted regression-adjusted lottery enrollment rate by 8.71 percentage points, whereas the same 
prompt deployed prior to the optimal deadline failed to impact enrollment behavior. In Study 3, 
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which modified the content of university financial aid email communications encouraging FAFSA 
submission, survival analysis demonstrated that exposure to post-optimal deadline planning 
prompts increased the probability of FAFSA submission by 12.16%. Notably, implementing a 
post-optimal deadline planning nudge was no more costly than implementing a simple reminder 
message before the optimal deadline, making these effects essentially costless for firms.  
Our findings extend prior literature on planning prompt nudges, implementation intentions, 
goal pursuit, and deadlines. In contrast to prior work, which has primarily examined terminal 
deadlines, we investigate the efficacy of planning nudges in the context of an alternative, yet 
frequently encountered, task deadline structure—optimal deadlines. Our research not only 
identifies a previously unclassified type of deadline, but also suggests that decisions regarding 
when to implement a planning prompt nudge can dramatically alter the intervention’s 
effectiveness. To date, however, research has generally ignored the temporal dynamics of nudges, 
including planning prompt nudges. This paper advances our understanding of how contextual 
features of the decision-making environment—in this case, temporal features—alter individual 
behavior.  
This research also promotes a broader perspective shift for scholars studying nudges: 
moving from eliciting a nudge effect to maximizing a nudge’s effectiveness. Our findings 
illuminate the potential behavioral benefit of considering not only whether planning prompt 
prompts are effective, but also when they are most effective. Our findings call for research that 
extends beyond a focus on nudge content and seriously considers the timing of nudge delivery. 
Along these lines, future research may consider additionally evaluating behavioral nudges with 
respect to their temporal effects (e.g., “does the effect emerge if delivered in different time 
periods?” “when does the nudge most effectively impact behavior?”). For firms and policy makers 
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intending to use such behavioral interventions, knowledge about their temporal sensitivity can 
meaningfully shape decisions about implementation timing. Thus, similar to Benartzi et al. (2017), 
this paper promotes an alternative approach to evaluating the effectiveness of behavioral 
interventions, one centered on the temporal sensitivity of a nudge’s effectiveness.  
Practically, our findings also indicate that firms and policy makers intending to implement 
nudges will benefit by using strategic, rather than standardized, timing when attempting to harness 
the power of planning prompts. For existing optimal-deadline tasks, this may involve intentionally 
scheduling planning prompt nudges to occur after the optimal deadline has passed, which is 
essentially costless because the firm intends to distribute message at some point anyways. For 
tasks lacking a clear optimal-deadline structure, the same effect may be achieved by generating a 
“phantom” optimal deadline like that used in Study 2 (e.g., notifying people of a fictional missed 
maximally beneficial opportunity and simultaneously encouraging planning behavior before the 
terminal deadline) or by specifying an “arbitrary” optimal deadline like that used in Study 3 (e.g., 
identifying a precise deadline to saliently demarcate a change in procrastination costs that may 
otherwise be ill-defined). In addition, firms can frame a task in multiple ways to shift deadline 
perceptions. Firms nudging people to “get a free flu shot at work” can frame the end of a one-day 
free clinic at work as a terminal deadline by emphasizing benefit of convenience (e.g., last 
opportunity to obtain a free on-site flu shot, after which you will not be able to receive influenza 
immunization for free at work) or as an optimal deadline by emphasizing benefit of vaccine 
efficacy (e.g., best opportunity to obtain a flu shot for maximum possible flu protection is at the 
clinic, after which you can still later get immunized although the delay means you will be protected 
for less of the flu season).  
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  Despite the theoretical and practical contributions of this work, limitations exist that 
represent interesting directions for future research. The focus of this paper involves investigating 
whether the timing of planning prompt nudges relative to an optimal deadline influences the 
nudge’s efficacy. Results indicate that the largest benefit of implementing planning prompt nudges 
(vs. simple reminders) occurs after, not before, an optimal deadline has passed, which is speculated 
to result from planning nudges offsetting motivation decay. Study 1 findings suggest motivation 
preservation occurring though altered perceptions of the target behavior (i.e., perceived benefit of 
discounted purchase) rather than perceptions of the self. Our field studies, however, do not provide 
granular insight regarding the specific psychological mechanisms underlying the motivation 
effect. Future research can formally and directly test for possible process mechanisms in additional 
field studies, potentially identifying alternative ways to achieve the same effect and offering 
additional intervention tools for firms and policy makers. 
Although this paper focuses on planning nudges within the previously uninvestigated, yet 
commonly occurring, task structure of optimal deadlines, this task structure represents just one of 
many possible alternative temporal task structures that may shape nudge efficacy. The tasks 
studied in this paper, despite varying in effort and complexity (e.g., entering lottery code online in 
Study 2 vs. completing the FAFSA in Study 3), constitute single observed occurrences. It is unclear 
whether we would observe the same effect for behaviors that are regularly repeated. A recent large-
scale field study found a null effect of planning prompt nudges on repeated exercise behavior 
(Carrera et al. 2018). For recurring tasks with a repeated optimal deadline structure (e.g., paying 
monthly utility bills), should planning nudges always be implemented after the optimal deadline? 
In providing insights regarding the implementation of planning nudges for tasks involving an 
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optimal deadline, the research also highlights the need to consider other temporal dimensions of 
task structures that could enhance or undermine traditional effectiveness. 
In demonstrating the benefit of implementing planning prompt nudges after an optimal 
deadline, our findings raise additional questions regarding the timing of nudge delivery. The 
present research suggests that nudging plan-making during the post-optimal deadline time window 
can curb procrastination, but how short is this window of opportunity? Research on “teachable 
moments” (McBride et al. 2003) shows individuals can briefly exhibit increased sensitivity to 
health interventions (e.g., smoking cessation) following adverse health events (e.g., new medical 
diagnosis, ER visit; Keenan 2009; Williams et al. 2005). With planning prompts, how soon after 
the optimal deadline should we nudge plan-making? Will the intervention remain effective until a 
terminal deadline? Future research can delve deeper to explore temporal duration elements of this 
effect. 
Finally, we suggest that other nudges merit temporal attention. For example, would social-
norm nudges be similarly effective before and after an optimal deadline? Would default nudges 
demonstrate equivalent efficacy if the choice immediately followed a meaningful temporal marker 
or if the timing of presentation was altered? More broadly, our findings raise questions about the 
inherently assumed time insensitivity of other behavioral economics tools, opening the door for 
future research to reinvestigate nudge efficacy considering the temporal context in which they are 
used. 
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3.0 (Essay 2) Giving Again: Temporal Structure of Initial Contribution Impacts the Size of 
Donors’ Subsequent Gift 
A rich research investigating consumer charitable giving has focused on examining factors 
that stimulate initial contributions (especially from new donors), including persuasive strategies of 
charitable appeals (e.g., Botner, Mishra, and Mishra 2015; Kristofferson, White, and Peloza 2014; 
Macdonnell and White 2015; Savary, Goldsmith, and Dhar 2015; Smith, Faro, and Burson 2013), 
defaulted and suggested donation amounts (e.g., Croson and Shang 2008; Edwards and List 2014; 
Goswami and Urminsky 2016; Smith and Berger 1996), and donor characteristics (e.g., Lee, 
Winterich, and Ross 2014; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012).  
It is critical, however, to understand not only what motivates consumers’ initial donation 
behavior, but also what influences prior donors’ later giving. Very high donor and donation 
attrition rates, averaging above 50% for more than a decade (Levis, Miller, and Williams 2019), 
are particularly problematic considering that repeat donors typically provide a larger source of 
annual revenue for charities (Flannery and Harris 2010) and are generally regarded as more cost-
effective compared to costs of acquiring new donors (Levis et al. 2019). To date, however, there 
is a limited understanding of such subsequent donations or the ways in which successive follow-
up requests can be optimally designed.  
In this paper, we explore how the temporal design of an initial donation experience, referred 
to as the “time architecture” of initial giving, can shape the size of future charitable support. 
Specifically, we consider two common temporal structures: a one-time lump sum donation (e.g., 
$120 single gift) and a recurring donation, in which the identical total contribution is temporally 
dispersed (e.g., $10 monthly gift for 12 months). We argue that, despite the financial equivalency 
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of these initial donations, the differences in their time architecture impact the size of later donor 
support. We find that prior donors whose first (i.e., “initial”) contribution was made as a series of 
recurring gifts later made a smaller second (i.e., “subsequent”) contribution to the same charity 
than prior donors who initially gave the same amount as a single lump-sum. When responding to 
a charity’s next successive donation request, initial recurring donors gave less than initial one-time 
donors, despite being similarly likely as initial one-time donors to make the second donation. 
Consistent with an anchoring account, but inconsistent with predictions based on hedonic editing 
and self-signaling, findings from five studies demonstrate that initial charitable contributions made 
as recurring (vs. one-time) gifts reduced the size of prior donors’ second donation in both simulated 
and consequential donation contexts. When presented with an additional (one-time) charitable 
request, those who made their initial contribution as a recurring gift subsequently gave a smaller 
amount than those initially donated the same amount as a single lump-sum gift. However, 
explicitly cueing donors to a larger anchor and reducing the informational value of the anchor both 
effectively attenuate the effect on subsequent giving.   
The present research makes both important theoretical and practical contributions. This 
paper adds to the charitable giving literature by explicitly examining factors contributing to donor 
attrition and donation deflation. By contrast, most of the existing work has overwhelmingly 
focused on the initiation, not the continuation, of charitable giving. Furthermore, this paper 
identifies time architecture as an aspect of a consumer’s initial donation experience that can 
influence long-term donor support. In doing so, this contributes to the development of a framework 
focusing on subsequent giving. For example, although some research suggests that displaying costs 
in a disaggregated format can increase compliance with initial charitable requests (e.g., Gourville 
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1998, 2003), the present work demonstrates that actually making such disaggregated payments can 
negatively impact subsequent donation behavior.  
In addition, the current research enhances understanding of the processes shaping 
continued charitable giving. In the present case, we find results consistent with anchoring and test 
simple strategies for weakening such anchoring effects. As such, this paper provides guidance 
regarding donation design. With results indicating that recurring donation structures can lead to 
less subsequent giving, charities may benefit from tailored appeals for prior recurring donors, such 
as reminding donors of their cumulative contribution to date when making a later donation request.    
3.1 Time Architecture and Charitable Giving 
3.1.1 Financially Equivalent ≠ Psychologically Equivalent 
Frequently, when making donations (especially online) consumers can opt to make either 
a one-time, lump sum donation (e.g., a single gift of $120 today) or a recurring donation that 
automatically repeats at some regularly occurring interval (e.g., a monthly gift of $10 for 12 
months). Although one-time and recurring donation formats differ with respect to their temporal 
structure, individuals cumulatively donate identical amounts over the same total time period (e.g., 
$120 over the course of the year). The time architecture of recurring donations, compared to one-
time donations totaling the same amount, partitions charitable giving into a series of several 
smaller gifts.  
We argue that despite the financial equivalency of these donation experiences, differences 
in their temporal design render them psychologically distinct. Extensive research has documented 
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such violations of rational behavior in the domain of money, including those resulting from 
differences in presentation format (e.g., Goldstein, Hershfield, and Benartzi 2016; Mishra, Mishra, 
and Nayakankuppam 2006; Raghubir and Srivastava 2002). For example, segregated (vs. 
aggregated) presentation of identical monetary amounts alters the perceived value consumers 
attach to different denominations (e.g., ten $10 bills vs. one $100 bill; Mishra et al. 2006) and the 
perceived adequacy of consumers’ retirement savings (e.g., monthly annuity vs. lump sum; 
Goldstein et al. 2016). Past theory offers three possible mechanisms by which the temporal 
structure of an initial charitable contribution may impact the size of prior donors’ next contribution 
to the same charity: anchoring, hedonic-editing, and self-signaling. We predict, and our findings 
support, an anchoring-based account.  
3.1.2 Size of Prior Donors’ Next Contribution 
3.1.2.1 Anchoring Account: Recurring Donors < One-Time Donors 
With anchoring effects, salient numeric values can systematically bias judgments and 
decisions in the direction of the anchor. In the context of the temporal structure of an initial 
charitable contribution, we suggest that recurring and one-time donation formats provide different 
anchors for prior donors, with recurring donors anchoring on a comparatively smaller amount than 
one-time donors (e.g., $10 vs. $120) and, consequently, skewing subsequent donation decisions in 
the direction of the anchor. Anchoring effects have been observed in a variety of consumer 
domains, including minimum credit card payments (Stewart 2009), online auctions (Kamins, 
Dreze, and Folkes 2004), calorie estimates (Chernev 2011), negotiation offers (Galinsky and 
Mussweiler 2001), price estimates (Nunes and Boatwright 2004), selling prices (Simonson and 
Drolet 2004), and willingness to pay (e.g., Critcher and Gilovich 2008; Gneezy, Gneezy, et al. 
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2012; Jung, Perfecto, and Nelson 2016). In addition, research within the domain of charitable 
giving demonstrates that donation behavior can be impacted by referencing specific amounts 
during a charitable appeal (e.g., Croson and Shang 2008; Desmet and Feinberg 2003; Shang and 
Croson 2009; Smith and Berger 1996). For example, during an on-air public radio fundraising 
drive, mentioning another donor’s contribution amount (i.e., “We had another member, they 
contributed $X. How much would you like to pledge today?”) skewed how much callers gave in 
the direction of the anchor (Croson and Shang 2008; Shang and Croson 2009).  
Multiple psychological mechanisms have been proposed to account for anchoring effects, 
including anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), numeric priming (Wilson et 
al. 1996), selective accessibility (Chapman and Johnson 1994, 1999; Mussweiler and Strack 1999, 
2000; Strack and Mussweiler 1997), and scale distortion theory (Frederick and Mochon 2012). 
Common across these theories is the idea that anchors provide information that subsequently 
impacts judgment and decisions (Turner and Schley 2016). Although scholars debate the specific 
process(es) by which anchoring occurs, the effects of anchoring are remarkably robust. Anchoring 
can occur even when anchor values are incidental to the environment and irrelevant to the 
evaluative judgment (e.g., Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003; Critcher and Gilovich 2008; 
Wilson et al. 1996), with effects that can persist despite explicit forewarning and incentivized 
accuracy (Chapman and Johnson 2002; Epley and Gilovich 2005; Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson 
2010; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Wilson et al., 1996). 
With respect to charitable giving, we contend that donors are more likely to anchor on the 
salient numerical dollar amount associated with their initial donation experience rather than its rate 
of repetition. Numerosity research indicates that numerical values are, by default, more salient to 
consumers than accompanying units (Monga and Bagchi 2012). More broadly, work on temporal 
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sequences finds that people generally neglect the duration of experiences with the most salient and 
most recent events disproportionally influencing judgment and recall (e.g., Ariely and Carmon 
2000; Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993). Thus, recurring donors likely discount the frequency of 
their repeated donations and attend more to the numeric amount of each donation, suggesting 
recurring donors anchor on a smaller value than one-time donors.    
Anchoring can also prime magnitude and activate a general sense of largeness or smallness 
(Adaval and Monroe 2002; Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf, and Brewer 2007), which has been shown to 
distort subjective evaluations of size (Oppenheimer et al. 2007). This suggests that, despite giving 
the same cumulative amount as one-time donors, recurring donors may perceive their total 
contribution as subjectively smaller than one-time donors as a result of anchoring on the smaller, 
separated values. It follows, therefore, that to the extent that prior donors anchor on the salient 
numeric value of their initial donation, future donation support will be skewed in the direction of 
that anchor. Consequently, we predict that initial contributions made in a recurring donation format 
will decrease the size of prior donors’ next donation to the same charity relative to one-time lump 
sum initial contributions of the same total amount. 
3.1.2.2 Hedonic Editing Account: Recurring Donors > One-Time Donors 
The theory of hedonic editing (Thaler 1985; Thaler and Johnson 1990) would predict that, 
holding total giving amount constant, consumers should experience greater prosocial utility when 
their initial donation is broken into repeated installments. Such installments would represent 
segregated gains in prosocial utility (Thaler 1985), and boost happiness in the same way as seen 
in Morewedge et al.’s (2007) work, where consumers experience greater hedonic benefit when 
receiving $5 on each of five days rather than $25 on one day. By contrast, prospect theory predicts 
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that each additional dollar donated in a single occasion lump-sum should provide donors with less 
happiness (i.e., utility).  
To the extent that contributions are experienced primarily as gains, temporally separated 
recurring payments would be expected to heighten consumers’ donation happiness (relative to one-
time lump-sum donations). Therefore, to the extent that happiness is an important “payoff” from 
donating, a recurring donation structure may encourage larger subsequent donations than the 
potentially less-satisfying lump-sum donation structure.  
3.1.2.3 Self-Perception Account: Recurring Donors > One-Time Donors 
Literature on self-perception theory (Bem 1972) and self-signaling (Bénabou and Tirole 
2006; Bodner and Prelec 2003) suggests that people make inferences about themselves based on 
their behavior and decisions. Consumer choices are signals to the self, conveying information that 
can influence one’s self-attributions and self-concept (e.g., Dhar and Wertenbroch 2012; Kahn and 
Dhar 2006). In fact, it has been proposed that self-signaling provides incremental utility 
independent of the outcome utility gained from consumption (Bodner and Prelec 2003). 
Recent work shows that charitable giving serves as a self-signal of one’s prosocial 
character that can increase subsequent donations (e.g., Gneezy, Imas, et al. 2012; Savary et al. 
2015). However, the valence and strength of these signals are susceptible to contextual influences, 
such as content of persuasive appeals (Savary et al. 2015) and personal costliness of prosocial 
action (Gneezy, Imas, et al. 2012). It is possible, therefore, that the structure of one’s charitable 
donation may similarly alter the self-signaling benefits of one’s charitable donation. The greater 
frequency of recurring donations may amplify the salience of positive prosocial self-signals. As 
such, donors may interpret the greater frequency of their charitable donations as a stronger signal 
of their prosocial character or personal commitment to the charity, leading to increased subsequent 
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donor support. Based on this line of reasoning, it follows that, compared to a lump-sum charitable 
contribution format, a recurring donation format will increase future donation support, as a result 
of increased prosocial self-signaling.  
3.1.3 Overview 
In sum, when making subsequent donation decisions, consumers may be influenced by the 
anchor provided from their initial donation structure, the utility gained from the initial donation 
experience (e.g., experienced happiness), or its strength as an identity signal (e.g., perceived 
charity commitment). Fortunately, these various accounts lend themselves to different patterns of 
effects. If, as anticipated, an anchoring effect holds, we would expect to see recurring donors make 
smaller subsequent gifts than one-time donors. If a hedonic-editing or self-perception account 
holds, we would expect to see recurring donors making larger subsequent gifts than one-time 
donors (see Table 9 for summary). Across five studies, we observe a pattern consistent with an 
anchoring account, demonstrating reduced giving of recurring donors as well as moderating effects 
theoretically supporting the anchoring mechanism.   
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Table 9 (Essay 2)  Summary of Predictions for Subsequent Donation Amount 
Theoretical 
Account 
Argument 
Subsequent Donation 
Amount 
Anchoring The numeric anchor provided by the initial gift (e.g., objective size) 
will be smaller for prior donors who initially give in a recurring 
format (vs. one-time format), directionally skewing the size of 
donors’ next contribution.   
Recurring < One-Time 
Hedonic Editing The prosocial utility gained from the initial gift (e.g., happiness 
experienced) will be greater for prior donors who initially give in a 
recurring format (vs. one-time format). 
Recurring > One-Time 
Self-Signaling The strength of the self-signal conveyed by the initial gift (e.g., 
perceived commitment to charitable cause) will be greater for prior 
donors who initially give in a recurring format (vs. one-time format).  
Recurring > One-Time 
 
Study 1 provides an initial evidence that making a one-time lump-sum donation (relative 
to recurring donations totaling the same amount) increases how much the donor gives on 
subsequent occasions, using an online donation scenario. Study 2 replicates this pattern of effects 
with a more consequential design, in which participants experience the temporal structure of their 
initial contribution and make real subsequent donations, additionally providing mediation 
evidence supporting the predicted anchoring account and ruling out alternative mechanisms.  
Study 3 and Study 4 both offer additional process evidence, demonstrating that factors that 
weaken an anchor’s influence also weaken the degree to which recurring donors scale back their 
giving (relative to one-time donors): providing a more favorable numeric anchor (Study 3) and 
reducing the informational value of the initial anchor (Study 4). Using a moderation-of-process 
design (Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 2005), Study 3 shows that reminding prior donors of their 
cumulative contribution to date when presenting a subsequent donation request attenuates the 
observed anchoring effect. Using a measurement-of-mediation design (Spencer et al. 2005), Study 
4 finds a weaker anchoring effect for those less susceptible to the influence of external 
informational cues.  
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Studies 5A and 5B explore the implications of presenting a one-time temporal structure 
when the initial donation decision is made, to circumvent later reduced giving among recurring 
donors by setting a more favorable anchor at the outset. Results from Study 5A find that although 
restricting initial giving to a one-time format can increase the size of a donor’s subsequent gift, 
consistent with an anchoring account, doing so can negatively impact the likelihood of making the 
initial donation. Study 5B suggests that jointly displaying both temporal structures during an initial 
donation request, however, can increase donors’ preference for lump-sum giving, thus offering the 
potential to realize the boost from a one-time donation structure without adversely impacting initial 
donations. 
3.2 Study 1:  ASPCA Donation Scenario 
Study 1 offers preliminary evidence that the temporal structure of an initial donation 
experience shapes subsequent giving in ways most consistent with an anchoring account. In this 
study, participants simulated making an online donation to the American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty for Animals (ASPCA), either as a time-dispersed recurring donation or as a 
one-time lump-sum donation of the equivalent total amount, and then estimated how much they 
would donate on a subsequent occasion and their likelihood of donating.  
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3.2.1 Method 
This study, run in November 2018, preregistered using Open Science Framework (OSF; 
https://osf.io/ecy92/). MTurk participants (n = 344;11 50.0% male; Mage = 37.80, SD = 11.34), who 
were compensated ($.50) for their participation, imagined making an online charitable gift to the 
ASPCA and were randomly assigned to one of two temporal structure conditions: a one-time 
donation of $30 (one-time), or a recurring monthly donation of $5 for six months (recurring). 
Thus, all participants donated identical total amounts (i.e., $30).  
When learning about their donation, all participants viewed a fictitious ASPCA webpage 
displaying their donation structure (see Appendix F for sample stimuli). To enhance participant 
involvement in the scenario study, participants then used a drop-down menu to select the amount 
that they had been assigned  (i.e., $5, $10, $15, $20, $25, or $30) and their assigned frequency 
(i.e., one time, monthly for 3 months, monthly for 6 months, monthly for 9 months, monthly for 
12 months, or yearly) of their donation, mimicking donor actions when making an online charitable 
gift. If this answer did not match their assigned condition, participants were asked to re-read the 
prior screen and only allowed to advance when they had answered correctly. 
All participants then imagined being asked to make a subsequent donation to the same 
charity six months later and reported the likelihood (1 – “Not at Likely,” 7 – “Very Likely”) and 
the amount (US $, open response) they would donate, the order of which was counterbalanced 
across participants. Afterwards, participants completed a three-item index of charity perceptions 
for inclusion as a covariate (“ASPCA supports a good cause,” “ASPCA is a great charity,” 
“ASPCA makes a difference;” 1 – “Strongly Disagree,” 7 – “Strongly Agree;” α = .94). Finally, 
 
11 This is the final sample included in analysis after removing participants based on our pre-registered exclusion criteria (those who identified as 
non-native English speakers or who reported encountering technical problems; n = 8).  
 76 
participants provided demographic information (e.g., income; for survey and stimuli see Web 
Appendix I). 
3.2.2 Results 
We included participants’ income and charity perceptions as covariates in our analyses, as 
past research has shown that individual wealth (Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang 2019; List 2011; 
Piff et al. 2010; Smeets, Bauer, and Gneezy 2015) and attitudes related to the charity and its 
recipients can influence generosity (e.g., Bartlett and DeSteno 2006; Small, Loewenstein, and 
Slovic 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). For the remainder of this paper, all subsequent 
results reflect covariate-adjusted estimates, and all analyses are robust to the exclusion of the 
covariates. 
3.2.2.1 Subsequent Donation Amount 
We conducted a regression analysis predicting prior donors’ subsequent donation amount 
as a function of the temporal structure of their initial donation (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring 
donor), controlling for income and charity perceptions. We observe a significant main effect of 
initial donation structure (b = -13.907, SE = 1.093, t = -12.72, p < .0001), with recurring donors 
making a significantly smaller subsequent donation to the same charity (M = $5.57) relative to 
one-time donors (M = $19.47; see Figure 6). 
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Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for covariates (income, charity perceptions). 
Figure 6 (Essay 2) Study 1: Subsequent Donation Amount 
3.2.2.2 Self-Reported Subsequent Donation Likelihood 
A linear regression analysis predicting prior donors’ self-reported likelihood of making a 
subsequent donation as function of their initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = 
recurring donor), controlling for income and charity perceptions, reveals a marginally significant 
main effect of initial donation structure (b = .329, SE = .178, t = 1.85, p = .066). Prior donors who 
made their initial donation as a recurring contribution weakly anticipated a tendency to be more 
likely to make a subsequent donation (M = 4.49) relative to one-time donors (M = 4.16).  
3.2.2.3 Observed Likelihood of Making Subsequent Donation (Inferred from Amount) 
We first created a binary indicator of whether prior donors made a subsequent donation 
based on the amount subsequently given. Those giving $0 were coded as 0 (“didn’t make 
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subsequent donation”) and those giving more than $0 were coded as 1 (“made subsequent 
donation”). In total, 80.23% of sample made a subsequent donation (n = 276). Results from a 
binary logistic regression with the indicator of additional giving as the dependent variable (0 = 
didn’t make subsequent donation, 1 = made subsequent donation) and temporal structure of the 
initial donation as the primary predictor, controlling for income and charity perceptions, show no 
main effect of initial donation format (b = .118, SE = .298, t = .40, p = .691). Recurring donors 
(81.02%) and one-time donors (79.46%) were equally likely to make a subsequent donation.  
3.2.3 Discussion 
Study 1 finds a robust effect of the initial donation temporal structure on the size of prior 
donors’ subsequent giving. Consistent with our predictions, recurring donors estimated they would 
give 71.39% less than one-time donors to the same charity six months later. This effect is consistent 
with an anchoring account, suggesting that individuals may be anchoring on the most accessible 
numerical value from their initial donation experience when making their subsequent donation 
decision, with individuals who initially gave smaller recurring amounts anchoring on a smaller 
value than individuals who initially gave an equivalent total amount as a larger one-time amount. 
Study 1 also showed weak evidence that recurring donors may believe they are more likely than 
one-time donors to make an additional contribution, although no difference in actual likelihood of 
additional giving emerged, suggesting that individuals may not anticipate the impact of donation 
structure on later giving. 
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3.3 Study 1: Follow-Up Studies 
3.3.1 First Follow-Up Study 
One alternative explanation for recurring donors’ smaller subsequent giving, however, 
could be that the recurring donors assumed that the second donation would also be temporally 
segregated, despite being described as a one-time additional charitable gift. Thus, they may have 
reported subsequent donation amounts representing only a fraction of the true total additional 
amount they are willing to give (i.e., they reported the amount they would give per month or week, 
not the aggregate sum). A follow-up study, however, suggests this is likely not the case.  
An independent sample of Mturk participants (n = 116;12 60.34% male; Mage = 34.85, SD 
= 11.40) were randomly assigned to the same Study 1 donation conditions (i.e., a one-time 
donation of $30 or a recurring monthly donation of $5 for six months) and imagined the identical 
online donation scenario (see Web Appendix I Follow-Up Study 1A for survey details). Unlike 
Study 1, after imagining making their initial donation, participants did not report their anticipated 
donation amount or likelihood to donate. Rather, participants imagined that six months after their 
initial gift they were asked to make a second, additional donation to the same charity. All 
participants imagined making a $5 donation in response to the additional charitable request. 
Participants then indicated how they interpreted their additional $5 donation (“Which of the 
following best represents how you interpreted the statement: You made a $5 donation.”), either as 
a one-time donation (i.e., “This means I made a one-time donation of $5 (i.e., only at the time of 
the request)”) or a recurring donation (i.e., “This means I made a repeating donation of $5 (e.g., 
 
12 This is the final sample included in analysis after removing those individuals who reported technical problems or being non-native English 
speakers (n = 2). 
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monthly for 6 months)”). Afterwards, participants completed the same three-item index of charity 
perceptions used in Study 1 (α = .92) and provided basic demographic information (e.g., income). 
Using the same exclusion criteria and covariates as in Study 1, we conducted a binary 
logistic regression regressing the perceived temporal structure of participants’ additional $5 
donation (0 = one-time, 1 = recurring) on the temporal structure of participants’ original donation 
(0 = one-time, 1 = recurring), controlling for income and charity perceptions. The temporal 
structure of the initial donation did not significantly predict the likelihood of participants 
interpreting their subsequent $5 donation as a recurring gift (b = -.499, SE = .537, t = -.93, p = 
.352; see Figure 7). Recurring donors (12.28%) and one-time donors (18.70%) were similarly 
likely to perceive the second donation as temporally distributed. This suggests that systematic 
misinterpretation of the temporal structure of the additional charitable donation does not account 
for recurring donors’ reduced giving in Study 1.  
3.3.2 Second Follow-Up Study 
Another alternative explanation is that recurring donations do not feel like a “gain” to the 
same degree as one-time donations. Charitable giving technically constitutes an economic loss. If 
individuals perceive donations as losses, prospect theory and hedonic editing predict that lump-
sum contributions would create less pain than recurring time-dispersed giving. Therefore, the 
lump-sum giver, being less pained by their payment, may give more on a subsequent occasion than 
the recurring-payment giver, who experiences multiple acute losses over the course of their 
donation experience. We test this potential alternative account in a second follow-up study. 
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A separate sample of Mturk participants (n = 149;13 42.28% male; Mage = 37.54, SD = 
12.21) imagined that they had completed a Mturk HIT six days ago (see Web Appendix I Follow-
Up Study 1B for survey details). That HIT paid $10, and participants were told they donated a 
portion of their earnings to charity (i.e., ASPCA). The temporal structure of this donation was 
randomly assigned as being recurring or one-time. Participants learned that they either donated $1 
every day for five business days (recurring condition) or donated $5 on the day they completed the 
HIT (one-time condition). Afterwards, participants completed four items measuring the degree to 
which their initial contribution felt like a gain versus a loss (e.g., “Right now, in this exact moment, 
to what extent does your donation to the ASPCA  feel like a “loss” versus like a “gain”? sliding 
scale anchored at -5 = “Complete Loss,” -2.5 = “More Loss than Gain” 0 = “Equally a Loss and a 
Gain,” 2.5 = “More Gain than Loss,” 5 = “Complete Gain”), which were averaged in a composite 
index of gain perceptions (α = .87). Finally, participants completed the same charity perceptions 
index (α = .94) and demographic information assessed in Study 1. 
Employing the same exclusion criteria and covariates as in Study 1, we conducted a 
regression analysis predicting gain perceptions as a function of the temporal structure of 
participants’ donation (0 = one-time, 1 = recurring), while controlling for income and charity 
perceptions. The temporal structure of the initial donation did not significantly predict the degree 
to which the donation was seen as a gain (b = .326, SE = .341, t = .95, p = .342); the “gain” felt 
by making a recurring donation (M = .88) was similar to that of making a one-time donation (M = 
.55; see Figure 7). Moreover, donations were not perceived as an economic loss. Both recurring 
donors (t = 4.10, p < .001) and one-time donors (t = 2.12, p = .036) perceived their donations more 
as a gain than a loss.  
 
13 This is the final sample included in analysis after removing those individuals who reported technical problems or being non-native English 
speakers (n = 4). 
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Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for covariates (income, charity perceptions).  
Figure 7 (Essay 2) Study 1: Follow-Up Studies 
3.3.3 Discussion 
These follow-up studies rule out two possible alternative explanations for recurring donors’ 
reduced giving in Study 1: that recurring donors (1) misinterpreted the temporal structure of the 
subsequent donation as also being temporally dispersed or (2) experienced their donation as less 
of a gain than one-time donors. We find that the temporal structure of the initial donation does not 
differentially influence the likelihood of inferring that the subsequent donation is believed to be 
recurring nor the degree to which one’s charitable giving feels like a gain.  
A. Temporal Structure of Subsequent Donation  B. Perceiving Donation as Gain (vs. Loss) 
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These follow-up studies, however, do not address the concern that Study 1’s donation 
experience was imagined. Despite the prevalence with which scenario-based experiments are used 
to study marketing phenomena, a recent examination of anchoring effects in the lab versus the 
field suggests that hypothetical payments may be more sensitive to anchors than real payments 
(Jung et al. 2016). Thus, a hypothetical donation experience could be stacking the deck in favor of 
results consistent with an anchoring mechanism. We directly address this weakness in Study 2 by 
introducing consequential donation behavior and having donors experience the temporal structure 
of their initial donation.  
3.4 Study 2: Mediation Support for Anchoring Account 
Unlike Study 1, participants in Study 2 experienced the temporal structure of their initial 
contribution and made real subsequent donations. Over a ten-day period, initial donations were 
made as either a lump-sum or recurring gift, after which participants were given the opportunity 
to make a second donation that was deducted from their payment. In addition, Study 2 sought to 
provide evidence of the anchoring process underlying the reduced subsequent giving of recurring 
donors while testing for potential alternative mechanisms. To do this, we measured constructs 
associated with each proposed mechanism: subjective magnitude of initial contribution 
(anchoring), experienced hedonic utility of initial contribution (prospect theory/hedonic editing), 
and altered self-inferences following the initial donation experience (self-signaling). If anchoring 
is driving effects, as predicted, we would expect that individuals who initially gave in a recurring 
donation structure would perceive their total charitable contribution as subjectively smaller than 
those who gave in a one-time donation structure, resulting in lower subsequent support. Moreover, 
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we would not expect mediating effects through hedonic utility or self-inferences resulting from the 
initial donation experience. For the sake of realism, Study 2 also included a condition in which 
recurring donors received an email notification after each donation payment, mimicking online 
payment confirmation that charities sometimes send following each recurring gift, to see if such 
reminders altered our results. 
3.4.1 Method 
In June 2016, Mturk participants (n = 362;14 54.70% male; Mage = 36.15, SD = 12.00) 
learned that as a thank you for participation, donations would be made on their behalf to charity. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three donation conditions: a one-time $.50 donation 
made on the day of the survey; a recurring $.10 donation every other day for ten days, without 
email notifications; or a recurring $.10 donation every other day for ten days, with email 
notifications. Thus, all participants donated the identical total amount (i.e., $.50).  
After learning how their donation was structured, participants selected which of three 
charities (i.e., Habitat for Humanity, ASPCA, Feeding America) would receive their donation, to 
increase participants’ engagement with and attribution of the donation. All donations were actually 
made, in accordance with participants’ charity selections.  
To heighten the legitimacy of the donation and to boost participants’ perceptions of the 
donation as coming from them (rather than the researchers), participants “approved” the donation 
(purportedly in accordance with institutional guidelines). Lump-sum donors selected a statement 
saying, “I am donating $.50 (today),” and recurring donors selected a statement saying, “I am 
 
14 This is the entire initial sample included in analysis after removing those who reported technical problems or being non-native English speakers 
(n = 7). 
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donating $.10 every other day for the next ten days (starting today).” After confirming their 
donation, participants provided basic demographic information (e.g., income). 
Starting on the day of the survey, those in the recurring-with notifications condition  
received an email following each of the five $.10 donations (i.e., every other day). All email 
notifications were identical and simply notified the participant that their $.10 donation had been 
made (see Figure 8 for donation and email schedule). 
 
Temporal Structure of Initial 
Donation 
Day  
1 
Day  
2 
Day 
3 
Day  
4 
Day  
5 
Day  
6 
Day  
7 
Day  
8 
Day  
9 
Day  
10 
Recurring (with notifications) 
$.10 
Email 
 
$.10 
Email 
 
$.10 
Email 
 
$.10 
Email 
 
$.10 
Email 
Subsequent 
Donation 
Request 
Recurring (no notifications) $.10  $.10  $.10  $.10  $.10 
Subsequent 
Donation 
Request 
One-Time $.50         
Subsequent 
Donation 
Request 
 
Figure 8 (Essay 2) Study 2: Email Notification and Donation Schedule 
Ten days later, participants were invited via email to complete a follow-up survey, 
reporting how happy they felt about their donation (1 – “Not at All Happy,” 7 – “Very Happy”), 
how committed they felt towards the charity (1 – “Not at All Committed,” 7 – “Very Committed”), 
and how large they perceived their donation to be (“How much did you donate?” 0 – “Very Little,” 
100 – “Very Much”), the order of which was randomized. Participants were then given the 
opportunity to donate a portion of their participation payment to the same charity on a sliding scale, 
ranging from $.00 to $.50 (see Web Appendix J for time 1 survey and Web Appendix K for time 
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2 survey). In total, 79.28% of the original sample (n = 287; 56.45% male; Mage = 36.71, SD = 
11.60) completed the follow-up survey, representing our final sample.15  
3.4.2 Results 
3.4.2.1 Subsequent Donation Amount 
We first conducted a regression analysis predicting how much prior donors subsequently 
give as a function of the temporal structure of their initial donation (dummy-coded as recurring 
without notifications: 0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring w/out notifications; and recurring with 
notifications: 0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring w/notifications), while controlling for participant 
income. Results revealed a marginally significant direct effect of initial donation structure on 
subsequent donation amount (F(2,283) = 2.66, p = .072). Both recurring donors receiving 
notifications (M = $.09; b = -.044, SE = .021, t = -2.03; p = .043) and those not receiving 
notifications (M = $.09; b = -.042, SE = .021, t = -1.95; p = .052) gave less than one-time donors 
(M = $.13) to the same charity 10 days later (see Figure 9). Recurring donors with notifications 
donated a similar amount as recurring donors without notifications (b = -.002, SE = .022, t = -.09, 
p = .926). 
 
15 Attrition did not vary by temporal structure of initial donation (ꭓ2 (2) = .86, p = .651). Recurring donors who received a reminder (76.73%; b = -
.266, SE = .318, t = -.84, p = .403) and recurring donors who did not receive a reminder (80.65%; b = -.031, SE = .329, t =  -.09, p =.926) were 
similarly likely to complete the follow-up survey as one-time donors (81.12%). 
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Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for covariate (income). 
Figure 9 (Essay 2) Study 2: Subsequent Donation Amount 
3.4.2.2 Perceived Donation Size 
Conducting a linear regression analysis using the same two dummy-coded indicators of 
temporal structure from the previous analysis to predict perceived subjective size of participants’ 
initial donation, controlling for income, reveals a significant main effect of initial donation 
structure (F(2, 283) = 5.99, p = .003). Contrasts show that recurring donors who received a 
reminder (M = 14.72; b = -10.433, SE = 3.177, t = -3.28; p = .001) perceived their donation as 
significantly smaller than one-time lump-sum donors (M = 25.15). Similarly, recurring donors 
who did not receive a reminder (M = 17.07; b = -8.080, SE = 3.153, t = -2.56; p = .011) also 
perceived their donation as significantly smaller relative to one-time donors. No difference 
emerged with respect to perceived donation size between recurring donations with and without 
reminders (b = -2.353, SE = 3.192, t = -.74, p = .462). Thus, although all participants gave the 
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same total amount for their initial donation (i.e., $.50), lump-sum donors perceived their initial 
charitable contributions as subjectively larger than recurring donors. 
3.4.2.3 Experienced Happiness 
A regression analysis predicting happiness experienced from donors’ initial contribution 
as a function of temporal structure of the initial donation (again using the two dummy-coded 
indicators of temporal structure from the prior analyses), controlling for income, revealed no 
significant main effect of initial donation structure (F(2,283) = .02, p = .984). Neither recurring 
donors receiving notifications (M = 5.57; b = .022, SE = .190, t = .12 ; p = .906) nor recurring 
donors not receiving notifications (M = 5.54; b = -.012, SE = .189, t = -.06; p = .951) differed from 
one-time donors (M = 5.55) in the happiness they experienced from their initial donation. In 
addition, recurring donors with notifications and recurring donors without notifications did not 
differ in their experienced donation happiness (b = .034, SE = .191, t = .18, p = .858). 
3.4.2.4 Charity Commitment 
A linear regression analysis predicting donors’ charity commitment as a function of 
temporal structure of the initial donation (using the same two dummy-coded indicators of temporal 
structure), while controlling for income, did not show a significant main effect of donation 
structure (F(2,283) = 1.30, p = .275). Results suggest that after making their initial donations, 
neither recurring donors receiving notifications (M = 4.53; b = -.397, SE = .335, t = -1.19; p = 
.237) nor recurring donors not receiving notifications (M = 5.05; b = .121, SE = .332, t = .37; p = 
.715) experienced different levels of charity commitment relative to one-time lump-sum donors 
(M = 4.92). Those making recurring donations with notifications and those making recurring 
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donations without notifications did not differ in their level of commitment (b = -519, SE = .337, t 
= -1.54, p = .124). 
3.4.2.5 Mediation 
Using PROCESS 3.0 (Model 4; 10,000 bootstrap samples; Hayes 2018), we ran a parallel 
multiple mediator model that simultaneously examined the indirect effect of the initial donation’s 
temporal structure on the amount of subsequent charitable support through each of the proposed 
mediators (i.e., experienced happiness from the initial contribution, perceived size of the initial 
contribution, and perceptions of charity commitment). Donation structure was coded as a multi-
categorical predictor, which generated two dummy variables: one comparing recurring donation 
without reminders to the one-time donation (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring w/out notifications) 
and the other comparing recurring donation with reminders to the one-time condition (0 = one-
time donor, 1 = recurring w/notifications).  
Results show a significant, negative indirect effect of donation structure on subsequent 
donation amount through the perceived size of the initial donation. Relative to one-time donors, 
recurring donors who received notifications perceived their initial charitable giving as smaller, 
resulting in a smaller second donation (b = -.012, SE = .007, CI95[-.029, -.001]; see Figure 10 and 
Appendix G). Likewise, recurring donors who did not receive a notification also made a smaller 
second donation than one-time donors because they perceived their initial donation as smaller (b 
= -.009, SE = .006, CI95[-.025, -.0004]). 
No significant mediating effects, however, emerged through experienced happiness. The 
smaller subsequent donation of recurring donors who received notifications (b = .0003, SE = .003, 
CI95[-.005, .006]) and recurring donors who did not receive notifications (b = -.0001, SE = .003, 
CI95[-.006, .006]), relative to one-time donors, was not due to differences in experienced happiness 
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from the initial donation. In addition, results showed no indirect effect of donation structure 
through charity commitment. Recurring donors who received notifications (b = -.005, SE = .005, 
CI95[-.015, .003]) and recurring donors who did not receive notifications (b = .002, SE = .004, 
CI95[-.007, .011]) did not give less than one-time donors because of differences in inferred charity 
commitment. Thus, neither experienced happiness from the initial contribution nor perceptions of 
charity commitment account for the indirect effect of donation structure on the size of later 
donation support.  
 
 
Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 4; 10,000 
bootstrapped samples), with a multicategorical IV (D1: 0 = one-time donation, 1 = recurring donation with notification; D2: 0 = one-time 
donation, 1 = recurring donation without notification) controlling for income. Indirect effects only emerged through perceived size of initial 
donation (D1: b = -.012, SE = .007, CI95[-.029, -.001]; D2: b = -.009, SE = .006, CI95[-.025, -.0004]). 
Figure 10 (Essay 2) Study 2: Parallel Mediation Analysis 
3.4.2.6 Observed Likelihood of Making Subsequent Donation (Inferred from Amount) 
To test for differences in the likelihood of making a subsequent donation, we generated a 
binary indicator of additional giving based on the size of prior donors’ additional contribution (0 
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= didn’t make subsequent donation, 1 = made subsequent donation). In total, 54.01% of the final 
sample made a subsequent donation (n = 155). Results from a binary logistic regression analysis 
predicting whether prior donors made a subsequent donation as a function of the temporal structure 
of their initial donation (dummy-coded as recurring without notifications: 0 = one-time donor, 1 = 
recurring w/out notifications; and recurring with notifications: 0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring 
w/notifications), while controlling for participant income, show no main effect of initial donation 
format (ꭓ2(2) = 2.86, p = .240). This suggests that recurring donors who received notifications 
(47.31%), recurring donors who did not receive notifications (54.99%), and one-time donors 
(59.38%) were equally likely to make a second, subsequent donation. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Despite giving the financially equivalent total donation amount, recurring donors perceived 
the subjective size of their initial contribution as significantly smaller than one-time donors, which 
subsequently reduced the size of their subsequent donation to the same charity. This mediating 
effect, however, did not emerge through either experienced happiness from the initial donation or 
self-perceptions of charity commitment. Taken together, these results are more consistent with an 
anchoring explanation than the proposed mechanisms derived from the hedonic editing and self-
signaling literatures. Recurring donors appear to anchor on the amount of their repeated donation 
rather than on the cumulative amount they have donated to date, such that perceived magnitude of 
their total contribution is subjectively smaller than one-time donors, resulting in reduced future 
charitable support (but not reduced likelihood). Study 2, therefore, replicates the results of Study 
1 using actual charitable contributions and provides mediation evidence of the psychological 
process underlying the observed anchoring effect. Moreover, Study 2 suggests that recurring 
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donation notifications do not exacerbate this effect, finding no evidence that recurring donors who 
received email reminders perceived the subjective size of their initial contribution or subsequently 
gave less than recurring donors who did not receive email reminders.  
Although participants’ subsequent, additional donation to the charity was deducted from 
their payment, one potential limitation of Study 2 is the initial donation was not voluntarily chosen 
or personally costly. Consequently, donors may have experienced less personal responsibility for 
the initial contribution, thereby weakening the potential hedonic benefits and self-signaling utility. 
There is some research suggesting that individuals’ prosocial responses depend on whether 
donation “costs” are actually incurred, or independent from, participation compensation (e.g., 
Gneezy, Imas, et al. 2012). Although we do not anticipate that this substantively impacted the 
results given that the initial donations were made independent of participant payment for all 
conditions, this does represent a potential weakness—one that we address in Study 3 by presenting 
the initial donation as noncompulsory and personally costly.  
3.5 Study 3: Shifting Attention to Alternative Anchor 
Study 3 uses a moderation-of-process design (Spencer et al. 2005) to test for additional 
process evidence consistent with the anchoring account. If anchoring is driving previously 
observed effects, then factors that weaken the initial anchor’s influence should also weaken the 
degree to which recurring donors scale back their giving relative to one-time donors. Study 3 tests 
whether shifting recurring donors’ attention to a larger anchor—specifically, their cumulative 
contribution—moderates the effect.  
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If recurring donation structures reduce subsequent support because the prior donors are 
anchoring on a smaller value, it follows that anchoring on a comparably larger value should 
attenuate this effect. To test this, Study 3 manipulated the salience of donors’ cumulative initial 
contribution, reminding participants of their total amount donated to date before making their 
subsequent donation. We argue that presenting the cumulative donation amount when donors are 
asked to make a second donation provides a new numeric anchor, such that recurring donors who 
would otherwise anchor on a smaller repeated donation amount will instead anchor on a larger 
value that is equivalent to that on which lump-sum donors are anchoring. When the cumulative 
donation amount is not presented, we anticipate that results will replicate the previous pattern of 
findings: one-time donors will subsequently give more than recurring donors. However, when the 
cumulative donation amount is presented, we predict that the difference in the size of subsequent 
donations between one-time donors and recurring donors will be attenuated. In sum, we 
hypothesize that presenting donors’ cumulative contribution during a subsequent donation request 
will reduce the negative impact of a recurring donation structure (relative to a one-time lump sum 
donation structure) on the size of charitable support.  
Study 3 also addresses potential methodological concerns from Study 2 regarding 
participants’ initial donations. Both Study 2 and Study 3 constitute consequential designs, as 
participants experienced the temporal structure of their initial contribution and made real 
subsequent donations. Study 3 further enhances experimental realism, with participants actively 
choosing to make an initial donation by spending additional time completing a separate research 
task that directly results in a financial donation (the structure of which was randomly determined). 
Thus, the initial donations in Study 3 are both voluntary and consequential.  
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3.5.1 Method 
The study was administered in February 2017 and the paradigm was similar to that of Study 
2, with the notable exception of how initial donations were made. Following an unrelated study, 
Mturk participants learned that they could make a charitable contribution by completing an 
additional task. Those who volunteered (n = 255; 39.61% male; Mage = 41.20, SD = 13.84) spent 
approximately five minutes on the charity task, after which they learned how their donation was 
structured. Given same pattern of results emerged in Study 2 for both recurring donation conditions 
(with and without notifications), the current study did not include notifications for recurring 
donors. Thus, participants were randomly assigned to either the one-time lump-sum or the 
recurring-no notifications condition. Similar to Study 2, participants in the lump-sum condition 
read that a donation of $.50 would be made that day, whereas participants in the recurring donation 
condition read that a recurring donation of $.10 would be made every other day for ten days, 
starting that day. Thus, in total, all participants donated the same cumulative amount (i.e., $.50). 
After learning how their donation was structured, participants selected which of three charities 
would receive their donation (i.e., Habitat for Humanity, ASPCA, Feeding America) and 
“approved” their donation (see Web Appendix L for time 1 survey). 
Ten days later, these volunteers were invited to complete a follow-up survey in which they 
were given the opportunity to make a subsequent donation to the same charity. Those randomly 
assigned to the cumulative anchor condition read, “To date, you have donated $.50 to [charity 
name],” whereas those in the no cumulative anchor condition were not presented with this 
information. All participants were then asked how much of their payment they would be willing 
to donate to the same charity (open response), which was deducted from their earnings (see Web 
Appendix M for time 2 survey). Participants then completed an attention check asking participants 
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to identify the charity to which they made their initial donation. Only those who correctly answered 
this item were included in analyses (n = 193; 41.97% male; Mage = 41.25, SD = 13.64),
16 reflecting 
75.69% of the original sample.17  
3.5.2 Results 
3.5.2.1 Subsequent Donation Amount 
We conducted a regression analysis testing the influence of temporal structure of initial 
donation (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring), cumulative donation anchor (0 = not present, 1 = 
present), and their interactive effect, controlling for participants’ income, on the size of 
participants’ subsequent donations.  Results show no main effect of providing a cumulative 
donation reminder (b = .008, SE = .024, t = .31, p = .756), nor a main effect of temporal structure 
of the initial donation (b = -.016, SE = .024, t = -.68, p = .497). These were qualified, however, by 
a marginal interaction between donation structure and cumulative anchor on the size of 
participants’ subsequent donations (b = .083, SE = .048, t = 1.74, p = .084).  
When the cumulative anchor was not presented, recurring donors made smaller subsequent 
donations (M = $.11) than one-time donors (M = $.17; b = -.058, SE = .034, t = -1.72, p = .088), 
replicating prior findings. However, reminding recurring donors of their cumulative charitable 
contribution mitigated this effect, with no difference emerging between the amount given by 
recurring donors (M = $.15) and that given by one-time donors (M = $.13; b = .025, SE = .034, t 
= .73, p = .465; see Figure 11). Thus, consistent with our predictions, reminding donors of their 
 
16 This is the final sample included in analysis, after removing those who failed attention check (n = 10).  
17 Attrition did vary by temporal structure of initial donation (b = .645, SE = .301, t = 2.14, p = .032), with recurring donors (81.33%) more likely 
to complete the follow-up survey than one-time donors (69.89%). 
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total prior contribution when making an additional charitable request reduced the difference in 
subsequent donation size between lump-sum and recurring donors. 
3.5.2.2 Observed Likelihood of Making Subsequent Donation (Inferred from Amount) 
In total, 59.59% of participants in the final sample made an additional charitable 
contribution (n = 115). We first recoded the additional amount donated into a binary indicator of 
whether a donation was made (0 = didn’t make subsequent donation, 1 = made subsequent 
donation). Using this indicator as the dependent variable, we conducted a binary logistic regression 
with temporal structure of initial donation (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring), cumulative donation 
reminder (0 = not present, 1 = present), and their interactive effect as predictors, controlling for 
participants’ income. The interactive effect found for donation amount did not emerge for donation 
likelihood (b = .846, SE = .601, t = 1.41, p = .160). In addition, results show no main effect of 
initial donation format (b = -.190, SE = .298, t = -.64, p = .523), with recurring donors (57.54%) 
and one-time donors (62.07%) similarly likely to make a subsequent donation. There was also no 
main effect of cumulative reminder (b = -.376, SE = .300, t = -1.25, p = .210). Receiving a reminder 
(55.16%) did not increase likelihood to donate, compared to not receiving reminder (64.15%).  
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Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for covariate (income). 
Figure 11 (Essay 2) Study 3: Impact of Displaying Cumulative Donation Amount on Subsequent Donation 
Amount 
3.5.3 Discussion 
Study 3 shows that providing recurring donors with a larger anchor by reminding them of 
their cumulative contribution can mitigate the negative impact on subsequent charitable support. 
When no cumulative contribution reminder was presented, recurring donors gave 35.29% less than 
one-time donors, replicating the pattern of prior results. However, when presented with the 
cumulative contribution reminder at the time of the second donation request, recurring and one-
time donors exhibited no difference in the size of their subsequent contributions. Consistent with 
the previous two studies, however, we found no evidence that the temporal structure of the initial 
charitable contribution influenced the likelihood of making a second donation. This suggests that 
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initial donations made in a recurring format (vs. a one-time format) reduce the size, but not the 
likelihood, of a subsequent gift. Thus, this study not only further supports an anchoring account, 
it also identifies one possible method by which nonprofits can disrupt recurring donors’ gift 
reduction in response to later charitable requests – reminding donors of the totality of their recent 
prior giving. 
3.6 Study 4: Reduced Informational Value of Anchor 
Study 4 sought to replicate the previous pattern of results in a different donation context 
(giving to religious congregation) and provide addition process evidence using a measurement-of-
mediation design (Spencer et al. 2005). Unlike the prior studies, in which the cumulative initial 
donation amount was held constant across participants, participant-provided estimates of giving 
were used in Study 4 to calculate the total initial contribution amount. This allowed us to explore 
whether the objective size of the initial amount moderates the previously demonstrated effect of 
the temporal donation structure on the size of subsequent giving. Because the relative difference 
in perceived magnitude may be minimized with smaller charitable gifts, the reduced subsequent 
giving of recurring donors (vs. one-time donors) may attenuate when the total initial contribution 
amount is relatively small. To examine this possibility, Study 4 tests for the interactive effect of 
total initial donation amount and initial donation structure on the size of subsequent giving.  
To test the proposed anchoring process, Study 4 examines whether recurring donors’ 
reduced giving can be attenuated when individuals possess strong internal sources of alternate 
anchors. Prior research has demonstrated that susceptibility to anchoring effects diminishes when 
individuals engage in less inference-making, such as when the consumer is more knowledgeable 
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about the domain (Smith, Windschitl, and Bruchmann 2013) or when the consumption context 
provides less ambiguous information (Naylor, Lamberton, and Norton 2011). In such cases, 
individuals rely on internal anchors, making externally-provided anchors less informative. If 
anchoring is driving recurring donors’ reduced giving, then we would expect to observe this effect 
weaken among those who derive little informational value from the anchor. In Study 4, which 
involves donating to a religious congregation, this would include those high in religiosity, whose 
giving is driven by internal norms and perceptions. Thus, Study 4 tests whether the previously 
described interactive effect of total initial donation amount and initial donation structure is 
conditional on religiosity, predicting that effects will be weaker among high-religiosity donors.  
3.6.1 Method 
Study 4 involved donating to a religious congregation. Historically, religious congregations 
have received the largest share of charitable giving in the U.S. (Giving USA 2017). Due to the 
nature of this scenario, the sample consisted only of individuals who reported giving money to a 
religious congregation. To determine eligibility, in April 2019 respondents first indicated their 
religious affiliation (“What is your present religion, if any? Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, 
Mormon, Orthodox such as Greek or Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, 
agnostic, something else, or nothing in particular?”); those who selected “atheist,” “agnostic,” or 
“nothing in particular” did not continue in this study. Respondents then estimated their monthly 
giving to their religious congregation (“Approximately how much do you give per month, on 
average, to your religious congregation (e.g., church, synagogue, or mosque)?”). Those who 
reported making no donation did not continue with this study.  
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Eligible Mturk participants (n = 145;18 47.59% male; Mage = 41.21, SD = 13.55), 
compensated ($.50) for their participation, were randomly assigned to one of two temporal 
structure conditions: a one-time donation (one-time) or a recurring weekly donation (recurring). 
Using the participant’s previously-provided monthly donation, we presented participants with a 
summary of their charitable giving over the past year estimated either in terms of the year (one-
time condition) or the week (recurring condition): “This means you’ve donated about $[X] to your 
religious congregation [in total/each week] over the last year.” 
Participants then imagined attending a special congregation event in which a one-time 
offering is taken up to support a specific upcoming congregation project. We asked participants 
how much they would give (as a one-time donation amount) at this event. Along with this donation 
request, participants were reminded of their prior donation (“Given that you’ve donated $[X] to 
your religious congregation in total/each week] over the last year, how much would you donate at 
the congregation event?” Additional one-time donation amount $____; see Web Appendix N for 
survey and stimuli). We then assessed participants’ religiosity using a 10-item index (Worthington 
et al. 2003) previously used to measure consumers’ sense of chronic religiosity (Grewal, Wu, and 
Cutright 2019). Afterwards, participants indicated their household income and other basic 
demographic items. 
3.6.2 Results 
Prior to conducting primary analyses, we first tested whether the temporal structure of the 
initial donation had an unintended impact on self-reported religiosity. Results from a regression 
 
18 This is the final sample included in analysis after removing those who identified as a non-native English speaker, who reported encountering 
technical problems, or indicated a subsequent donation amount greater than three standard deviations above the mean (n = 3).  
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analysis predicting religiosity as a function of initial donation structure (0 = one-time, 1 = 
recurring) controlling for size of initial donation amount and income, found no main effect of 
temporal structure (b = .110, SE = .166, t = .66, p = .508). Recurring donors (M = 3.511) and one-
time donors (M = 3.401) reported similar levels of religiosity. 
3.6.2.1 Subsequent Donation Amount 
Using PROCESS 3.0 (model 3, 10,000 bootstrapped samples; Hayes 2018), we conducted 
a regression analysis predicting the subsequent donation amount as a function of the presented 
temporal structure of initial donation (0 = one-time, 1 = recurring), estimated monthly donation 
amount reported by participants, religiosity, and their interactive effects, while controlling for 
participant income. Results show a marginal main effect of the initial amount given (b = .049, SE 
= .029, t = 1.69, p = .093), a marginal main effect of donation structure (b = -13.067, SE = 7.309, 
t = -1.79, p = .076), and a marginal main effect of religiosity (b = 6.329, SE = 3.695, t = 1.71, p = 
.089). These results, however, are qualified by a significant three-way interaction between 
temporal structure of the initial donation, religiosity, and the size of the initial donation (b = .195, 
SE = .087, t = 2.24, p = .027; see Appendix H).  
Spotlight analysis, using the 16th and 84th percentiles (Hayes 2018), indicates that the 
temporal structure x initial amount donated interaction is conditional on the donor’s level of 
religiosity. For those low in religiosity, the two-way interaction between temporal structure and 
initial donation amount was significant and negative (b = -.554, p = .004; see Figure 12). As with 
prior studies, recurring donors gave less than one-time donors, and this difference increased with 
larger initial donation amounts. However, for donors high in religiosity, this interactive effect was 
not significant (b = -.067, p = .404), consistent with our prediction. 
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3.6.2.2 Observed Likelihood of Making Subsequent Donation (Inferred from Amount) 
In total, 93.79% of final sample (n = 136) made a subsequent donation. After recoding 
donation amount into a binary indicator (0 = didn’t make subsequent donation, 1 = made 
subsequent donation), we conducted a binary logistic regression with temporal structure of initial 
donation (0 = one-time, 1 = recurring), estimated monthly donation amount reported by 
participants, religiosity, and their interactive effects as predictors, while controlling for participant 
income. The three-way interaction from the prior analysis did not emerge (b = .1243, SE = 19.295, 
t = .01, p = .995) and the set of two-way interactions did not converge. Results do, however, show 
a significant main effect of religiosity (b = 1.144, SE = .511, t = 2.24, p = .025), with more religious 
donors more likely to make a subsequent donation. In addition, we found a main effect of initial 
donation amount (b = -.010, SE = .003, t = -3.52, p < .001), suggesting larger initial contributions 
decrease the likelihood of making a subsequent donation. We observed no main effect of temporal 
structure of the initial donation (b = 1.054, SE = .905, t = 1.16, p = .244), with recurring donors 
(95.85%) and one-time donors (91.61%) equally likely to make a subsequent donation. 
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      Low Religiosity            High Religiosity 
  
Note. Conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 3; 10,000 bootstrapped samples), with 16th and 84th percentiles for spotlight analysis (Hayes 2018). 
Estimates represent predicted values, including covariate (income).  
Figure 12 (Essay 2) Study 4: Interactive Effect of Religiosity, Initial Amount Given, and Temporal Structure 
on Subsequent Amount Donated 
3.6.3 Discussion 
Study 4 shows that recurring donors give less than one-time donors to a greater degree as 
the total initial amount increases—an effect that only emerges among those lower in religiosity. 
No differences emerge between recurring and one-time donors, however, with respect to likelihood 
of making the second donation. These results are consistent with an anchoring account, which 
would predict the initial donation anchor to be less informative for higher religiosity donors. Thus, 
Study 4 replicates the anchoring effect observed in prior studies in an additional charitable giving 
context (i.e., giving to a religious congregation) using a different initial donation temporal structure 
manipulation (i.e., presenting annual contribution estimate in terms of a one-time gift or a recurring 
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weekly gift). Moreover, Study 4 provides initial evidence that the observed anchoring effect may 
be more severe as the size of the initial donation anchor increases (i.e., the objective size of the 
initial contribution). This suggests that the temporal structure of a donor’s initial contribution may 
more strongly impact the size of subsequent giving among the largest donors.  
3.7 Studies 5A and 5B: Presenting Initial Contribution Temporal Structure Options 
Previous experiments show that weakening the initial anchoring effect can subsequently 
reduce the degree to which recurring donors scale back their giving, such as when shifting attention 
to a more favorable anchor (Study 3) or when the informational value of the unfavorable anchor 
is low relative to internal norms (Study 4). It follows, therefore, that setting a more favorable 
anchor at the outset, such as by making initial donations in a one-time temporal format, should 
shortcut the effect on subsequent giving. Firms could do this, for example, by presenting the initial 
donation decision exclusively in terms of a one-time contribution (i.e., initial donors restricted to 
a single temporal structure) or jointly as both a one-time contribution and a recurring contribution 
(i.e., initial donors chose preferred initial temporal structure).  
Although recommending a one-time temporal structure during the initial donation 
experience may effectively counteract recurring donors’ reduced giving in a later donation request, 
it could also undermine total giving. Research on the “pennies-a-day” (PAD) pricing strategy 
(Gourville 1998, 2003) finds that temporally framing costs in a disaggregated format (e.g., daily 
expense vs. yearly expense) can increase consumer compliance, including compliance with 
donation solicitations. Individuals, therefore, may be more likely to make an initial donation to 
charity when the same total contribution amount is presented as a (temporally-dispersed) recurring 
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contribution versus a (temporally-aggregated) one-time contribution. If so, attempts to offset the 
reducing giving of recurring donors by recommending a one-time temporal structure when making 
the initial donation decision may have the unintended consequence of decreasing the rate of initial 
giving, raising questions about this intervention approach. Studies 5A and 5B test this PAD 
prediction and explore the possible net effects of an initial donation request’s temporal structure.  
We designed Studies 5A and 5B such that the decision of whether to make an initial 
donation is always voluntary, but the decision of how to temporally structure the initial donation 
is not. Using consequential giving paradigms, all individuals are presented with an initial charitable 
appeal and, later, a second donation request. In Study 5A, the initial donation request is presented 
either as a one-time contribution or a recurring contribution totaling the same cumulative amount, 
such that individuals are defaulted into a predetermined temporal structure and can only give in 
one way. In Study 5B, however, the initial donation request presents individuals with both a one-
time contribution option and a recurring contribution option (totaling the same cumulative 
amount), such that individuals choose their preferred temporal structure.  
Across both studies, we predict that when presented with an additional charitable appeal 
those donors who initially made a recurring contribution will give less that those donors who 
initially made a one-time contribution of the equivalent total amount, consistent with prior results. 
In addition, we also examine whether merely asking for an initial donation in a recurring format 
versus a one-time format impacts (a) the likelihood someone makes an initial charitable 
contribution and (b) the average cumulative total amount a person gives across both the initial and 
the subsequent donation requests. Taken together, these studies provide insight regarding how we 
can present the initial donation request to consumers in a way that may offset recurring donors’ 
reduced giving, without undermining total giving. Based on the results, we conclude that attempts 
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to circumvent reduced subsequent giving by only providing a one-time donation option (to set a 
more favorable anchor at the outset) are not reliably effective. Charities wanting to intervene when 
requesting the initial donation, rather than when requesting the subsequent donation, may be better 
off jointly presenting both temporal structures to potential donors.  
3.8 Study 5A: Present One Temporal Structure Option When Requesting Initial Donation 
In addition to testing the primary prediction regarding recurring donors’ reduced giving 
and exploring potential net effects, Study 5A additionally examines the implications of defaulting 
donors into a temporal structure for their initial contribution. As such, using a charitable giving 
paradigm in which both initial and subsequent donation decisions are voluntarily made, financially 
consequential, and temporally experienced, Study 5A tests both the robustness of the basic reduced 
giving effect demonstrated in previous studies and the viability of this possible intervention.   
Study 5A also provides additional mediation testing of the possible psychological process 
underlying the observed anchoring effect. Results from Study 2 showed a mediating effect through 
perceived size of the initial contribution but not through either experienced happiness from the 
initial contribution or perceived commitment to the charity following the initial contribution. In 
Study 2, prior donors who initially gave in a one-time structure perceived their total charitable 
contribution as subjectively larger than those who gave in a recurring structure, shrinking 
subsequent support for recurring givers—results that are consistent with an anchoring account and, 
specifically, a magnitude priming mechanism. Using the same measures administered in Study 2, 
Study 5A examines whether the same pattern of results emerges when prior donors actively choose 
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and financially realize both initial and subsequent donation decisions. Consequently, Study 5A 
tests the robustness of these mediation findings. 
In addition, Study 5A explores the possible moderating effect of mediator measurement 
timing. Study 2 measured mediators at the time of the second donation request, when a prior 
donor’s psychological assessment of their initial contribution is argued to influence subsequent 
giving. One could argue, however, that measuring potential mediator variables closer in time to 
initial donation decision is more appropriate, given these mediators assess perceptions associated 
with the initial contribution. Although measurement at the time of the subsequent donation request 
is more theoretically consistent with our proposed process, Study 5A explores whether results 
depend on the timing of mediator measurement, with initial donors completing the three process 
measures either after the initial donation request or after the subsequent donation request. 
3.8.1 Method 
Similar to Study 2 and Study 3, the current study employed a two-part paradigm in which 
individuals responded to an initial donation request (included in an unrelated survey task) and then 
later respond to a subsequent donation request (included in an unrelated follow-up survey task). In 
this study, preregistered on OSF (https://osf.io/3kpr8) and conducted in February 2020, Mturk 
participants earned $1 for each survey completed (initial and follow-up), in addition to a base pay 
of $.25. To minimize attrition, participants began by reviewing the two-part task and payment 
structure and confirming their willingness to complete the follow-up survey. Only those indicating 
a willingness to complete the follow-up survey continued with the study.  
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Before starting an unrelated task, participants (n = 923;19 46.50% male;20 Mage = 38.90, SD 
= 12.28)21 learned of an opportunity to donate the $1 earned for completing the initial survey. We 
asked participants to make a donation to charity (see Web Appendix O for time 1 survey details). 
We presented the donation request as a binary choice (donate the equivalent of $1 or donate 
nothing), manipulating the temporal structure of donation option to represent either a one-time 
charitable gift or a recurring charitable gift. Whereas those randomly assigned to the one-time 
donation condition chose between “Yes, I will make a one-time donation of $1 today” and not 
donating, those randomly assigned to the recurring donation condition chose between “Yes, I will 
make a recurring daily donation of $.10 for ten days” and not donating. Those participants who 
chose to make an initial charitable contribution (n = 302;22 40.71% male;23 Mage = 40.87, SD = 
12.91)24 then selected which of three charities would receive their donation (i.e., Habitat for 
Humanity, ASPCA, Feeding America) and the amount was deducted from their earnings. Donors 
reviewed a summary of their contribution and were thanked for their generosity. All participants 
then proceeded to an unrelated puzzle task and demographic items (e.g., income).  
In this study, initial donors responded to items assessing potential process mechanisms. 
Specifically, donors completed the same three items from Study 2, indicating how happy they felt 
about their donation (1 – “Not at All Happy,” 7 – “Very Happy”), how committed they felt towards 
the charity (1 – “Not at All Committed,” 7 – “Very Committed”), and how large they perceived 
their donation to be (“How much did you donate?” 0 – “Very Little,” 100 – “Very Much”), the 
order of which was randomized. Study 2 measured mediators at the time of the second donation 
 
19 Number after employing exclusion criteria (reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker; n = 37). 
20 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 405; 46.50%), “female” (n = 458; 52.58%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 8; .92%). 
21 Values reported reflect the subset of initial donors who completed demographic items (n = 871).  
22 Number included in analysis after removing those who reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker (n = 20). 
23 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 114; 40.71%), “female” (n = 164; 58.57%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 2; .71%). 
24 Values reported reflect the subset of initial donors who completed demographic items (n = 280).  
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request, before responding to the additional charitable appeal. Unlike Study 2, however, Study 5A 
manipulated the timing of when these mediating were measured. Whereas some donors were 
randomly assigned to complete mediator items after the initial donation request (in the initial 
survey), other donors were randomly assigned to complete the mediator items after the subsequent 
donation request (in the follow-up survey). Thus, following the demographic items, those in the 
after initial donation request condition finished this survey by completing measures of experienced 
happiness, charity commitment, and perceived size of initial donation.   
Twelve days later, all participants (both initial donors and initial non-donors) were invited 
via email to complete a follow-up survey, earning an additional $1 (see Web Appendix P for time 
2 survey details). Prior to starting the unrelated follow-up survey task, however, participants 
responded to a new request for a one-time donation. Individuals who made an initial donation (n 
= 302)25 were asked how much of their payment they would be willing to donate to the same 
charity that received their initial charitable contribution (US $, open response), which was 
deducted from their earnings. In total, 70.20% of initial donors (n = 212; 40.28% male;26 Mage = 
42.17, SD = 12.93)27 completed the follow-up survey, representing our final analysis sample. 
Finally, all initial donors who were randomly assigned to complete mediator measures after the 
second donation request then responded to items assessing experienced happiness, charity 
commitment, and perceived size of their initial donation.28   
Note that to explore the potential net effects of the temporal structure of an initial donation 
request we also offered those who did not initially give to charity the opportunity to make a one-
time donation. These initial non-donors were asked how much of their payment for completing the 
 
25 Number included in analysis after removing those who reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker (n = 20). 
26 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 85; 40.28%), female” (n = 124; 58.77%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 2; .95%). 
27 Values reported reflect the subset of initial donors responding to the follow-up survey who completed demographic items (n = 211). 
28 Attrition did not vary by temporal structure of initial donation (b = -.273, SE = .255, t = -1.07, p = .285), with recurring donors (67.66%) just as 
likely as one-time donors (73.33%) to respond to the follow-up survey. 
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follow-up survey they would be willing to donate to charity (US $, open response). Those who 
opted to give selected a charity to receive their donation (i.e., Habitat for Humanity, ASPCA, or 
Feeding America), and the amount was deducted from their payment.  
3.8.2 Results 
We first test for the moderating effect of mediator measurement timing, when appropriate. 
Because not all participants completed demographic items, analysis sample is smaller when 
including (mean-centered) income as a control variable. However, exclusion of covariates does 
not substantively change observed pattern of results.  
3.8.2.1 Subsequent Donation Amount 
We first conducted a linear regression analysis predicting subsequent donation amount as 
a function of initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor) and timing of 
mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation request) 
and their interaction, controlling for (mean-centered) income. Results show no interaction between 
initial donation structure and timing of mediator measurement on subsequent amount donated (b 
= .010, SE = .100, t = .10, p = .923). Consequently, we control for timing of mediator measurement 
in the subsequent analysis.  
When running a linear regression with subsequent donation amount as the dependent 
variable and initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor), (mean-centered) 
income, and timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after 
subsequent donation request) as predictors, results show no main effect of mediator timing (b = 
.003, SE = .050, t = .07, p = .948). Donors who completed mediators after the first donation request 
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(M = $.40) and donors who completed mediators after the second donation request (M = $.41) 
subsequently donated a similar amount. Results reveal, however, a significant negative main effect 
of initial donation structure (b = -.137, SE = .050, t = -2.76, p = .006). Recurring donors made a 
significantly smaller subsequent donation (M = $.34) than one-time donors (M = $.48), consistent 
with our prediction (see Figure 13). 
 
 
Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Estimates are adjusted for income and mediator timing. 
Figure 13 (Essay 2) Study 5A: Subsequent Donation Amount 
3.8.2.2 Perceived Donation Size 
Results from a linear regression analysis predicting donors’ perceived size of their initial 
contribution as a function of initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor), 
timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation 
request), and their interaction, while controlling for (mean-centered) income, showed no 
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significant interaction effect (b = -2.054, SE = 9.325, t = -.22, p = .826). With no moderating 
influence, we control for timing of mediator measurement in the subsequent analysis.  
We regressed perceived size of donors’ initial donation on initial donation structure (0 = 
one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor), timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation 
request, 1 = after subsequent donation request), and (mean-centered) income. Results show a 
significant main effect for timing of mediator measurement (b = -9.989, SE = 4.623, t = -2.16, p = 
.032), such that donors perceived their initial contribution as larger when measured after the initial 
donation request (M = 39.080) compared to after the subsequent donation request (M = 29.091). 
No effect of initial donation structure emerged (b = 2.460, SE = 4.64, t = .53, p = .596). Contrary 
to predictions, recurring donors (M = 35.299) and one-time donors (M = 32.839) perceived their 
initial contribution to be similar in size.  
3.8.2.3 Experienced Happiness 
We conducted a linear regression analysis predicting happiness experienced from donors’ 
initial contribution as a function of initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring 
donor), timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent 
donation request), and their interaction, while controlling for (mean-centered) income. A marginal 
initial donation structure x timing of mediator measurement interaction emerged (b = -.617, SE = 
.348, t = -1.77, p = .078). Follow-up analyses indicate that when measured after the initial donation 
request, recurring donors reported experiencing greater happiness (M = 6.351) than one-time 
donors (M = 5.571; b = .675, SE = .243, t = 2.78, p = .006). However, when measuring happiness 
experienced after the second donation request, recurring donors (M = 5.629) and one-time donors 
(M = 5.571) did not differ in their reported happiness (b = .058, SE = .249, t = .24, p = .814).  
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3.8.2.4 Charity Commitment 
Similar to the previous analyses, we first tested for an initial donation structure x timing of 
mediator measurement interaction. We regressed donors’ reported commitment to the charity 
receiving their initial contribution on initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring 
donor), timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent 
donation request), and their interaction, while controlling for (mean-centered) income. Results 
reveal no significant interactive effect (b = .310, SE = .577, t = .54, p = .591). Thus, we control for 
timing of mediator measurement in the subsequent analysis.  
Running a linear regression analysis predicting donors’ charity commitment as a function 
of initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor), timing of mediator 
measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation request), and (mean-
centered) income, we find a significant effect of timing of mediator measurement (b = -1.009, SE 
= .286, t = -3.52, p = .001). Donors reported greater commitment to the charity receiving their 
donation when assessed after the initial donation request (M = 7.165) compared to after the 
subsequent donation request (M = 6.157). A significant main effect also emerged for donation 
structure (b = .840, SE = .287, t = 2.92, p = .004), with recurring donors reporting greater charity 
commitment (M = 7.058) than one-time donors (M = 6.218).  
3.8.2.5 Mediation 
We first conducted a conditional process model using PROCESS 3.0 (Model 8; 10,000 
bootstrap samples; Hayes 2018) to examine whether timing of mediator measurement (0 = after 
initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation request) moderates the indirect effect of 
initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor) on subsequent donation amount 
through any of the potential mediators (i.e., perceived donation size, experienced happiness, 
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charity commitment), while controlling for (mean-centered) income. The index of moderated 
mediation was not significant through any of the mediators: perceived donation size (b = -.001, SE 
= .008, CI95[-.019, .016]), experienced happiness (b = -.031, SE = .027, CI95[-.098, .005]), and 
charity commitment (b = .005, SE = .013, CI95[-.020, .036]). Thus, we controlled for timing of 
mediator measurement in the subsequent analysis.  
We ran a parallel multiple mediator model using PROCESS 3.0 (Model 4; 10,000 bootstrap 
samples; Hayes 2018) to simultaneously examine the indirect effect of the initial donation’s 
temporal structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor) on the amount of subsequent 
charitable support through each of the proposed mediators (i.e., perceived donation size, 
experienced happiness, charity commitment), controlling for (mean-centered) income and timing 
of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation request). 
Consistent with prior results from Study 2, no indirect effects emerged through experienced 
happiness (b = .018, SE = .014, CI95[-.003, .049]) or charity commitment (b = .013, SE = .014, 
CI95[-.012, .044]; see Figure 14). Unlike prior results, however, no indirect effect emerged through 
perceived donation size (b = .001, SE = .004, CI95[-.007, .011]; see Appendix I). 
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Note. Significance values are indicated as follows: ~ p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 4; 10,000 
bootstrapped samples), controlling for (mean-centered) income and timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after 
subsequent donation request). No indirect effect emerged through any of the mediators: perceived donation size (b = .001, SE = .004, CI95[-.007, 
.011], experienced happiness (b = .018, SE = .014, CI95[-.003, .049]), and charity commitment (b = .013, SE = .014, CI95[-.012, .044]). 
Figure 14 (Essay 2) Study 5A: Parallel Mediation Analysis 
3.8.2.6 Observed Likelihood of Making Subsequent Donation (Inferred from Amount) 
To explore whether the temporal format of the initial donation impacted the likelihood of 
donors making a subsequent donation, we generated an indicator variable to identify whether 
initial donors made a subsequent donation (0 = size of subsequent donation equals $0, 1 = size of 
subsequent donation exceeds $0). Of the initial donors who responded to the follow-up survey, 
82.08% (n = 174) made an additional donation. 
We first conducted a binary logistic regression predicting likelihood of making a 
subsequent donation (1 = made subsequent donation, 0 = did not make subsequent donation) as a 
function of initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor), timing of mediator 
measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation request), and their 
interaction, controlling for (mean-centered) income. Results show no interaction between initial 
donation structure and timing of mediator measurement on subsequent amount donated (b = .142, 
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SE = .743, t = .19, p = .848). Thus, we control for timing of mediator measurement in the 
subsequent analysis.  
We then conducted a binary logistic regression analysis with the subsequent donation 
decision indicator (1 = made additional donation, 0 = did not make additional donation) as the 
dependent variable and initial donation structure (0 = one-time donor, 1 = recurring donor), timing 
of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 1 = after subsequent donation request), 
and (mean-centered) income as predictors. No effect of timing of mediator measurement emerged 
(b = -.568, SE = .368, t = -1.54, p = .123), with donors completing the mediator items after the 
initial donation request (86.04%) similarly likely to give as those completing mediators after the 
subsequent donation request (77.83%). In addition, results reveal no effect of initial donation 
structure (b = -.019, SE = .365, t = -.05, p = .957), such that recurring donors (81.86%) and one-
time donors (82.14%) were equally likely to make an additional donation.  
3.8.2.7 Likelihood of Making Initial Donation 
To examine whether the temporal format presented to potential donors shaped the 
likelihood of making an initial donation, this analysis includes all participants who were initially 
asked to donate (n = 923),29 of which 32.72% (n = 302) chose to give. We conducted a binary 
logistic regression predicting likelihood to make initial donation (1 = made initial donation, 0 = 
did not make initial donation) as a function of the temporal structure presented with the donation 
request (0 = one-time donation, 1 = recurring donation), controlling for (mean-centered) income.30 
Given that only those who made an initial donation were asked to complete the mediator items, 
timing of mediator measurement was not included as a predictor in this analysis. Results show a 
 
29 Number after employing exclusion criteria (reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker; n = 37). 
30 Mean-centering was re-computed for this analysis.  
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marginally significant positive effect of initial donation structure (b = .282, SE = .146, t = 1.94, p 
= .052). Consistent with the pennies-a-day effect, individuals were more marginally likely to 
donate when the initial donation request was presented as a recurring donation structure (35.25%) 
than as a one-time donation structure (29.11%).  
3.8.2.8 Average Total Donation Amount 
For all participants who were initially asked to donate (n = 923),31 the net total donation 
was computed as the sum of the initial donation amount (equivalent to $1 or $0, depending on 
initial donation decision) and the subsequent donation amount (ranging from $0 to $1). To test the 
net effect of restricting individuals to the recurring or one-time temporal format, we conducted a 
regression analysis predicting net total donation amount as a function of the initial donation 
structure presented (0 = one-time donation, 1 = recurring donation), controlling for (mean-
centered) income.32 Similar to the previous analysis, timing of mediator measurement was not 
included because only initial donors were asked to complete mediator items.  
No effect of initial donation structure emerged (b = .042, SE = .043, t = .98, p = .326), such 
that those initially presented with a recurring donation format option (M = $.46) gave a similar net 
amount as those initially presented with a one-time donation format option (M = $.42). This 
suggests that presenting an initial donation request in a way that forces those who donate to give 
in a one-time format decreased the average net donation amount $.04 per person, although this 
difference was not statistically significant.  
 
31 Number after employing exclusion criteria (reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker; n = 37). 
32 Mean-centering was re-computed for this analysis.  
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3.8.3 Discussion 
Study 5A finds that donors who initially gave a recurring contribution subsequently gave 
a smaller amount than donors who initially gave a one-time contribution, consistent with prior 
results suggesting an anchoring effect. Although temporal structure of the initial donation 
influenced the amount prior donors additionally gave to the same charity, the initial temporal 
structure did not influence the likelihood of prior donors making a subsequent donation. The 
current study, therefore, further demonstrates the robustness of the basic effect of reduced giving 
among recurring donors and provides additional empirical evidence consistent with the anchoring 
account.   
In Study 5A, no mediating effects emerged through experienced happiness or charity 
commitment, as predicted. We did not, however, find anticipated mediation results through 
perceived size. Recurring and one-time donors perceived the subjective size of their initial 
contribution as similar in magnitude. This contrasts the results of Study 2, which found perceived 
size of initial donation mediating the influence of initial donation structure on subsequent donation 
amount. Moreover, Study 5A showed that timing of mediator measurement does not substantively 
impact results. Across all analyses, we generally observed no moderating influence of mediator 
measurement timing. 
Both methodological and theoretical explanations may account for the inconsistent 
mediating effect of perceived size. Methodologically, Study 2 and Study 5A differ in several ways. 
Most notably, prior donors in Study 5A actively choose and financially realize both initial and 
subsequent donation decisions. Additional differences include increased frequency of recurring 
temporal structure (i.e., donation made every day vs. every other day), larger donation amount 
(i.e., donors give up to $1 vs. $.50 each time), and reversed sequencing of initial donation request 
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(appeal presented before vs. after unrelated task). Theoretically, the mixed evidence could also 
indicate that psychological mechanisms other than subjective evaluations of size may underly the 
observed anchoring effect. Multiple psychological processes have been used to explain anchoring 
effects, such as scale distortion theory (Frederick and Mochon 2012) and selective accessibility 
(Strack and Mussweiler 1997), among others. Thus, although all studies consistently show a 
pattern of reduced giving among recurring donors, suggesting consumers anchor on the salient 
numeric value associated with their initial contribution, it is possible the specific mechanism(s) 
driving this observed anchoring effect may be multiply determined. 
Study 5A also examined the viability of restricting the initial donation option to a one-time 
giving structure as a way to offset the reducing giving of recurring donors. When presenting the 
initial donation request, charities can offer lump-sum giving in one of two ways: allowing one-
time giving as the only donation option or allowing both temporal formats as options. As shown 
in Study 5A, the first method may reduce giving by undermining the “pennies-a-day” effect 
(Gourville 1998, 2003). Although we observed no adverse impact on average total funds raised 
per person, individuals presented with the recurring format (vs. one-time format) were more likely 
to make an initial donation, consistent with “pennies-a-day” predictions (Gourville 1998, 2003). 
Presenting an initial donation request that restricts gifts to a one-time giving structure, therefore, 
can potentially backfire for charities. Findings from the next study, however, suggest that the 
second method may be more promising.  
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3.9 Study 5B: Present Both Temporal Structure Options When Requesting Initial Donation 
Whereas Study 5A considers the implications of limiting the temporal structure of initial 
giving to a single option, Study 5B considers the implications of offering both temporal structures 
as options for initial giving. In the current study, individuals choose their preferred temporal format 
when making their initial donation decision (i.e., a one-time gift or recurring gift totaling the same 
amount). The previous study suggests that requiring an initial donation be made as a lump-sum 
gift may have the unintended effect of reducing the rate of initial giving. Study 5B examines 
whether presenting both temporal structure options simultaneously similarly suppresses the 
likelihood of initial giving.   
Furthermore, Study 5B explores the potential impact of the size of the initial donation 
request of potential donors. Results from Study 4 suggest that larger initial donations can enhance 
the previously observed anchoring effect of reduced giving among recurring donors. Study 5B 
examines the robustness of this result when the initial donation amount requested is randomly 
determined, rather than retrospectively self-reported by prior donors.  
Unfortunately, Study 5B could not be completed as planned due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Although data collection ended prematurely (during the time between the initial and 
subsequent donation requests) and precluded observation of donors’ subsequent donation 
behavior, we were still able to observe participants’ initial donation decisions.  
3.9.1 Method 
Study 5B uses a two-part charitable appeal paradigm similar to that of Study 5A. People 
first respond to a survey containing an initial donation request and then later respond to a separate 
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follow-up survey containing a second donation request. Participants earn $1 for each survey 
completed in addition to a base pay of $.25 and donations are deducted from their payment.  
In March 2020, participants first reviewed the task and payment structure, and only those 
indicating a willingness to complete the follow-up survey continued with the study. After 
completing an unrelated task and standard demographic items (e.g., income), participants (n = 
1,055;33 43.03% male;34 Mage = 39.56, SD = 12.74) were presented with the initial donation request 
asking them to donate to charity (see Web Appendix Q for survey details). Consistent with our 
preregistration (https://osf.io/h6cm5), people made their donation decision by choosing among 
three simultaneously presented options: making a one-time donation (“Yes, I will make a one-time 
donation of $X today”), making a recurring donation (“Yes, I will make a recurring daily donation 
of $X for ten days”), or making no donation (“No, I don’t want to help”). Cumulatively, both the 
one-time and recurring donation options gave a financially equivalent total amount. The size of 
that amount, however, varied between participants. Participants were randomly assigned to view 
a charitable appeal requesting an initial total donation amount between $.10 and $1.00, presented 
in increments of $.10. The initial donation decision was consequential. For those who opted to 
give (n = 319;35 42.63% male;36 Mage = 42.19, SD = 13.37), the amount was deducted from their 
earnings and given to their selected charity recipient (i.e., Habitat for Humanity, ASPCA, Feeding 
America). Donors were thanked for their generosity and all participants were reminded to complete 
the follow-up survey. 
We planned to administer the follow-up survey twelve days after completing the initial 
survey, with participants first responding to an additional (one-time) donation request and then 
 
33 Number after employing exclusion criteria (reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker; n = 49). 
34 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 454; 43.03%), “female” (n = 591; 56.02%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 10; .95%). 
35 Number included in analysis after removing those who reported technical problems or being non-native English speaker (n = 16). 
36 Participants could choose among three options: “male” (n = 136; 42.63%), “female” (n = 180; 56.43%), and “prefer not to say” (n = 3; .94%). 
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completing the same mediation items from Study 5A. However, due to disruptions resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic the follow-up survey was not administered. Thus, neither the key 
dependent variable (i.e., the dollar amount prior donors give to the same charity in response to an 
additional one-time charitable appeal) nor process measures (i.e., experienced happiness, charity 
commitment, perceived donation size) were assessed. We could examine patterns of initial giving 
but could not test predictions regarding the impact of initial donation temporal structure on prior 
donors’ subsequent donation amount.  
3.9.2 Results 
We conducted a multinomial logistic regression, with initial donation decision as a three-
level categorial dependent variable (chose not to give, chose to make recurring donation, chose to 
make one-time donation). Making a recurring donation was used as the reference group. Initial 
donation amount ($.10, $.20, $.30, $.40, $.50, $.60, $.70, $.80, $.90, $1.0; coded as a continuous 
predictor) was included as the primary predictor, controlling for (mean-centered) income.  
The fully estimated model was significant (ꭓ2(4) = 49.76, p < .0001, pseudo R2= .032). 
Examination of the intercept effect (ꭓ2(2) = 46.39, p < .0001) suggests that individuals were more 
likely to not donate than to make a recurring donation (b = 2.093, SE = .308, t = 6.79, p < .001, 
OR = 8.108) and were more likely to make a one-time donation than to make a recurring donation 
(b = 2.005, SE = .318, t = 6.31, p < .001, OR = 7.425). The analysis additionally revealed a main 
effect of initial donation amount requested (ꭓ2(2) = 46.67, p < .0001). Increasing the size of the 
initial donation request increased the probability of choosing not to donate compared to making a 
recurring initial donation (b = 1.260, SE = .541, t = 2.33, p = .020, OR = 3.527). However, 
increasing the size of the initial donation request did not impact the probability making a one-time 
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initial donation compared to a recurring initial donation (b = -.474, SE = .567, t = -.84, p = .404, 
OR = .622; see Figure 15).  
 
 
Note. Estimates represent predicted values, including covariate (income). 
Figure 15 (Essay 2) Study 5B: Initial Donation Decision 
3.9.3 Discussion  
Study 5B examined implication of presenting both a recurring donation structure and a 
one-time donation structure simultaneously when making the initial donation decision. Although 
we could not test our primary predictions regarding additional giving due to disruptions resulting 
from the COVID-19 pandemic, observations of individuals’ initial donation decisions allowed us 
to explore the impact of jointly presenting a one-time and recurring temporal structure on initial 
donation likelihood.  
Results show people were more likely to opt to give in a one-time format than a recurring 
format and that larger donation requests, despite generally increasing the likelihood of not making 
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an initial donation, did not impact the likelihood of selecting a one-time versus a recurring 
structure. Not only is this finding inconsistent with the traditional PAD effect, which would predict 
increased donation likelihood for temporally-dispersed structures, it also suggests that jointly 
displaying both temporal structures during an initial donation request has the potential to decrease 
the likelihood of donors choosing a recurring format, which our prior studies have shown can 
reduce subsequent giving. Thus, although restricting the temporal structure of the initial donation 
may not be a reliably effective intervention for offsetting recurring donors’ smaller subsequent 
giving (Study 5A), charities that desire to employ interventions that target the initial donation 
experience may be more successful at encouraging one-time donations by jointly presenting both 
temporal structures.  
Because the follow-up portion of Study 5B was not conducted and subsequent donation 
decisions were not made, we could not directly test predictions regarding the impact of initial 
donation structure on prior donors’ subsequent donation amount. Having replicated recurring 
donors’ reduced subsequent giving in prior studies, however, allows us to use previous effects to 
estimate possible net donation implications in the current context. We computed the net total 
donation as the sum of the initial donation amount and the additional donation amount, which was 
estimated using covariate-adjusted average values obtained in Study 5A (which, of all studies 
conducted in this paper, employs a donation paradigm most similar to Study 5B with respect to 
the voluntary and financially consequential nature of initial donation decisions). Results using the 
approximated net total amount found that initial donors who chose the one-time temporal format 
gave a larger net amount, on average, than initial donors who chose the recurring temporal format 
(see Web Appendix R for analysis details). Although additional experimental investigation is 
needed, this estimation suggests that presenting an initial donation request in a way that allows 
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initial donors to choose a lump-sum gift as their preferred temporal format may boost the average 
total amount of charitable funds raised per person. 
3.10 General Discussion 
Most of the research on charitable giving has focused on what spurs initial contributions. 
However, charities are continuously challenged by high donor and gift attrition rates (Levis et al. 
2019), making it critical to understand not only what motivates consumers’ donation behavior, but 
also what sustains it. In the current paper, we consider how marketers can shape consumers’ initial 
donation experience to increase the magnitude of future charitable gifts, examining whether 
structuring one’s initial contribution as a one-time donation (e.g., $120 single gift) or a recurring 
donation (e.g., $10 monthly gift for 12 months) is superior in promoting future charitable support. 
Drawing on prior anchoring research, we predicted that temporally structuring an initial donation 
experience as a series of recurring gifts (vs. a one-time lump-sum gift) results in a smaller 
subsequent donation. We argue that consumers anchor on the salient numeric value associated with 
their initial donation, which subsequently skews the size of their next donation.  
The current research demonstrates that the temporal structure of consumers’ initial 
charitable contributions, despite being financially equivalent, can shape donation perceptions in 
ways that impact future donation support. Across six studies, we find that recurring donations 
reduce the size of later giving, consistent with an anchoring account. Specifically, when prior 
donors encounter a later one-time charitable request, those who made their initial contribution as 
a recurring gift subsequently gave a smaller amount than those who made their initial contribution 
as a single lump-sum gift. This result replicated with both consequential (Study 2, Study 3, Study 
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5A) and hypothetical (Study 1, Study 4) donations, with different types of charitable giving (e.g., 
nonprofit organizations, religious congregations), with varied initial donation amounts (e.g., $.50, 
$30), and with different donation timeframes (e.g., 12 days, 6 months).  
This pattern of reduced giving among recurring donors is most consistent with an anchoring 
explanation. Several studies explored the specific psychological processes underlying the observed 
anchoring effect. Study 2 and Study 5A examined whether temporal structure impacts subsequent 
giving by skewing the perceived size of donors’ initial charitable contributions. In Study 2, but not 
Study 5A, recurring donors perceived their initial contribution as subjectively smaller than one-
time donors, resulting in smaller subsequent giving. Although these studies offer mixed mediation 
evidence regarding distorted perceptions of subjective size, both rule out competing psychological 
accounts, finding no indirect effect through either experienced happiness or charity commitment.  
Study 3 and Study 4 offer additional processes evidence, testing whether factors that 
weaken the effects of an anchor subsequently reduce the degree to which recurring donors scale 
back their giving. In Study 3, when asked to make an additional donation, recurring donors 
provided with a new (larger) numeric anchor equivalent to that of lump-sum donors subsequently 
gave a similar amount. In Study 4, recurring donors’ reduced subsequent giving to their religious 
congregation was attenuated when the anchor provided less informational value (i.e., for those 
higher in religiosity).  
Studies 5A and 5B explored the implications of recommending a one-time temporal 
structure when the initial donation decision is made, to circumvent later reduced giving among 
recurring donors by setting a more favorable anchor at the outset. Results from Study 5A find that 
presenting an initial donation request in a way that compels donors to make a one-time gift 
increases the size of their subsequent gift, consistent with the anchoring account. However, 
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limiting initial giving to a one-time format has the potential to decrease the likelihood of making 
an initial donation to charity (Study 5A). Thus, restricting the temporal structure of the initial 
donation may not be a reliably effective intervention for offsetting recurring donors’ smaller 
subsequent giving. Study 5B suggests, however, that charities that nevertheless desire to target the 
initial donation request may be more successful at encouraging one-time donations by 
simultaneously presenting both temporal structures.  
The observed anchoring effect, however, seems to be limited to the size of prior donors’ 
subsequent giving. Across all relevant studies, we find that although temporal structure of the 
initial donation influenced the amount prior donors additionally gave to the same charity, the 
temporal structure did not influence the likelihood of prior donors making an additional donation. 
Thus, compared to one-time lump-sum donors, recurring donors subsequently give less but are no 
less likely to give (see Table 10 for results summary). 
Table 10 (Essay 2) Summary of Results for Donation Amount and Donation Likelihood 
Study 
Initial Donation 
 
Subsequent Donation 
Amount Likelihood 
 
Amount Likelihood 
      
1 – – 
 
Recurring < One-Time ns 
2 – – 
 
Recurring (no notification) < One-Time 
Recurring (with notification) < One-Time 
ns 
3 – – 
 
[No Cumulative Reminder] Recurring < One-Time 
[Cumulative Reminder] ns 
ns 
4 ns* – 
 
[Low Religiosity] Recurring < One-Time 
[High Religiosity] ns 
ns 
5A – Recurring > One-Time 
 
Recurring < One-Time ns 
5B ns Recurring < One-Time 
 
– – 
Note. Likelihood of making subsequent donation was inferred from subsequent amount donated, generating an indicator variable as the (0 = size 
of subsequent donation equals $0, 1 = size of subsequent donation exceeds $0). 
* No difference was expected, as temporal structure manipulation had not yet occurred (i.e., result suggests balanced giving between conditions). 
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This paper also tests different methods by which charities can disrupt recurring donors’ gift 
reduction in response to later charitable requests. When appealing to prior donors for a new one-
time contribution, including a reminder of their cumulative contribution to date may offer charities 
a low-cost, scalable intervention to effectively offset reducing giving (Study 3). Attempts to set a 
more favorable anchor at the outset by only allowing initial donors the lump-sum format option, 
however, have the potential to decrease the likelihood of making an initial donation (Study 5A). 
3.10.1 Theoretical Implications 
The present research extends prior work on charitable giving in several ways. Our findings 
demonstrate that the “time architecture” of a consumer’s initial donation experience impacts 
subsequent donation behavior. In doing so, we not only identify a previously unrecognized aspect 
of charitable giving that can influence long-term donor support, but also highlight how the 
structure of early donation experiences can shape later patterns of giving. In addition, this research 
also contributes to the charitable giving literature by extending our understanding of factors 
contributing to donor and donation attrition. To date, charitable giving research has largely focused 
on factors motivating consumers’ initial donation decisions. Despite the considerable insights 
gained from such investigations, there remains a limited understanding of when and why donors 
scale back and abandon their contributions. The present paper highlights the role of initial donation 
experiences (and, specifically, their temporal structure) in perpetuating donor support.  
This focus on the continuation, not the initiation, of charitable giving differentiates the 
current work from similar research exploring the “pennies-a-day” (PAD) effect (e.g., Gourville 
1998, 2003). Studies of the PAD effect in the domain of charitable giving focus exclusively on the 
initial instantiation of donation behavior, whereas the present research investigates the 
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consequences of that initial donation behavior. Furthermore, the PAD studies examine a framing 
effect, namely how successful disaggregated pricing formats are in persuading consumers to make 
a donation; they do not involve effects associated with making payments in disaggregated pricing 
structures. Conversely, the current research studies the impact of experiencing different donation 
payment structures. Thus, the current research compliments prior PAD findings by demonstrating 
the downstream consequences of making initial charitable contributions in PAD-type segregated 
donation structures.  
More broadly, these results also contribute to the growing literature on information 
architecture and the subjective value of money. Research is increasingly demonstrating that the 
way in which money is presented can distort its perceived value. For example, consumers exhibit 
a “bias for the whole” and attach greater value to money in the form of a whole (e.g., $100 bill) 
versus parts (e.g., ten $10 bills; Mishra et al. 2006). In addition, consumer spending is influenced 
by the “denomination effect,” wherein consumers are less likely to spend an equivalent sum of 
money represented in larger denominations (Raghubir and Srivastava 2002). Recent work has also 
shown that consumers’ perceptions of the adequacy of their retirement savings and, consequently, 
subsequent saving decisions are influenced by the mode in which their savings are presented (lump 
sum or monthly amount; Goldstein et al. 2016). We extend this research into the domain of 
charitable giving, showing that the format in which a person’s prior donation is structured shapes 
the size of future support. Thus, although we limit the current research to the context of charitable 
giving, the effects demonstrated could have broader implications for how consumers manage their 
spending and saving decisions.  
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3.10.2 Managerial Implications 
Charitable organizations generally regard recurring donors as more valuable than one-time 
donors. Benefits include more cost-effective and more predictable fundraising, as well as the 
possibility for a larger lifetime return (especially when donors forget to cancel the renewal of their 
recurring gift). The current research does not dismiss the potential benefits of recurring giving nor 
recommend that charities eliminate recurring donations. Rather, the current research highlights a 
potential downside of a recurring temporal structure—reduced future support—and illustrates the 
importance of systematically understanding donor behavior beyond initial giving. Although some 
research suggests that displaying costs in a disaggregated format can increase compliance with 
initial charitable requests (e.g., Gourville 1998, 2003), we demonstrate that actually making such 
disaggregated payments can negatively impact subsequent donation behavior. This presents a 
curious possibility for charities: that recurring donations may have the ironic effect of increasing 
the rate of initial donations and then decreasing the magnitude of future charitable contributions. 
Results from Study 5B offer initial support for this possibility. This study finds that presenting an 
initial donation request in a way that compels donors to make a lump-sum gift not only increases 
the size of donors’ subsequent donations, it can also reduce likelihood of making an initial donation 
to charity. 
The current research suggests that charities may want to 1) reconsider the blanket strategy 
of encouraging all donors to make recurring gifts and 2) utilize different methods when appealing 
for additional donations from prior recurring givers. In the current research, we identify a very 
simple and costless adjustment to donation appeals may help charities boost giving of existing 
recurring donors. Because recurring donors anchor on the comparatively smaller numeric value of 
associated with their initial contribution, relative to one-time donors, recurring donors 
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subsequently give less when faced with a subsequent donation request from the same charity. 
Reminding prior donors of the cumulative amount they have given to date, however, effectively 
eliminates the negative impact on subsequent charitable support by providing recurring donors 
with a new and more favorable (i.e., larger) anchor.  
Such interventions and individualized marketing strategies will likely become increasingly 
important as online giving continues to rise. Because consumers are typically encouraged to 
become recurring donors when making online donations, understanding the implications of 
donation structures on subsequent support is increasingly relevant with the growing proliferation 
of online charitable giving. Online giving has repeatedly outpaced the growth of overall charitable 
giving for several years. In 2019, for example, online giving accounted for 8.7% of all fundraising, 
representing a 6.8% growth in online giving (MacLaughlin et al. 2020). By comparison, overall 
giving grew by just 1.0% in 2019 (MacLaughlin et al. 2020). 
3.10.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The current paper focuses on an under-researched aspect of the donor lifecycle–what 
influences continued charitable support. Although our findings extend understanding of the 
potential downstream effects of initial charitable giving, we do not examine how long these effects 
last or whether they depend on how the initial charitable appeal was made. As we have suggested, 
temporally dispersed donations may initially increase the likelihood that a person gives to charity 
but may subsequently prompt a scaling back of charitable support the next time the charity requests 
a donation. Therefore, to better understand the net-effect of one-time versus recurring initial 
contributions, we recommend that future research simultaneously consider how donation structure 
influences both the initiation and continuation of charitable contributions. 
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Another limitation of the current paper that represents an opportunity for future research 
involves the initial donation decision. Because we wanted to empirically demonstrate the 
implications of the structure of the initial donation on subsequent donor support, we enacted 
greater methodological control regarding the initial contribution (e.g., holding the amount 
constant, randomly assigning people to a donation structure). However, it is possible that the 
reasons for selecting a particular temporal structure (one-time vs. recurring) may moderate our 
observed effects. For example, people may purposefully choose to make recurring monthly 
donations because a lump sum payment is not financially feasible or because they want to 
strategically manage the “warm glow” they experience from giving, consistent with prior work on 
hedonic editing (Thaler 1985). The current research does not address the granular impact of such 
reasons. Future research might explore the moderating influence of the motivations driving donors’ 
selection of a particular temporal structure. 
In addition, the current research exclusively examines the effect of initial donation structure 
on subsequent contributions to the same charity. Future research could test whether these effects 
extend to donation requests from other charities (that did not receive the initial donation). Our 
findings indicate that anchoring accounts for the negative impact of recurring donations on future 
support. If the anchoring is priming magnitude among recurring donors, then as long as that 
construct is activated it may reduce donations for charities other than the one initially supported. 
Future research might explore this idea and, more broadly, the scope of anchoring effects observed 
in the current research.  
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4.0 (Essay 3) Time’s Out: Examining the Effectiveness of Contemporary Online Time 
Scarcity Promotions 
Consistent with Cialdini’s (1984) canonical argument that “when our freedom to have 
something is limited, the item becomes less available, and we experience an increased desire for 
it” (188), time scarcity marketing tactics are a mainstay in promotional advertising. Historical 
content analyses have revealed that “time-oriented appeals have been used as primary appeals with 
generally increasing frequency since the late 1800s” (Gross and Sheth 1989, 79) and that “scarcity 
appeals are clearly dominated by the use of the limited time technique” (Howard, Shu, and Kerin 
2007, 23), with over one in six offline retail advertisements containing time scarcity promotions 
(Howard et al. 2007). Widespread use of offline time scarcity promotions among marketing 
practitioners has garnered increased empirical attention among marketing scholars, creating a 
related body of work exploring the nuances of these offline tactics (e.g., Abendroth and Diehl 
2006; Brannon and Brock 2001; Kristofferson et al. 2017). Since the exponential growth of 
ecommerce, however, time scarcity promotions have additionally proliferated within online 
retailing and digital marketing, often in the form of flash sales and exploding deals (e.g., “HURRY! 
40% off FLASH SALE ending in: 06 hours: 38 minutes: 52 seconds”), recurring online daily deals 
(e.g., Amazon’s “Gold Box Deal of the Day,” Best Buy’s “Daily Doorbuster Deals”), online-
exclusive offers (e.g., Cyber Monday, Prime Day), and entire websites focused on such promotions 
(e.g., Groupon.com, 1sale.com, GILT.com). Simply applying marketing’s past theory and findings 
about offline time scarcity promotions to the current online retail context, one would predict 
contemporary online time scarcity tactics to increase consumers valuation of the promoted product.  
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The foundational demonstrations of time scarcity’s effectiveness, however, were largely 
conducted prior to the rise of online retailing. When Cialdini’s book Influence, which popularized 
the use of time scarcity promotions, was published in 1984, all consumer shopping was offline: 
the World Wide Web had not publicly launched and only 8% of U.S. households had a computer  
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). The first completely online transaction did not occur until 1994 
Fessenden 2015; Lewis 1994) and large-scale ecommerce adoption took even longer. Modern-day 
offline retailing is almost unrecognizable when compared to offline retailing of the past, especially 
with consumers often interacting with multiple retail channels before purchase occurs. Should we 
expect that prior time scarcity results in offline retail contexts will generalize to a fundamentally 
different marketplace? Firms, themselves, are questioning the use of such tactics. For example, 
Disney recently scrapped its iconic “Disney Vault,” which only allowed consumers to purchase a 
film within a limited timeframe before being ‘locked away’ for years. After years of generating 
“scarcely scarce scarcity” (Felton 2011) following the growth of online retailing and digital 
delivery, the vault is being dismantled and made continuously available via Disney’s new 
“Disney+” streaming service (Rahmanan 2019). In 2010, Marvel Comics similarly abandoned a 
vault-style online time scarcity promotion on its digital app platform after users refused to accept 
the marketing practice (Felton 2011), expressing that “in terms of digital media, scarcity is a 
drawback, not a selling point” (Brothers 2010).  
This paper broadly examines the use and effectiveness of time scarcity tactics as they 
appear in contemporary online retail context, exploring the degree to which present-day 
instantiations of online time scarcity promotions (e.g., flash sales) theoretically and empirically 
operate in ways consistent with predictions originating from prior work that predominantly 
consists of offline time scarcity tactics (e.g., newspaper ads) and that historically predates modern 
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online retailing. Therefore, the focus of this paper is not on comparing the relative efficacy of 
contemporary online tactics versus contemporary offline tactics, nor is the focus on testing the 
reproducibility of prior offline time scarcity promotion experiments. Rather, the paper focuses on 
comparing widely accepted expectations regarding online time scarcity promotions to modern 
marketplace realities, asking whether there are reasons to question such assumptions.  
Defining online time scarcity promotions as marketing tactics used in the online 
environment designed to impose salient temporal restrictions explicitly related to the promotional 
offer’s acquisition availability, we undertake this exploration in a four-part process. First, we 
examine the assumptions underlying offline time scarcity theory in the face of market changes 
resulting from the internet that have occurred since foundational work in this area was developed—
namely, shifts in (1) the contexts in which time scarcity effects are desired (e.g., from “bricks” to 
“clicks”), (2) the methods by which time scarcity is intended to be implemented (e.g., from static 
timeframes to dynamic timers), and (3) the consumer experience of target individuals (e.g., from 
non-existent to proficient understanding of online time scarcity tactics; from limited to excessive 
information; and from onerous to trivial search costs). Although it is impossible to construct a 
present-day test of online time scarcity tactics that entirely excludes these factors (or to reverse 
time to obtain completely naïve consumers), these changes raise questions about the 
comprehensive applicability of previously established assumptions about time scarcity promotions 
for the present online environment. 
Second, we conduct a retrospective analysis of past marketing research that most closely 
matches our focal phenomenon. We find that, empirically, prior work on offline time scarcity 
promotions tells conflicting stories, depicting positive, conditional, and null effects. Typically, 
meta-analysis can help resolve such inconsistencies. However, not only do several study 
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characteristics of past work preclude meta-analytic comparison, the vast majority examine offline 
time scarcity promotions that are explicitly designed for non-digital distribution and print media, 
such as newspaper inserts (e.g., Howard and Kerin 2006), physical coupons (e.g., Cheema and 
Patrick 2008), flyers (e.g., Inman, Peter, and Raghubir 1997), and print ads (e.g., Aggarwal, Jun, 
and Huh 2011; McQuilken et al. 2015). Only in the last decade have a handful of studies expressly 
investigated online time scarcity promotions (e.g., Coulter and Roggeveen 2012; Eisenbeiss et al. 
2015), although most have focused on daily deal websites that have cooled in popularity (Baker 
2013; Sheppard 2017) and, by their nature, lack a control condition where no time scarcity is 
present. Thus, we conclude that direct examination of time scarcity appeals in their modern online 
form remains too sparse to offer generalizable recommendations.  
Consequently, we conduct new empirical tests of online time scarcity promotions. Twenty-
six empirical studies with over 35,000 participants examine whether contemporary online time 
scarcity promotions increase product valuation in ways consistent with prior offline theory and 
findings. This portfolio of studies was designed to reflect the range of contemporary online time 
scarcity promotions, using a variety of different product types (e.g., tablet computer, air purifier, 
information access, snacks), price points (e.g., average market value ranging from approximately 
$5 to $3,500), digital domains (e.g., online retail websites, email marketing messages, social 
media) and implementation formats (e.g., dynamic countdown timers, which represent the 
prototypical modern instantiation of online time scarcity tactics). We also employ multiple 
indicators to assess consumer value, such as monetary and subjective willingness to pay (WTP), 
self-reported purchase intentions, actual digital behavioral engagement, perceived product 
desirability, and purchase decisions. Moreover, individual studies capture several other consumer 
perceptions (e.g., persuasion knowledge activation, attitude toward the retailer, website 
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perceptions) or manipulate specific factors (e.g., risk reduction, system 1 vs. system 2 mindset, 
elaboration) to explore potential explanations for patterns observed in the data. 
Finally, we synthesize our compendium of new empirical findings. Results from both 
single-study analyses and single-paper meta-analyses (McShane and Böckenholt 2017) 
demonstrate that, despite a few single-study instances where positive effects emerge for select 
measures, contemporary online time scarcity promotions more often have null or negative effects 
on marketing-relevant measures that would be presumed to benefit if past offline theory held. 
Single-paper meta-analytic results also show that plausible alternative explanations for these 
findings, such as persuasion knowledge activation and negative attitudes toward the retailer, do 
not fully account for our results. Although much remains to be learned, this evidence suggests that 
contemporary online time scarcity tactics are not as universally effective as previous offline time 
scarcity research and pervasive marketplace usage may suggest, thus providing an empirically-
grounded call for new theory development in this area.  
This article represents a novel approach to revisiting past theory that contributes to a new 
understanding of the current consumer and marketplace. First, this article provides new empirical 
evidence that directly tests online time scarcity promotions. Findings indicate that contemporary 
online time scarcity promotions can negligibly or adversely influence valuation of goods or 
opportunities. These results suggest weakened relevance of previous offline time scarcity theory 
and findings for contemporary online marketing and calls for renewed consideration of the 
translation of offline theory to online contexts. 
A second contribution concerns the paper’s general approach. This article is not intended 
to be a literature review nor a meta-analysis of prior work. Rather, we model a generalizable 
paradigm for considering the relevance of past marketing theory to current marketing contexts. 
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The framework, which we refer to as the ARTS paradigm (Assumption, Retrospection, Testing, 
Synthesis), involves evaluating the appropriateness of prior theory’s assumptions in the present 
market (Assumption), analyzing the relevance of past research (Retrospection), conducting new 
empirical tests for the present phenomenon (Testing), and synthesizing new findings using 
aggregating methodology (Synthesis). Thus, the ARTS process offers a roadmap for determining 
whether given theories or effects are robust across temporal and market changes, particularly when 
the permanency and prevalence of such changes renders perfect duplication of prior circumstances 
impossible and, consequently, untestable. Moreover, the ARTS framework provides a systematic 
way to theoretically and empirically reexamine established marketing phenomena, without casting 
aspersion on the rigor or credibility of past work.  
This article additionally responds to repeated calls for a means to publish rigorously 
obtained null results (Abadie 2018; Angrist et al. 2017; Doshi et al. 2013; Landis et al. 2014; 
Rothstein and Bushman 2012; van Assen et al. 2014). Although, historically, the selective 
reporting of findings and aversion to null effects has been pervasive (e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, and 
Wicherts 2012; Fanelli 2012; Ferguson and Heene 2012; Franco, Malhotra, and Simonovits 2014; 
Giner-Sorolla 2012; Ioannidis et al. 2014; Ziliak and McCloskey 2008), the publication of null 
results has become increasingly common and important in a wide-range of basic and applied fields, 
such as education (e.g., Angrist et al. 2017; Oreopoulos et al. 2018), economics (e.g., Bhattacharya, 
Garber, and Goldhaber-Fiebert 2015; Bronchetti et al. 2011; Camerer et al. 2016; Carrera et al. 
2018), and oncology (e.g., Begley and Ellis 2012). By transparently presenting our observed null 
effects, this work informs the direction of future research and industry practices, calling for critical 
re-evaluation and ongoing testing of online time scarcity promotions. Consequently, this article is 
intended to stimulate work that generates new theory regarding online time scarcity promotions 
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and identifies whether specific circumstances exist under which these tactics are robustly effective. 
We discuss ideas toward this end in the General Discussion. 
4.1 Assumptions: Are the Assumptions Underlying Past Research Appropriate for the 
Contemporary Marketplace? 
Cialdini’s (1984) publication of Influence popularized scarcity as powerful means of 
consumer influence. Cialdini suggested that consumers use scarcity as a heuristic cue for inferring 
value. In addition to proposing the effectiveness of “limited-number” tactics that place quantity 
restrictions on an offer, Cialdini also speculated on the efficacy of “deadline” tactics that place 
time limits on an offer, noting that “people frequently find themselves doing what they wouldn’t 
particularly care to do simply because the time to do so is shrinking” (Cialdini 1984, 181). Despite 
relying primarily on anecdotal examples (e.g., the “Great Poseidon Auction” among TV networks, 
his brother’s college car sales, and his desire to tour a Mormon temple) and on previously existing 
empirical evidence of a basic quantity-based scarcity effect (e.g., Worchel, Lee, and Adewole 
1975, cookie studies), the book contributed to the widespread use of time scarcity promotions 
among marketing practitioners and increased empirical attention among marketing scholars. 
To support this assertion, we must adopt two major assumptions. First, it is necessary to 
assume that time scarcity promotions increase the perceived value of the promoted product. This 
assumption originates from classic research seeking to understand the influence of scarcity on 
perceived value, starting with commodity theory (Brock 1968). Commodity theory proposed that 
commodities are perceived to be more valuable as their availability decreases (Brock 1968). Meta-
analytic results generally support commodity theory’s claims with offline quantity-based 
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restriction (Lynn 1991), yet reversals have been noted (e.g., Shippee, Mowen and Gregory 1981). 
Although researchers debate the mechanisms underlying the association between scarcity and 
increased value (e.g., need for uniqueness, Fromkin and Snyder 1980; reactance, Brehm 1966; 
Clee and Wicklund 1980; Worchel et al. 1975; lay theories, Lynn 1992; value inferences, Cialdini 
1984; Ditto and Jemmott 1989; elaborative processing, Brock and Brannon 1992; arousal, Zhu and 
Ratner 2015), most agree that a basic scarcity effect is robust.   
The second assumption required to support Cialdini’s (1984) contention in the present-day 
marketplace is that the influence of time scarcity promotions emerges independent of the retail 
context in which the tactics are employed. Scarcity is generally regarded as a “universal” economic 
and marketing principle, such that "any commodity will be valued to the extent that it is 
unavailable" (Brock 1968, 246). In marketing, quantity-based scarcity effects have been reported 
for a wide range of products, including cookies (Worchel et al. 1975), recipe books (Verhallen and 
Robben 1994), wine (van Herpen, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2009), and automobiles (Cachon, 
Gallino, and Olivares 2019). Research has also demonstrated quantity-based scarcity effects in a 
wide range of consumption situations, including when experiencing financial constraint (Sharma 
and Alter 2012), viewing real-time inventory information (Cui, Zhang, and Bassamboo 2019), and 
inferring market circumstances for product shortage (e.g., high demand, Gierl and Huettl 2010). 
The diversity of these quantity-based scarcity findings contributed to further strengthening of the 
assumption that scarcity principles are broadly generalizable and invariant to the method or 
medium of implementation.  
We question whether these assumptions remain applicable for present-day online time 
scarcity promotions. Introduction of the internet and subsequent growth in e-commerce radically 
transformed (1) the contexts in which time scarcity tactics are meant to be applied, (2) the methods 
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by which time scarcity tactics are intended to be implemented, and (3) the experience of consumers 
expected to favorably respond to these tactics. Under such circumstances, even the most well-
designed and rigorous research may not uniformly translate to the present. 
First, the internet has transformed the contexts in which time scarcity tactics are meant to 
be applied. If parallels exist between modern marketing retail contexts and those from over 30 
years ago, one might preserve the assumption that time scarcity promotions favorably enhance 
value of the promoted product irrespective of the retail environment in which the promotions are 
implemented. However, such parallels may be quite weak, if they exist at all. When Cialdini’s 
book was published in 1984, only 8% of U.S. households had a computer and 0% had internet 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988). It would be seven years until the World Wide Web publicly 
launched in 1991, and even longer until the first exclusively online transaction reportedly occurred 
in 1994 (for Sting’s “Ten Summoner’s Tales” CD; Fessenden 2015; Lewis 1994). By contrast, 
76% of U.S. adults have made and online purchase in the past year (NPR Marist Poll 2018) and 
global e-commerce sales are estimated to exceed $4.4 trillion (16% of all retail sales) by 2021 
(eMarketer 2017).  
The internet prompted unprecedented changes that have profoundly transformed the retail 
context, with major theoretical implications.  For one, the internet increased information 
availability and accessibility to consumers, dramatically reducing search costs (e.g., Alba et al. 
1997; Bakos 1997, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Hoffman and Novak 1996; Lynch and Ariely 
2000). This prompted the emergence of new decision aids, such as price comparison websites 
(Häubl and Trifts 2000) and, more broadly, the adoption of the internet as a decision support tool 
(Lamberton and Stephen 2016). In addition, the internet increased product selection and variety 
for consumers (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2003), contributing to the marketplace’s  shift to “the 
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long tail” (Anderson 2004), marked by increasing the proportion of sales generated by niche 
products and reducing the share from a few best-sellers (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester 2011). 
Moreover, the internet introduced a new form of physical separation between consumers and 
products, characterized by limited sensory information (Alba et al. 1997; Degeratu, Rangaswamy, 
and Wu 2000; Saini and Lynch 2016).  
Second, the internet has transformed the methods by which time scarcity tactics are 
implemented. In contrast to traditional tactics previously used for offline print advertisements and 
brick-and-mortar retailers, such as static coupons or flyers, contemporary online time scarcity 
marketing tactics are more dynamic, precise, and brief. Each of these changes introduces new 
cognitive and affective processes that may alter their effects. For example, across multiple digital 
marketing channels (e.g., email, social media, online retail product posting), consumers have been 
repeatedly exposed to “flash sales” that emphasize an exceedingly short promotional window (e.g., 
12-hour online retail fashion sale). Some retailers regularly offer online “deal-of-the-day” 
promotions that provide time-limited discounts on specific items for a 24-hour period (e.g., 
Amazon’s “Gold Box Deal of the Day,” Home Depot’s “Special Buy of the Day,” and Best Buy’s 
“Daily Doorbuster Deals”). Often accompanying flash offerings is a timer counting down the time 
remaining in the promotion intended to increase consumers’ urgency to act (e.g., “sale ends in 3 
hours: 12 minutes: 48 seconds!”). In fact, the popularity of such promotions has sparked the 
emergence of multiple online retailers with business models that rely heavily or exclusively on 
platforms of online daily flash sales (e.g., Groupon.com).   
Third, the internet has dramatically transformed the retail experience of consumers. Online, 
consumers experience greater ease to obtain product price information and engage in cross-store 
comparisons (e.g., Lynch and Ariely 2000), which may reduce the likelihood that a given online 
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time scarcity promotion provides the most salient information possible about the value of a good 
or the availability of a given price. In addition, the internet has made it easier for consumers to 
share their information about and experiences with online time scarcity promotions. This has 
prompted greater production of and reliance on consumer-generated evaluative content and word 
of mouth (e.g., customer ratings, online reviews, blog posts, product reveal videos) as means of 
evaluating a product’s value (Lamberton and Stephen 2016). Online time scarcity tactics, 
therefore, may have little influence on product valuation in the presence of information provided 
alternative sources that are more heavily weighted by the consumer. 
Whereas consumers’ understanding of online tactics in general, and online time scarcity 
promotions specifically, was virtually non-existent in the decade after Influence was published, 
consumers’ exposure to exploding deals and countdown clocks is now widespread. Frequent 
exposure is likely to generate persuasion knowledge (Friestad and Wright 1994) that can increase 
consumer suspicion and skepticism surrounding the offer and the retailer (Campbell and Kirmani 
2000) or promote unfavorable inferences regarding the retailer and the retail environment. In 
addition, the competitive orientation elicited by such scarcity cues (Kristofferson et al. 2017; Roux, 
Goldsmith, and Bonezzi 2015), which is often directed at other consumers (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 
2011), may shift to be directed at the retailer in online retail contexts, where the retailer (rather 
than other consumers) represents the source of the restriction.  
Thus, the emergence of the internet has radically altered the context, implementation, and 
experience of time scarcity promotions. These changes provide theoretical grounds on which to 
question the relevance of prior theory related to online time scarcity promotions. If, however, time 
scarcity promotions examined in prior research have consistently raised product valuation relative 
to cases in which they were not present, then we may have less reason to doubt that such online 
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transformations have undermined their effectiveness despite the contextual changes described 
above. We next examine past academic research for such evidence. 
4.2 Retrospection: To What Degree is Related Past Empirical Evidence Conclusive and 
Generalizable? 
We first conducted a search for terms such as “time scarcity,” and “time scarcity 
promotions” in the peer-reviewed marketing literature, examining the citation lists of resulting 
papers to find related work. Given our definition of online time scarcity promotions as marketing 
tactics used in the online environment designed to impose salient temporal restrictions explicitly 
related to the promotional offer’s acquisition availability, we excluded studies restricting decision 
time not explicitly related to a promotional offer, such as limiting the time participants had to 
complete their shopping (Chowdhury, Ratneshwar, and Mohanty 2009, Study 1) or to review a 
print advertisement (Krishnan, Dutta, and Jha 2013, Studies 2 and 3). Additionally, we excluded 
studies for which the time restriction was unrelated to the acquisition availability of the 
promotional offer (e.g., exclusively related to offer redemption), such as imposing “blackout 
dates” that restrict when participants could use a fictional flight deal (Sinha, Chandran, and 
Srinivasan 1999, Study 2) or manipulating how long after a purchase that a promotional incentive 
would be dispersed (Roehm and Roehm 2011, Study 1).   
Table 11 displays coding and details for each identified study. The first two columns 
identify the article and study, respectively. The next three columns describe the product stimuli 
(Column 3), final sample (Column 4), and empirical context (Column 5) used in each study. 
Columns 6 and 7 provide information about study conditions, detailing specifics related to the time 
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scarcity promotion manipulation or measurement in Column 6 (e.g., phrasing used in time scarcity, 
quantity scarcity, and control conditions) and identifying any additional study design conditions 
in Column 7 (e.g., low vs. high discount size offered).  
Column 8 indicates whether acquisition of the promotion occurs in an online retail context, 
regardless of whether the context was fictional or real (e.g., simulated retail website, fictional 
social media post, Groupon.com data); thus, studies conducted using an online survey platform 
(e.g., Qualtrics) were not coded as investigating an online promotion. Column 9 lists the primary 
outcome variable(s), the results of which are summarized in Columns 10 and 11. For each outcome, 
Column 10 displays the overall nature of the time scarcity effect (relative to the control condition), 
which is coded either as positive (“+”), negative (“–”), null (“=”), or conditional (“~”). Subscripts 
indicate when testing of the time scarcity promotion condition versus the promotion control 
condition is not applicable (i.e., “NAa” denotes that a control condition is absent; “NAb” denotes 
that not direct test was reported). Additional details regarding the observed time scarcity effect are 
provided in Column 11, including specific contrasts when the effect is conditional. In total, 34 
empirical studies from 19 published articles comprise Table 11. 
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Table 11 (Essay 3) Summary of Existing Empirical Evidence for Time Scarcity Promotions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Article Study Product Final 
Analyzed 
Sample 
Context TS Manipulation/Measurement 
TS = time scarcity, C = control, 
TC = time control, QS = quantity scarcity  
Other 
Factor(s) 
Online  
TS  
Promo 
Outcome  
Variable 
TS  
Promo 
Effect 
Effect  
Details 
Lee et al. 
2018 
1 Sunglasses 150 
(students) 
Viewed printout of 
fictional website 
with fashion 
promotion 
TS: “Hurry, limited time offer” 
QS: “Hurry, only a few items left” 
C: no restriction in ad 
Reversibility: low; high Yes Purchase Intentions ~ RH: ↑ RL: TS = C 
WTP ($) ~ RH: ↑ RL: TS = C 
Falsity Inference NAb  
Kristofferson 
et al. 2017 
7 iPhone 6 152 
(students) 
Viewed fictional ad; 
played 2 competitive 
games: first-person 
shooter; word search  
TS: “Sale lasts for 1 day only”  
TC: “Sale lasts for 30+ days” 
QS: “only 3 available” 
QC: “3,000 available”  
C: no restriction in ad 
― No Aggression 
(# of shots fired) 
= TS = C TC = C 
Nonaggression 
(# of words found) 
= TS = C TC = C 
Shen 2016 1 Soft drink 200  
(students) 
Viewed print ad for 
fictional new soft 
drink 
 
TS-short: “Special Introductory Offer. One 
week only!”  
TS-long: “Special Introductory Offer. Six 
months only!” 
Argument: strong; weak No Product Evaluation NAa  
Evaluation Confidence NAa  
Thought Listing Valance 
(of Product Attributes)  
NAa  
Perceived Availability NAa  
Message Content NAa  
Weathers et 
al. 2015 
1 Inflatable 
massage 
chair 
190 
(students) 
Saw product 
description and 
typical price; viewed 
fictional print ad 
TS-short: “1 Day Sale!”  
TS-long: “30 Day Sale!”  
Discount Size: 5% (small); 
50% (large) 
 
No Purchase Intentions NAa  
Retailer Credibility NAa  
2 Waterproof 
phone case 
226 
(online  
panel) 
(same as Study 1) (same as Study 1) Discount Size: 10% 
(small); 50% (large) 
 
No Purchase Intentions NAa  
Retailer Credibility NAa  
Product Quality NAa  
Retailer Opportunism NAa  
McQuilken et 
al. 2015 
1 2-year 
Telecom 
Contract 
180 
(online  
panel) 
Viewed fictional 
print ad promoting 
telecom services 
TS: “Bundle and save! Hurry! Save 15%. Offer 
ends [DATE].”  
C: “Bundle and save!” 
Bundling: no bundle; 2-
item bundle; 3-item bundle 
No Promotion Value (rating) ~ B3: ↓ B2: ↑2 B0:  
TS = C 
Perceived Risk ~ B3: ↑ B2:  
TS = C 
B0:  
TS = C 
Perceived Confusion = TS = C 
2 Sony 
PlayStation 
4 
206 
(online  
panel) 
Viewed fictional 
print ad promoting 
videogame products 
(same as Study 1) (same as Study 1) No Promotion Value (rating) = TS = C 
Perceived Risk = TS = C 
Perceived Confusion = TS = C 
Eisenbeiss, et 
al. 2015 
1 Dinner; 
Bicycle  
tune-up 
126 
(students) 
Imagined finding a 
“Daily Deal” 
promotion for 
consumer experience 
TS-short: “available only 1 day” 
TS-long: “available only 7 days”  
Discount Size: 50% off; 
70% off 
Product: hedonic; 
utilitarian 
Yes Deal Attractiveness NAa  
 2 Groupon 
deal 
5,698 
(Groupon 
shoppers) 
 
Analysis of Groupon 
transaction data 
(Sept. 2009 - July 
2011) 
*Coded 
TS: (inverse of) promotion duration 
Product Category: hedonic; 
utilitarian 
(*coded) 
 
Yes Unit Sales NAa  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Article Study Product Final 
Analyzed 
Sample 
Context TS Manipulation/Measurement 
TS = time scarcity, C = control, 
TC = time control, QS = quantity scarcity  
Other 
Factor(s) 
Online  
TS  
Promo 
Outcome  
Variable 
TS  
Promo 
Effect 
Effect  
Details 
Jang et al. 
2015 
1 Watch; 
yogurt 
184 
(students) 
Imagined possible 
release of new 
limited-edition items 
(only scarcity 
groups); all viewed 
fictional ad  
TS: “only available for [XX] days” (yogurt: 15, 
watch: 30) 
QS: “only [XX] available” (yogurt: 5,000, 
watch: 500) 
C: no restrictions in ad 
Conspicuous Product: 
watch (yes); yogurt (no) 
(*no manipulated for C)  
No Purchase Intentions NAb  
Product Value (rating) NAb  
Brand Attitude NAb  
2 Watch; 
yogurt 
216 
(Mturk 
Workers) 
Imagined possible 
release of new 
limited-edition 
items, then viewed 
fictional ad 
TS: (same as Study 1) 
QS: (same as Study 1) 
Conspicuous Product: 
(same as Study 1) 
Need for Uniqueness: low; 
high (*measured) 
No Purchase Intentions NAa  
Product Value (rating) NAa  
Brand Attitude NAa  
WOM Intentions NAa  
Krishnan et 
al. 2013 
1 DVD 
player 
141 
(students) 
Completed booklet 
with printed ad and 
survey 
TS: “Weekend Sale Only” 
C: “Weekend Sale”  
Reference Price: plausible; 
exaggerated 
No Promotion Value (rating) NAb  
Shopping Intentions NAb  
Attitude Toward Deal NAb  
Coulter and 
Roggeveen 
2012 
1 Groupon 
deal 
109 
(Groupon 
deals; 2 US 
markets) 
Analysis of Groupon 
promotion data 
(Spring 2011) 
*Time until expiration, measured 4 times daily 
after deal “tipped”  
TS-short: last two measurements (TS3, TS4)  
TS-long: first two measurement (TS1, TS2) 
Prior Buyer Number 
(*measured) 
Yes % change of Buyers NAa  
2 Groupon 
restaurant 
deal 
121 
(online  
panel) 
Imagined finding 
fictional Groupon 
deal 
TS-short: “3 minutes 57 seconds”  
TS-long: “2 days, 13 hours, 9 minutes, 57 
seconds” 
Prior Buyer Number: small; 
large 
Purch. Limit: yes; no 
Yes Purchase Intentions NAa  
Promotion Value (rating) NAa  
Anticipated Regret NAa  
Aggarwal et 
al. 2011 
1 Watch 123 
(students) 
Viewed print ad for 
fictional sales event 
TS: “For six days only”  
QS: “First 100 customers only”  
C: no restriction in ad 
― No Purchase Intentions NAb  
Consumer Competition NAb  
2 Laptop 207 
(students) 
Imagined shopping 
for laptop (favorite 
brand), viewed 
fictional print ad  
TS: “Limited Time Only” 
QS: “Limited Quantities Only” 
C: no restriction in ad 
Brand Concept: symbolic; 
functional 
No Purchase Intentions NAb  
Consumer Competition NAb  
Cheema and 
Patrick 2008 
1 Deal at 
Favorite 
Store 
131 
(students) 
Primed mindset; 
imagined receiving 
coupon 
*coupon had one-week redemption window  
TS-expansive: “anytime between noon and 4pm” 
TS-restrictive: “only between noon and 4pm” 
Mindset: implemental; 
deliberative 
Discount Size: 30% (low); 
60% (high) 
No Feasibility of Use NAa  
Time Interval Precision NAa  
Deal Attractiveness NAa  
1post Deal at 
Favorite 
Store 
55 
(students) 
(same as Study 1) (same as Study 1) ― No Deal Rarity  NAa  
Deal Exclusivity  NAa  
Deal Specialness  NAa  
2 Deal at 
Favorite 
Store 
168 
(consumers 
near 
university) 
Imagined receiving 
coupon; completed 
BIF  
(same as Study 1) Mindset: implemental; 
deliberative (*measured) 
No Feasibility of Use NAa  
Time Interval Precision NAa  
Usage Likelihood NAa  
3 Coffee 
shop 
coupon 
222 
(students) 
Completed BIF; 
received coupon for 
nearby local coffee 
shop  
TS-expansive: “anytime over the next seven 
days” 
TS-restrictive: “only over the next seven days”  
(same as Study 2) 
 
No Coupon Redemption NAa  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Article Study Product Final 
Analyzed 
Sample 
Context TS Manipulation/Measurement 
TS = time scarcity, C = control, 
TC = time control, QS = quantity scarcity  
Other 
Factor(s) 
Online  
TS  
Promo 
Outcome  
Variable 
TS  
Promo 
Effect 
Effect  
Details 
Suri et al. 
2007 
1 Cancun 
travel 
package 
49 
(students) 
Imagined purchasing 
travel package after 
reviewing booklet of 
available packages 
TS: “available once in the summer”  
C: “available every weekend throughout 
summer” 
Price: $728 (low); $998 
(high) 
No Product Value (rating) ~ PH: ↑ PL: ↓ 
Monetary Sacrifice ~ PH: ↓ PL: ↑ 
Product Quality ~ PH: ↑ PL: ↓ 
2 Cancun 
travel 
package 
108 
(students) 
(same as Study 1) (same as Study 1) 
 
Price: (same as Study 1) 
Info Processing 
Motivation: 
low (ML); high (MH) 
No Product Value (rating) ~ MH = PH: ↑ PL: ↓ 
  ML = PH: ↓ PL: ↑ 
Monetary Sacrifice ~ MH = PH:  
TS = C 
PL: ↑ 
  ML = PH: ↑ PL: ↓ 
Product Quality ~ MH = PH: ↑ PL: ↓ 
  ML = PH: ↓ PL: ↑ 
Heuristic Thoughts ~ MH: ↑ ML: ↓ 
Elaborated Thoughts ~ MH: ↓ ML: ↑ 
Recall Accuracy ~ MH: ↓ ML: ↑ 
Thought Valence = TS = C 
Devlin et al. 
2007 
1 TV 90 
(adults)  
 
Viewed promotional 
advertisement as part 
of shopping task in 
online experiment 
TS: “For one week only!!!”  
C: no time restriction in ad 
Discount Size: 
“…Save £40!” (low); 
“…Save £190!” (high); 
“…Save!” (C) 
No Purchase Intentions = TS = C 
Promotion Value (rating) = TS = C 
Search Intentions  = TS = C 
Howard and 
Kerin 2006 
1 Bedroom 
set; Sofa 
160 
(furniture 
outlet 
shoppers) 
intercepted as 
entering store; 
viewed set of 
fictional print ads  
TS: “Three Days Only! Now $_.”  
Ref. Price: “Now $_. Regularly $_.”  
TS + Ref. Price: “Three Days Only! Now $_. 
Regularly $_.”  
C: “Now $_.”  
Involvement: low; high 
Product: bedroom; sofa 
No Attitude Toward 
Advertised Price 
NAb  
2 Bedroom 
set; Sofa 
240 
(furniture 
outlet 
shoppers) 
(same as Study 1) TS: (same as Study 1) 
Ref. Price: (same as Study 1) 
TS + Ref. Price: (same as Study 1) 
C: (same as Study 1) 
Discount: “Now $_. Regularly $_. 40% Off.”  
TS + Ref. Price + Discount: “Three Days Only! 
Now $_. Regularly $_. 40% Off.”  
(same as Study 1) No Attitude Toward 
Advertised Price 
~ IH: NAb IL: ↑1 
Shopping Intentions ~ IH: NAb IL: ↑1 
    
3 Bedroom 
set; Sofa 
240 
(furniture 
outlet 
shoppers) 
(same as Study 1) TS: (same as Study 1) 
Ref. Price: (same as Study 1) 
TS + Ref. Price: (same as Study 1) 
Sale: “Now $_. Regularly $_. Sale.”  
TS + Sale: Three Days Only! Now $_. Sale.”  
TS + Ref. Price + Sale: “Three Days Only! 
Now $_. Regularly $_. Sale.”  
(same as Study 1) No Attitude Toward 
Advertised Price 
NAa  
Shopping Intentions NAa  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Article Study Product Final 
Analyzed 
Sample 
Context TS Manipulation/Measurement 
TS = time scarcity, C = control, 
TC = time control, QS = quantity scarcity  
Other 
Factor(s) 
Online  
TS  
Promo 
Outcome  
Variable 
TS  
Promo 
Effect 
Effect  
Details 
Abendroth 
and Diehl 
2006 
2 Concert 
t-shirt 
313 
(students) 
Imagined attending 
concert by favorite 
band; sketched t-
shirt design; 
imagined available 
for purchase 
TS: “…the shirt is officially licensed 
merchandise and is only available at the 
concert”  
Purchase: bought; did not 
buy 
Utility: low; high 
No Short-Term Regret NAa  
Changes in Regret NAa  
3 Concert 
CD 
92 
(students) 
Imagined attending 
concert by favorite 
band; live recording 
available for 
purchase 
TS: “…will only be available at the concert” 
C: “...will also be available on the band’s 
website and at the Virgin Megastore…” 
Purchase: (same as Study 
1) 
No Short-Term Regret NAb  
Changes in Regret = TS = C 
Product Value ($) = TS = C 
Psych Reactance = TS = C 
Aggarwal and 
Vaidyanathan 
2003 
1 Ketchup; 
Peanut 
Butter 
not reported 
(Nielsen 
panelists; 
moderate-
heavy users;    
1 city) 
Secondary data 
analysis of purchase 
behavior using A.C. 
Nielsen Scanner 
Panel Data 
*Coded 
TS: Store coupons  
TS: In-store price specials  
C: Manufacturers’ coupons 
― No Purch. Acceleration: 
Store Coupon (K) NAa 
 
In-Store Specials (K) NAa  
Manuf. Coupon (K) NAa  
Store Coupon (PB) NAa  
In-Store Specials (PB) NAa  
Manuf. Coupon (PB) NAa  
2 Home 
stereo 
system 
102 
(students) 
Viewed fictional 
print ad in 
experiment 
questionnaire 
booklet 
TS: “10 Hours Only Super Sale”  
C: “10th Anniversary Super Sale”  
― No Search Intentions  – ↓1 
Willingness to Buy  + ↑1 
Attitude Toward Deal + ↑1 
Brannon and 
Brock 2001 
3 Cinnamon 
twist 
305 
(drive-thru 
customers) 
Encouraged to order 
cinnamon twist 
before providing 
food order (during 
off-peak hours) 
TS-short: "Would you like a cinnamon twist 
made with our special recipe today only?"  
TS- long: "Would you like a cinnamon twist 
made with our usual recipe for this year?”  
Argument: strong; weak No Product Purchase NAa  
Inman et al. 
1997 
3 batteries; 
cassette; 
electric 
toothbrush 
182 
(students) 
Imagined needing to 
buy a product, 
viewed fictional 
print ad for 
supermarket 
promotion 
TS: “Restricted Offer. Only Available for a 
Limited Time [Expires _]” 
QS: “Restricted Offer. Maximum Purchase 
Allowed: One (1) per Customer” 
C: no restrictions given 
Discount Size: 
5% (low); 20% (high) 
No Deal Evaluation ~ DH: ↑ DL: ↓ 
Purchase Intentions ~ DH: ↑ DL: ↓ 
    
4 batteries; 
cassette; 
electric 
toothbrush 
128 
(students) 
Viewed 2 fictional 
print ads for same 
product, each 
offering different 
discount promotion 
TS: (same as Study 3) 
QS: (same as Study 3) 
C: (same as Study 3) 
Precondition: “Restricted Offer. Only 
Available with a Minimum Purchase of 
$25” 
*within-subjects  
Discount Size:  
5% (low); 50% (high) 
No Purchase Intentions ~ DH: ↑ DL: TS = C 
Inman and 
McAlister 
1994 
1 Spaghetti 
sauce 
(7 varieties) 
260 
(coupon  
drops) 
Analysis of coupon 
redemption in A.C. 
Nielsen Scanner 
Panel Data 
*Measured 
TS: Time until expiration of coupon  
 
― No Weekly Coupon 
Redemption Rate 
NAa  
Note. Consistent with our previously stated conceptualization of online time scarcity promotions, this table only includes empirical studies examining time restriction that was explicitly related to the 
acquisition availability of a promotional offer. Column 8 (“Online TS Promo”) indicates whether acquisition of the promotion occurs in an online retail context (actual or simulated). In Column 10, the nature 
of the time scarcity effect, relative to the control condition, is indicated as follows: positive (“+”), negative (“–”), null (“=”), conditional (“~”), not applicable due to no control condition (“NAa”), and not 
applicable due to no direct test of TS effect (“NAb”). In Column 11, the subscript “1” indicates a one-tailed test, and subscript “2” indicates a marginal effect. All conditions were manipulated between 
subjects, unless otherwise indicated. 
 150 
4.2.1 Inconsistent Results 
Several characteristics of prior research weaken our ability to conclude that online time 
scarcity promotions will reliably raise consumers’ value of the promoted product. First, prior 
empirical work on time scarcity promotions offers inconsistent results, demonstrating positive, 
conditional, and null effects (see Table 11). For example, Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan (2003; 
Study 2) found that exposure to time scarcity print promotions, compared to control promotions, 
can increase willingness to buy the advertised product, enhance favorability of deal, and reduce 
intentions to search for a better deal. By contrast, additional work suggests that such positive 
effects are conditional on other factors. Inman et al. (1997), for example, found that time scarcity 
print promotions increase purchase intentions at higher discount levels (20%, 50%), but exhibit 
negative (Study 3) or null (Study 4) effects at low discount levels (5%). Consequently, Inman et 
al. (1997) suggested that “the effect of [time] restrictions is not uniform” (77).  
Howard and Kerin (2006) also report a conditional time scarcity promotion effect, 
dependent on consumer involvement with the promoted product. In Study 2, time scarcity print 
advertisements reviewed by furniture outlet customers increased store shopping intentions and 
favorability of product price attitudes, relative to ads without time scarcity, but only for low-
involvement shoppers (for whom the ad was not personally relevant). This finding suggests that 
time scarcity promotions do not positively influence consumers who are actively shopping for the 
product or service promoted in the advertisement. As an additional example of conditional effects, 
Suri, Kohli, and Monroe (2007) found that when individuals were highly motivated to process the 
promotional offer’s message, time scarcity promotions (relative to a control condition) enhanced 
a higher-priced promoted product’s subjective value and reduced a lower-priced product’s 
subjective value. This pattern reversed, however, for individuals with low processing motivation: 
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exposure to time scarcity promotions lowered the subjective value of a higher-priced product and 
increased the subjective value of a lower-priced product (Study 2).  
And yet, as another alternative to positive or conditional effects, we also observe instances 
of prior empirical work reporting a null effect of time scarcity promotions. In examining the impact 
of limited purchase opportunities on regret, Abendroth and Diehl (2006, Study 3) manipulate the 
temporal availability of a concert CD but find no influence on its estimated monetary value. 
McQuilken et al. (2015) find that time scarcity enhanced a promoted product’s value only when 
the fictional print advertisement involved a 3-item telecom contract (Study 1); in all other cases, 
there was no effect of the time scarcity tactic on consumers’ subjective valuation of the advertised 
offer (Studies 1 and 2). Devlin et al. (2007) reported no significant impact time scarcity promotions 
on subjective value of the promoted deal, regardless of the size of the discount offered, contrary 
to the findings of Inman et al. (1997).  
4.2.2 Limited Direct Comparability 
Although meta-analysis can often provide insight for resolving such inconsistencies, there 
are several factors that severely limit direct comparability across studies, making a traditional 
meta-analytic approach inappropriate. One issue concerns the lack of a promotional control 
condition: only 50% of studies detailed in Table 11 have a promotional control condition to which 
we can directly compare a time scarcity promotion effect. Rather, many studies make comparisons 
among different marketing tactics or promotion formats (e.g., time scarcity vs. quantity scarcity 
promotions). For example, Cheema and Patrick (2008, Studies 1-3) compare whether expansive 
(“anytime between”) or restrictive framing (“only between”) time restriction is better for coupon 
promotion attractiveness and redemption. Eisenbeiss et al. (2015, Study 1) examine whether 
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people perceive shorter (“available only 1 day”) or longer (“available only 7 days”) daily deal 
promotions as more attractive. Similarly, Weathers, Swain, and Makienko (2015, Studies 1 and 2) 
investigate whether shorter (“1 Day Sale!”) or longer (“30 Day Sale!) time scarcity print 
promotions prompt greater purchase intentions. Brannon and Brock (2001, Study 3) examine 
cinnamon twist purchases at a Mexican drive-thru to compare whether employees’ use of shorter 
timeframes (“would you like a cinnamon twist made with our special recipe today only?”) or 
longer timeframes (“would you like a cinnamon twist made with our usual recipe for this year?”) 
in time scarcity messaging generates more sales.  
Some studies, despite including a promotional control condition, lack direct statistical 
testing relative to the time scarcity condition. Jang et al. (2015), for example, jointly test whether 
scarcity promotions (combining both quantity and time scarcity promotions) increase the perceived 
value of the promoted product relative to a control condition, but do not report testing the effect 
of time scarcity promotions in isolation. Similarly, Lee, Oh, and Jung (2018) combine quantity 
scarcity and time scarcity promotion conditions when testing against control condition but do not 
test the distinct time scarcity promotion effect. As another example, when assessing shopping 
intentions, Krishnan et al. (2013) report a significant interaction between the presence of a time 
scarcity tactic (i.e., present vs. absent) and the promotion’s reference price (i.e., plausible vs. 
exaggerated) but do not provide simple effects comparing time scarcity promotion to the control 
condition for each reference price; rather, they report the simple effects comparing plausible and 
exaggerated reference prices for each promotion type (time scarcity and control).  
An additional factor limiting the direct comparability across studies is dissimilar outcome 
measurement. Two of the 34 total studies in Table 11 measured objective financial valuation of 
the promoted product in monetary terms (i.e., WTP $ amount, product $ value). By contrast, nine 
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studies measured subjective valuation (of product or promotion) and 11 studies assessed self-
reported purchase intentions.  
4.2.3 Designed for Offline Retail  
Even if all prior studies were perfectly comparable, conclusions drawn from any meta-
analysis conducted on the previous work would rely almost entirely on time scarcity promotions 
intended for offline retail contexts, making the applicability of past empirical evidence to the 
present-day marketplace questionable. The bulk of work in this area examines offline time scarcity 
promotions explicitly designed for non-digital distribution and print media, such as newspaper 
inserts (e.g., Howard and Kerin 2006), physical coupons (e.g., Cheema and Patrick 2008), 
supermarket flyers (e.g., Inman et al. 1997), and print advertisements (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2011; 
McQuilken et al. 2015). Several studies used ad copies physically printed as part of a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire (e.g., Aggarwal and Vaidyanathan 2003; Inman et al. 1997; Krishnan et al. 
2013). Other studies, despite presenting stimuli using online survey software (e.g., Qualtrics), 
displayed time scarcity promotions that were explicitly stated to be for print media or 
dissemination via non-digital marketing (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2011; McQuilken et al. 2015).  
Direct examination of time scarcity appeals in their modern online form is sparse: only a 
handful of studies in the past decade (14.71% of studies in Table 11) have expressly investigated 
online time scarcity promotions (e.g., Coulter and Roggeveen 2012; Eisenbeiss et al. 2015). Given 
that online time scarcity promotions often display remaining promotion time in digitally dynamic 
ways, it is unclear how prior, primarily offline, work can be directly comparable.   
Taken together, this retrospective review suggests that we lack a coherent body of research 
that replicates consistent, practically meaningful effects of time scarcity marketing tactics that are 
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relevant for contemporary online settings. Little past work appears to consistently or directly 
address online time scarcity promotions. This, coupled with the transformative changes to the 
marketing context, promotion implementation, and consumer experience, weakens the theoretical 
relevance and empirical generalizability of earlier research examining traditional offline time 
scarcity promotions. However, if new empirical evidence investigating online time scarcity 
promotions in the present-day marketing context converges with patterns and predictions of 
research conducted in the preceding marketing context, then the field can have greater confidence 
that initial theory regarding time scarcity promotions extends to current online implementation of 
these tactics in the modern marketplace of contemporary consumers. To test this possibility, we 
next conduct a series of new empirical studies that addresses the issues that limit the relevance of 
prior work: directly examining time scarcity promotions in their current online form, consistently 
measuring product valuation using retailer-applicable metrics, and regularly including promotional 
control conditions. In doing so, we generate a new body of evidence that is generalizable to current 
marketing contexts and consumers, informative for retailers, and directly tests for the influence of 
online promotions with and without time scarcity. 
4.3 Testing: What New Empirical Investigations Reflect the Contemporary Manifestation 
of this Phenomenon? 
We conducted 26 studies directly testing the effect of online time scarcity promotions 
across a range of consequential and attitudinal outcomes, promotional stimuli, and digital contexts. 
Appendix J presents each study’s online time scarcity manipulation, Web Appendix W 
summarizes each study’s separate design and findings, and Web Appendix X provides additional 
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analysis information. We further refer the reader to OSF (https://osf.io/epsdg/) for access to all 
stimuli, data, and survey materials.  
 
A. 
 
B. 
 
    
C. 
 
D. 
 
Note. Example online time scarcity promotions are from a varied subset of studies: Panel A (Studies 1 and 14), Panel B (Study 7), Panel C (Study 
11), and Panel D (Studies 4 and 5). All online time scarcity promotion manipulations consisted of the presence (vs. absence) of a countdown 
timer; all other website, product, and promotional content was identical across time scarcity and control conditions. All countdown timers were 
dynamic, with time remaining actively decreasing upon viewing the online promotion. Panels A and D display categorical time manipulations 
(i.e., a specific pre-determined amount of time); Panels B and C display continuous time manipulations (i.e., a randomly selected amount of time 
within a pre-determined range). Studies that directly assessed WTP amount ($) did not present product price (Panels A, B, and D).  
Figure 16 (Essay 3) Example Online Time Scarcity Promotion Manipulations 
Our goal was to sample broadly across possible operationalizations and typical contexts of 
time scarcity promotions. The basic paradigm used involves participants imagining wanting to 
purchase a product or having the real opportunity to do so; encountering a deal for the item when 
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shopping online or via an email; viewing the promotional offer (with or without online time 
scarcity); and subsequently reporting their willingness to pay (WTP) and/or observing other 
indicators of product valuation. To reflect the range of contemporary online time scarcity 
promotions, we adapted this paradigm across studies, using a variety of different product types 
(e.g., tablet computer, air purifier, web access, snacks), price points (e.g., approximately $5 to 
$3,500), digital domains (e.g., online retail websites, email marketing messages, social media), 
and implementation formats (e.g., dynamic countdown timers, static Facebook ad). Furthermore, 
we also assess various indicators of consumer value, including monetary and subjective WTP, self-
reported purchase intentions, actual digital engagement, perceived product desirability, and 
purchase decisions (see Web Appendix Z for individual items used in each study). Note that in the 
set of studies, we include four consequential experiments – one study with a real online boutique 
using Facebook ads to activate time scarcity perceptions, one with a real service provider using 
email communications and an actual promotion, one in a lab setting involving real choice of 
snacks, and one involving MTurkers and a time-sensitive HIT.  
For those studies using an active countdown timer embedded within the promotion to 
mimic contemporary instantiations of online time scarcity marketing tactics (see Figure 16 for 
explicated screenshots of typical experimental conditions and Appendix J for a full list of stimuli), 
the specific amount of time displayed to consumers was manipulated in one of two ways. 
Categorical online time scarcity promotion manipulations displayed a specific pre-determined 
amount of time: the amount of time remaining was pre-programmed such that random assignment 
determined whether the countdown represented a shorter or longer time period (e.g., Study 16). 
Continuous online time scarcity promotion manipulations, however, displayed a randomly selected 
amount of time within a pre-determined range of time (e.g., Study 12). Using these techniques for 
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manipulating remaining promotion time minimizes the possibility that any specific time displayed 
drives observed effects.  
Numerous indicators of consumer valuation were also assessed: WTP, online purchase 
behavior, reported purchase intentions, product quality perceptions, and product desirability 
perceptions. Some studies measured WTP as an objective financial amount (e.g., “How much 
would you be willing to pay for this product?” sliding scale anchored at $0 and $[approximately 
twice listed price]). Others assessed WTP as a subjective rating relative to a mean price (e.g., 
“Average [product] from this brand have been seen selling on this website for approximately 
$[approximately twice listed price]. How much would you be willing to pay for [product]? 1–
Much Less than $X, 2–Less than $X, 3–A Little Less than $X, 4–Exactly $X, 5–A Little More 
than $X, 6–More than $X, 7–Much More than $X).  
To measure purchase intentions, participants reported likelihood of buying the promoted 
product on a 7-point response scale (e.g., “How likely are you to buy this tablet right now?” 1–
Very Unlikely, 7–Very Likely). In total, eight studies assessed purchase intentions. Online 
purchase behavior was measured as whether individuals exposed to an online promotional offer 
decided to pay for the promoted product. Consumers in the two studies made consequential 
purchase decisions in simulated retail contexts, meaning choice to buy was honored and 
individuals received their purchase (i.e., website access, study 24; snacks, study 26). We also 
identified product quality and desirability perceptions as possible alternative indicators of 
increased valuation. Participants evaluated the promoted product, rating quality in eight studies 
(e.g., “How would you rate the quality of this product?” 1–Very Poor Quality, 7–Very High 
Quality) and desirability in six studies (e.g., “How desirable is this product?” 1–Not at All 
Desirable, 7–Extremely Desirable). Select studies assessed online engagement behavior as the 
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primary outcome of interest, such as time searching online for better deal (Study 2), accepting 
MTurk HIT (Study 22), opening email (Study 23), social media engagement (Study 25). 
To enhance understanding of the psychological effects of exposure to online time scarcity 
promotions, some studies additionally measured consumers’ persuasion knowledge activation, 
retailer competition activation, mood, or psychological reactance. Over time, consumers are 
argued to develop persuasion knowledge that enables them to recognize influence tactics more 
readily and cope with persuasion attempts (Friestad and Wright 1994). In retail contexts, 
persuasion knowledge can shape the inferences consumers make about a retailer’s motives, with 
shoppers perceiving the use of certain marketing tactics as evidence the retailer is attempting to 
manipulate them (e.g., Campbell and Kirmani 2000). It is possible, therefore, that using online 
time scarcity promotion tactics may activate consumers’ persuasion knowledge, subsequently 
increasing suspicion of the retailer’s motives (Campbell and Kirmani 2000) and inclination to 
regard the retailer as an adversary trying to maximize their own gain. Exploring this possibility, 
individuals in three studies completed a five-item mean-composite index of persuasion knowledge 
(e.g., “I'm skeptical about how good this deal is;” 1–Strongly Disagree, 7–Strongly Agree; α’s 
range from .62 to .78 across 3 studies). The scale incorporated items adapted from previous 
research assessing inferences of motives and manipulative intent (Campbell 1995; Campbell and 
Kirmani 2000), as no single commonly accepted measure of persuasion knowledge has been 
developed (Ham, Nelson, and Das 2015).  
In six studies, we examined the impact of online time scarcity promotions on consumers’ 
perception of competition with the retailer. Prior research suggests that a sense of competition can 
be evoked by scarcity cues. For example, consumers exposed to generalized resource scarcity cues 
adopt a diffuse competitive orientation (Kristofferson et al. 2017; Roux et al. 2015) and print 
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advertisements using quantity scarcity promotion tactics can increase perceptions of competition 
with other consumers, which subsequently increased reported purchase intentions (Aggarwal et al. 
2011). Following this logic, it is possible that online time scarcity promotion tactics may also 
engender a competitive orientation, one directed at the primary source of the temporal restriction–
the retailer. To investigate this possibility, participants completed six items capturing the degree 
to which they felt a sense of competition with the retailer (e.g., “Purchasing the product feels like 
a contest: me vs. the retailer;” 1–Strongly Disagree, 7–Strongly Agree), which were averaged to 
form a composite index of perceiving the retailer as an opponent (α’s range from .82 to .90 across 
6 studies; see Web Appendix Z for all items). 
Multiple studies additionally examined retail website perceptions, general product scarcity 
perceptions, and time scarcity, enabling examination of these factors as possible alternative 
explanations. In 18 studies, individuals evaluated the retail website itself. Specifically, participants 
indicated their agreement that the website is “professional,” “easy to understand,” and “visually 
attractive” on a 5-point response scale (1–Strongly Disagree, 5–Strongly Agree). The mean of 
these three items provides a composite index of retail website perceptions (α’s range from .64 to 
.85 across 18 studies). To assess general scarcity perceptions, participants in 16 studies reported 
how scarce they perceived the promoted product to be (e.g., “How scarce is this product?”) 
measured on a 7-point response scale (1–Not at All Scarce, 7–Extremely Scarce). To assess time 
scarcity perceptions, participants in 11 studies indicated how much time remained to purchase the 
promoted product (e.g., “How much time is left to purchase this product?” 1–Not Long at All, 7–
Extremely Long). Consequently, each item represents an opportunity to confirm that participants 
specifically experienced time scarcity. 
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Critically, all studies included an online promotion control condition, which enabled direct 
testing of the effect of online time scarcity promotions. Select studies manipulated additional 
factors to test boundary conditions or potential explanatory mechanisms of online time scarcity 
promotions, such as risk reduction tactics (Study 4, Study 5), enhanced elaboration (Study 6, Study 
20), and holiday retail context (Study 3).  
4.4 Synthesis: What Does Synthesizing New Empirical Findings Reveal About Effect’s 
Robustness Across Temporal and Market Changes? 
Each study was first analyzed in isolation, the results of which we summarize in Web 
Appendix W. In short, we do not observe a reliable convergence of positive online time scarcity 
promotion results as would be predicted by offline time scarcity theory. For example, among the 
17 studies measuring willingness to pay (as a dollar amount), one study finds that online time 
scarcity promotions increase consumer WTP amount (Study 7), one study finds a conditional 
negative effect (Study 16), and 15 studies find no effect on the amount consumers are willing to 
pay (Studies 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24).  
Though individual studies do not yield clear effects, online time scarcity promotions can 
take many forms and firms may vary in their interest in specific product valuation outcomes 
measured. As such, although any given study may deviate from effects seen in offline settings, 
single-paper meta-analyses on comparable studies allows us to see if certain combinations of 
experimental factors do, in fact, yield positive effects of time scarcity on various retailer-relevant 
outcomes (McShane and Böckenholt 2017). By reporting every study conducted, determining 
inclusion criteria a priori (i.e., based on construct measurement), and pre-registering multiple 
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studies, we seek to avoid the methodological pitfalls of internal meta-analyses that can inflate 
likelihood of obtaining a false positive result (Vosgerau et al. 2019).  
4.4.1 Study Identification 
We began our SPM analysis by identifying the different ways in which our 26 studies 
measure consumer valuation responses to online time scarcity promotions. WTP was assessed 
using both objective and subjective responses. Although both measures are believed to measure 
the same underlying construct, each elicits a different type of valuation response: one involving a 
subjective comparison and the other an objective dollar amount. Because it is not definitively 
known that participants use both scales in the same way, we follow recommendations of McShane 
and Böckenholt (2017) and conduct separate SPM analyses for each WTP measure, identifying 17 
eligible studies for inclusion in the WTP (amount) SPM and three eligible studies for inclusion in 
the WTP (subjective) SPM. 
Because alternative indicators of consumer valuation, including online purchase behavior, 
reported purchase intentions, product quality perceptions, and product desirability perceptions, 
were also similarly assessed in multiple studies, we could analyze these constructs using SPM 
methodology. Several studies additionally examined persuasion knowledge activation, retailer 
competition activation, retail website perceptions, general product scarcity perceptions, and time 
remaining in promotion, which enabled SPM testing.  
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4.4.2 Factor Retention 
For each SPM analysis, we totaled the number of experimental factors and factor levels 
across those studies measuring the outcome of interest. Each study contained an online time 
scarcity promotion experimental factor, manipulated between subjects in all but two studies 
(Studies 9 and 10, which employed a within-subjects design). To specifically examine the 
influence of online time scarcity relative to no online time scarcity, we aggregated across different 
time scarcity durations (e.g., shorter, longer), if present, within individual experiments. 
When factors appeared exclusively in a single or small subset of studies (e.g., risk 
reduction; Study 5), only the factor level corresponding to the control condition in unmoderated 
studies was retained (McShane and Böckenholt 2017); in moderated studies, the factor level 
serving as a control-equivalent condition was retained for comparison (e.g., control elaboration 
condition in Studies 6 and 20; no risk reduction condition in Studies 4 and 5). Because Study 3 
was the only three-factor study and revealed no main effect of product recipient (self vs. other), 
we treated the conditions of purchasing for the self or other person as separate studies (i.e., Studies 
3A and 3B, respectively), enabling us to retain the data from all experimental tests of online time 
scarcity promotions in Study 3. When studies were identified as eligible for inclusion in multiple 
SPM analyses, we treated each equivalently across all SPM analyses unless otherwise stated. The 
resulting number of experimental tests of the effect of online time scarcity, therefore, did not 
always equal the number of studies eligible for inclusion in the SPM analysis.  
The final sample of experimental tests of the effect of online time scarcity promotions on 
WTP used in SPM analyses totaled 18 for WTP dollar amount (Studies 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24) and three for subjective WTP ratings (Studies 1, 4, 5). With 
respect to alternative indicators of consumer valuation, the final sample of experimental tests used 
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in SPM analyses totaled nine for purchase intentions (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15), two 
for online purchase behavior (Studies 24, 26), six for product desirability (Studies 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15), 
and nine for product quality (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15). With respect to psychological 
consequences of online time scarcity promotions, the number of experimental tests included in 
SPM analyses totaled four for persuasion knowledge activation (Studies 3A, 3B, 9, 10) and seven 
for adversarial retailer perceptions (Studies 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). Examining possible alternative 
explanations, the final sample of experimental tests used in SPM analyses totaled 17 for general 
scarcity perceptions (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21), 12 for time 
scarcity perceptions (Studies 3A, 3B, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21), and 19 for retail website 
perceptions (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). All summary 
statistics were standardized within study prior to SPM analysis, unless otherwise stated (see Web 
Appendix Y for summary statistics). 
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Table 12 (Essay 3) SPM Results Summary 
Outcome 
n SPM I2 TS 
(studies) Est. [95% CI] Est. [95% CI] Impact 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) Results       
WTP (Dollar Amount) 18 -.0388 [-.1029, .0253] 0%  [0%, 26%] null 
WTP (Dollar Amount)1 13 .0274 [-.0482, .1029] 0%  [0%, 6%] null 
WTP (Dollar Amount) 10 ̶ 0% [0%, 13%] ̶ 
Shorter Online Time Scarcity Promotion ̶ -.1449 [-.2463, -.0434] ̶ ↓ 
Longer Online Time Scarcity Promotion ̶ -.0725 [-.1738, .0288] ̶ null 
WTP (Subjective Rating) 3 -.3054 [-.5040, -.1070] 0%  [0%, 43%] ↓ 
       
Alternative Indicators of Consumer Valuation         
Purchase Likelihood 9 .0130 [-.0903, .1163] 6% [0%, 54%] null 
Online Purchase2 2 -.0695 [-.1716, .0325] 0% [0%, 89%] null 
Product Desirability 6 -.0529 [-.1797, .0739] 7% [0%, 63%] null 
Product Quality 9 -.0270 [-.1397, .0856] 35% [0%, 64%] null 
       
Psychological Consequences       
Persuasion Knowledge Activation 4 .0588 [-.0747, .1923] 27%  [0%, 68%] null 
Perceiving Retailer as Opponent 7 .1391 [-.0092, .2873] 0%  [0%, 37%] null 
       
Alternative Explanations       
Perceived General Scarcity of Promoted Item  17 .1036 [.0329, .1743] 0% [0%, 21%] ↑ 
Perceived Time Remaining to Purchase Item  12 -.9008 [-.9951, -.8066] 40% [2%, 64%] ↓ 
Retail Website Perceptions 19 -.0727 [-.1331, -.0123] 7% [0%, 37%] ↓ 
1 As a robustness check, five studies plausibly containing non-equivalent comparison conditions (Studies 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21) were excluded.  
2 Because outcome of interest was a proportion, values were not standardized prior to conducting SPM analysis. 
Note. I2 quantifies degree of heterogeneity, with values 25%, 50%, and 75% describe low, moderate, and high, respectively (Higgins et al. 2003). 
4.4.3 Willingness to Pay (WTP) Results 
4.4.3.1 WTP Amount ($) 
The classic time scarcity effect predicts that marketing promotions including online time 
scarcity will significantly increase consumers’ valuation of the promoted product–in this case, the 
standardized WTP amount ($). As seen in Figure 17, however, SPM results of 18 experiments 
(Studies 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24) estimated the effect to be 
nonsignificant, at -.0388 (CI95[-.1029, .0253] with a confidence interval that includes zero (see 
Table 12 for I2 heterogeneity estimates for each SPM analysis). 
Despite this, one might question the degree to which the specific factor levels of control-
comparable conditions in studies with moderators (e.g., control elaboration condition; Studies 6) 
 165 
functioned similarly to the control condition in studies without moderators. Thus, as a robustness 
check, we re-ran this analysis after dropping moderated studies lacking an identical comparable 
control condition (n = 5).37 An SPM of the remaining 13 experiments (Studies 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 24) estimated the effect at .0274 (CI95[-.0482, .1029] with a confidence 
interval including zero, again indicating a non-significant difference in how much consumers are 
willing to pay for products promoted with (vs. without) online time scarcity tactics.  
4.4.3.2 WTP Subjective Rating 
We also tested whether exposure to online marketing promotions with time scarcity 
increased subjective willingness to pay for the promoted product. SPM of three studies (Studies 1, 
4, 5) estimates the effect to be significant, at -.3054 (CI95[-.5040, -.1070]), with a confidence 
interval that does not include zero. This finding indicates that online time scarcity promotions have 
a significant negative effect on subjective WTP ratings, contrary to the standard time scarcity 
marketing prediction. Thus, neither objective nor subjective WTP ratings demonstrate support for 
a value-enhancing influence of online time scarcity promotions. 
 
37 Dropped Studies 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21. 
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Note. Single-study effect estimates are represented by squares; Single-Paper Meta-Analysis (SPM) estimate is represented by vertical bars. Thick 
and thin lines represent the 50% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Square size reflects the average sample size per condition in each 
study. The SPM suggests the effect does not attain statistical significance for WTP $ amount (Panel A) nor purchase intentions (Panel B). The 
SPM suggests a positive effect on general scarcity perceptions (Panel C) and a negative effect on perceived amount of time remaining in the 
promotion (Panel D). 
Figure 17 (Essay 3) SPM Results 
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4.4.3.3 Exploratory Analysis: Amount of Time Remaining 
We also conducted an exploratory SPM analysis testing for the distinct effects of shorter 
versus longer online time scarcity promotions, relative to promotions without online time scarcity. 
Studies that could be discretely categorized as using either shorter or longer online time scarcity 
tactics were included in the analysis. An SPM of the 10 experiments that enabled such comparisons 
(Studies 4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21) shows that online promotions with time scarcity do 
not significantly increase consumers’ WTP dollar amount for the promoted product, regardless of 
whether time remaining in the promotion is shorter or longer: the effect of shorter online time 
scarcity promotions was negative and significant, at -.1449 (CI95[-.2463, -.0434]) with a 
confidence interval that does not include zero; and the effect of longer online time scarcity 
promotions was non-significant, estimated to be -.0725 (CI95[-.1738, .0288]) with a confidence 
interval that includes zero.  
Taken together, we observe no significant positive effect (and in some cases, observe a 
negative effect) of online time scarcity promotions on WTP, regardless of how WTP was assessed 
(i.e., as an objective financial amount or a subjective relative rating) and how much time remained 
before the promotional offer expired (i.e., shorter or longer timeframe).  
4.4.4 Alternative Indicators of Consumer Valuation   
4.4.4.1 Purchase Intentions 
Some work suggests there are circumstances under which WTP may be particularly 
difficult to move (e.g., when consumers possess well-established internal reference prices, Monroe 
1973; Urbany, Bearden, and Weilbaker 1988). Consequently, we explored the potential impact of 
online time scarcity promotions on alternative indicators of valuation, including one of the most 
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commonly used in prior time scarcity promotion research: purchase intentions. SPM analysis of 
nine experimental tests (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15) estimated the effect of online time 
scarcity promotions on purchase intentions to be positive but not significant, at .0130 (CI95[-.0903, 
.1163]) with a confidence interval that includes zero.  
4.4.4.2 Real Online Purchasing 
The traditional time scarcity promotion hypothesis proposes that exposure to online time 
scarcity marketing tactics should increase online purchase of the promoted product. SPM results 
from two studies measuring the proportion of consumers who spent money to make a 
consequential online purchase (Studies 24 and 26) estimated the effect of online time scarcity 
promotions on actual purchase likelihood to be negative, but non-significant, at -.0695 (CI95[-
.1716, .0325] with a confidence interval that includes zero.38 
4.4.4.3 Product Perceptions 
An SPM analysis with six experiments (Studies 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15) estimates the effect of 
online time scarcity promotions on product desirability ratings to be non-significant, at -.0529 
(CI95[-.1797, .0739]) with a confidence interval that includes zero. An SPM analysis with nine 
experiments (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15) estimates the effect of online time scarcity 
promotions on product quality ratings to also be non-significant, at -.0270 (CI95[-.1397, .0856]) 
with a confidence interval that includes zero. Thus, the presence of online time scarcity tactics 
does not seem to impact evaluations of the product’s quality or desirability, as would have been 
suggested by Lynn (1991) based on commodity theory (Brock 1968).  
 
38 Because the outcome of interest was a proportion, we did not standardize values before conducting the SPM analysis. 
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4.4.5 Psychological Consequences 
4.4.5.1 Persuasion Knowledge Activation 
In our assessment of the changes that may undermine the robustness of an online time 
scarcity effect in the present market, we argued that perhaps increased exposure to exploding deals 
led consumers to develop persuasion knowledge about such tactics, which is activated by 
additional exposure to online time scarcity promotions. To test this, we considered whether our 
online time scarcity promotions activated persuasion knowledge, as measured by the 5-item index 
described earlier. An SPM analysis of four experiments (Studies 3A, 3B, 9, 10) estimates the effect 
to be non-significant, at .0588 (CI95[-.0747, .1923]) with a confidence interval that includes zero. 
This suggests, therefore, that consumers’ persuasion knowledge was not consistently triggered by 
exposure to online time scarcity promotions.  
4.4.5.2 Perceiving Retailer as Opponent 
Drawing on prior research demonstrating scarcity can prompt a competitive orientation 
among consumers (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Kristofferson et al. 2017; Roux et al. 2015), we examined 
whether online time scarcity promotions evoke a competitive orientation directed at the retailer, 
the source of the promotion time restriction. SPM analysis with seven experiments measuring the 
6-item index of competitive orientation towards the retailer described earlier (Studies 3A, 3B, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8) estimated the effect to be non-significant, at .1391 (CI95[-.0092, .2873]) with a 
confidence interval that includes zero. This finding suggests that online time scarcity promotions 
do not impact competitive perceptions of the retailer.  
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4.4.5.3 Failure to Induce Scarcity 
It is possible that accessibility to other information about product availability prevented 
consumers from perceiving the promoted products as scarce. Results, however, suggest our 
manipulations effectively reduced perceived product availability. An SPM analysis of 17 
experiments (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21) estimated the effect 
of online time scarcity promotions on general scarcity perceptions to be positive and significant, 
at .1036 (CI95[.0329, .1743]) with a confidence interval that does not include zero. This indicates 
that consumers perceive products promoted with online time scarcity tactics to be scarcer than 
those promoted without online time scarcity tactics.  
It is also possible that our online time scarcity manipulations did not generate a perception 
of less time remaining in the promotion. This could occur, for example, if consumers were 
skeptical about the veracity of the time limit displayed. An SPM of 12 experiments (Studies 3A, 
3B, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21), however, estimated the effect of online time scarcity 
promotions on perceived time remaining to purchase the promoted product as significant and 
negative, at -.9008 (CI95[-.9951, -.8066]) with a confidence interval that does not include zero. 
This indicates that consumers reliably perceived the amount of time left to purchase the promoted 
product as significantly shorter when accompanied by an online time scarcity tactic, meaning the 
online promotion effectively evoked time scarcity perceptions. 
4.4.5.4 Website Perceptions 
It is also possible that online time scarcity promotion effects did not emerge because such 
tactics altered consumer perceptions of the retailer’s website. Using the three-item website 
perceptions index described earlier, an SPM of 19 experiments (Studies 1, 3A, 3B, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21) estimated the effect to be significant and negative, at -
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.0727 (CI95[-.1331, -.0123]) with a confidence interval that does not include zero. This suggests 
that, indeed, consumers’ value perceptions can spillover to the online retail context; the SPM 
results indicate individuals perceive online retail environments with online time scarcity 
promotions less, rather than more, favorably (in terms of visual attractiveness, ease of 
understanding, and professionalism) than those running the identical promotion without an online 
time scarcity tactic. Importantly, across conditions, the websites were identical with the exception 
of the time scarcity marketing intervention.  
4.4.6 Discussion 
Taken together, both isolated single-study analyses and meta-analyses suggests that online 
time scarcity effects fail to emerge in the present market in ways consistent with predictions that 
would be expected based on theory related to offline time scarcity promotions. Though we reliably 
manipulate perceived time scarcity, findings related to multiple stimuli, consumer populations, 
behavioral outcomes, and attitudinal measures consistently demonstrate no significant increases in 
financial WTP amount, nor in subjective WTP ratings. Somewhat surprisingly, individuals’ 
willingness to pay amount even decreased for products promoted with exceedingly short 
timeframes (i.e., less than one hour).  
SPM results also revealed no increase in actual online purchase behavior or in self-reported 
purchased intentions–one of the most commonly used metrics of value in prior tests of time 
scarcity promotions. Furthermore, online time scarcity offers did not favorably enhance perceived 
value of the promoted product (i.e., quality or desirability) or of the retail environment (i.e., 
website perceptions); in fact, consumers devalued the e-commerce website of those retailers 
employing online time scarcity promotional tactics.  
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We also gain some preliminary insight into the psychological effects of exposure to online 
time scarcity. Results do not indicate that exposure to online time scarcity promotions lowered 
inferred product quality, activated consumers’ persuasion knowledge, or consistently elicited a 
competitive orientation towards the retailer. It appears, however, that despite holding all other 
elements of the websites and products constant within each study, consumers view websites using 
online time scarcity tactics as less attractive, understandable, and professional than those without 
online time scarcity promotions. This finding may suggest that such tactics have come to be 
associated with less-appealing retailers, a finding we discuss later.  
4.5 General Discussion 
This article revisits a marketing tool widely implemented and generally accepted as 
effective: online time scarcity promotions. Applying the ARTS paradigm (Assumption, 
Retrospection, Testing, Synthesis) for revisiting established marketing phenomena, we identify 
several reasons to question the relevance of past theory and findings to novel instantiations of 
online time scarcity promotions. First, we evaluated the applicability of prior offline theory to the 
present online marketplace. The emergence of the internet and growth in online retailing 
fundamentally altered the contexts in which time scarcity tactics are meant to be applied, the 
methods by which time scarcity tactics are implemented, and the experience of consumers targeted 
by time scarcity tactics. Foundational theories and demonstrations of time scarcity promotions, 
however, largely predate these radical market changes, reducing the suitability of applying 
previous assumptions underlying offline tactics to the modern-day online marketplace. Under such 
transformative conditions, even the most rigorous research warrants reevaluation.  
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We then conducted a retrospective analysis of prior empirical work, finding that existing 
findings offer limited insight that is generalizable to contemporary online time scarcity 
promotions. Results reveal inconsistent evidence supporting the efficacy of offline time scarcity 
promotions, demonstrating a combination of positive, conditional, and null effects. In addition, 
nearly all studies examine offline time scarcity promotions explicitly designed for non-digital 
distribution. With prior work providing inconclusive evidence and sparse direct examination of 
time scarcity appeals in their modern online form, extrapolating prior offline research to 
contemporary online retailing seems misguided without additional robust empirical testing.  
Consequently, we then generated a new body of empirical evidence investigating present-
day online time scarcity promotions. The series of 26 new studies addressed several issues that 
limit the generalizability and relevance of prior work (e.g., examining time scarcity promotions in 
their contemporary online form, regularly including a promotion control condition to which online 
time scarcity tactics can be compared). The newly conducted studies used a variety of product 
stimuli, promotional timeframes, digital formats, behavioral outcomes, and attitudinal measures 
that more aptly reflect contemporary online time scarcity promotions and enhance the empirical 
generalizability of results. Consequently, the field can have greater confidence in assessing 
whether initial theory regarding time scarcity promotions extends to current online implementation 
of these tactics in the modern marketplace with contemporary consumers.  
Synthesizing both single-study and single-paper meta-analytic results from this new 
empirical evidence, we find little to suggest that online time scarcity effects emerge in the present 
market in ways consistent with predictions derived from theory regarding offline time scarcity 
promotions. Despite a small set of single-study isolated instances for which favorable time scarcity 
effects emerge for select measures, contemporary instantiations of online time scarcity promotions 
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more often have negligible or adverse effects. Indeed, SPM analyses show that exposure to online 
time scarcity promotions fail to positively impact any indicator of consumers’ valuation of the 
promoted product: financial WTP amount, subjective WTP ratings, actual online purchase 
behavior, self-reported purchase intentions, nor perceptions of the promoted product’s desirability 
or quality. Moreover, several possible alternative accounts (e.g., failure to induce scarcity 
perceptions, persuasion knowledge activation, competitive orientation towards the retailer) do not 
account for these findings. Taken together, these findings show that present-day online time 
scarcity tactics are not as universally effective as previous offline time scarcity research and 
marketplace usage would suggest, thereby providing a strong foundation on which to develop new 
theory and recommendations regarding the use of online time scarcity tactics.  
4.5.1 Practical and Managerial Implications 
If offline time scarcity theory does not hold in cases of typical present-day online time 
scarcity promotions, what implications arise? First, our results imply that marketers should 
systematically question and judiciously revise existing marketing practices regarding online time 
scarcity promotions. The radical innovation of the internet and the growth of online retailing (e.g., 
e-commerce, m-commerce) has transformed both consumers’ exposure to and marketers’ 
implementation of online time scarcity tactics. This article suggests that such changes have not 
only dramatically shifted the marketing landscape, but also the assumptions on which time scarcity 
promotions are based. Thus, the amount of evidence currently supporting the efficacy of online 
time scarcity promotions does not seem to justify marketers’ preponderant usage. Consequently, 
practitioners working in online retail or digital marketing domains may benefit from reducing 
online time scarcity promotion prevalence and executing the tactic more discerningly. Failure to 
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update existing practices may jeopardize marketers’ estimates of the marketing promotion’s 
efficacy, thereby forfeiting prospective benefits of a successful campaign. 
Second, our work implies that marketers should carefully attend to the ways in which 
practice applies past theory. Prudent marketers would refrain from the use of online time scarcity 
promotions unless tactics have been repeatedly demonstrated using multiple operationalizations, 
robustly supported by meta-analyses that can directly compare their effects, and consistently 
replicated among new consumer samples and retail contexts. In fact, if alternative promotional 
tactics meet these criteria, we would be comfortable recommending that they be used before online 
time scarcity promotions. For example, recent work has shown the durability of extremeness 
aversion as a driver of consumer behavior (Neumann, Böckenholt, and Sinha 2016) and the robust 
effects of defaults in consumer settings (Jachimowitz et al. 2019). Our results, however, suggest 
that online time scarcity promotions may constitute a much weaker marketing tool. Thus, retailers 
could benefit from tactics with a stronger evidentiary base, at least until a new theory for and more 
robust evidence supporting online time scarcity promotions emerges. 
In addition to providing specific insights regarding contemporary online time scarcity 
promotions, this article also makes a methodological contribution: providing a simple paradigm 
for reconsidering established marketing phenomena. This Assumption, Retrospection, Testing, 
Synthesis method (i.e., ARTS paradigm) is driven by theory, in contrast to a “forensic statistics” 
approach employed to identify dubiously replicable effects. We have no reason to doubt that any 
prior research on time scarcity promotions was not executed using the highest standards of 
precision or transparency; indeed, the work contains numerous convincing field studies, identifies 
important moderators, and provides much-needed experimental support for Cialdini’s (1984) 
original assertions. Applying the ARTS paradigm, however, we can systematically reconsider the 
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relevance of past theory for the present-day marketplace, thus contributing to our understanding 
of both offline and online time scarcity: building on, rather than dismantling, past knowledge.  
4.5.2 Next Steps: Toward a Theory of Online Time Scarcity Promotions 
This research also implies that researchers have an opportunity for impactful theoretical 
development, either augmenting prior offline scarcity theory to accommodate online 
operationalizations and experiences or developing a distinct theory that treats these tactics as a 
fundamentally new phenomenon. Our empirical work offers preliminary ideas about the way such 
a theory might take shape. First, though we assessed some psychological factors that might explain 
the absence or reversal of online time scarcity effects (e.g., persuasion knowledge, retailer-oriented 
competition), much work remains to be done to pinpoint consumer psychological processes that 
account for muted efficacy of online time scarcity promotions.  
Despite experiments using multiple product stimuli, dependent measures, and online 
promotions, the current results do not identify the specific conditions under which online time 
scarcity promotions might be effective. As one possible route for inquiry, we note that studies did 
not systematically vary the depth of this discount, nor did we offer free product or samples for a 
limited time. If time scarcity is used to promote online free trial, rather than purchase, it is likely 
to have much more positive effects, as such offers may be unique to one retailer and involve very 
little risk for the consumer. Future research may consider such boundary conditions, in part, as a 
means of developing new theory for this tactic.   
Our results also suggest that consumers’ perceptions of the online retail context itself 
should be integrated into any new theory of online time scarcity promotions. Consumers viewed 
websites using online time scarcity marketing tactics less favorably (i.e., less attractive, 
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understandable, and professional) than the websites of retailers offering the identical online 
promotion without time scarcity. However, neither website perceptions nor a failure to induce a 
sense of general or time-specific scarcity seems to account for the observed inefficacy of online 
time scarcity promotions across our new empirical investigations. Although the SPM methodology 
does not allow for aggregate tests of mediation, we separately tested for the mediating effect of 
website perceptions for each single-study instance in which online time scarcity promotions 
impacted consumers’ willingness to pay.39 In each case, single-study mediation results showed no 
mediating influence of website perceptions.40 Thus, although website perceptions do not explain 
the failure of online time scarcity promotions to reliably enhance the promoted product’s value, 
the unfavorable perceptions captured can help to identify consequences of using these tactics or 
instances when they may be undermined. 
In addition, broad consideration of the unique features of the online retail context can also 
offer new avenues for understanding what circumstances could enhance the effectiveness of online 
time scarcity promotions. As previously discussed, for example, one of the biggest implications of 
online retailing involves dramatically lowered search costs, in both online and offline retailing, 
which may have reduced the efficacy of online time scarcity promotions. If so, it follows that 
online time scarcity tactics may be more effective (vs. online control promotions) when consumers 
experience greater online search frictions. We conducted preliminary studies exploring the idea 
that increasing online search costs may increase consumers’ proneness to online time scarcity 
promotions. The first study (https://osf.io/y8adn) adapted the fitness tracker promotion paradigm 
from Studies 7 and 8, varying search costs by manipulating whether individuals expected that 
 
39 Study 1 (WTP subjective rating), Study 7 (WTP $ amount), and Study 16 (WTP $ amount). 
40 Mediation analyses (PROCESS, model 4; 10,000 bootstrap samples; Hayes 2018) found no indirect effect through website perceptions 
occurring for Study 1 (-.005, SE = .009, CI95[-.025, .011]), Study 7 (1.879, SE = 1.913, CI95[-1.482, 6.183]), or Study 16 (-1.108, SE = .680, 
CI95[-2.548, .091]). All results were robust to the exclusion of covariates.  
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searching online would be faster or slower than normal. Participants (n = 577 MTurkers) viewed 
a promotional offer (with or without time scarcity) and then indicated how likely they would be to 
take the deal without searching other online retailers for a better price and the amount they would 
be willing to pay for the promoted product. No interactive effects, however, emerged for either 
outcome.41 The second study (https://osf.io/y2afz) employed an incentive-compatible and 
behaviorally consequential design involving new type of wireless earbuds. Participants (n = 295 
students) saw an online promotion (with or without time scarcity) and then selected whether to 
buy the item from that online retailer at the promoted price or search other online retailers’ prices 
for the same product. To manipulate search costs, participants learned that they would have access 
to either a price comparison aggregator website (easier search) or would have to search each 
retailer website individually (harder search). Again, however, results showed no moderating effect 
of search costs.42 Although these studies represent only two of many ways online search costs can 
be experimentally operationalized—and do not reflect a comprehensive test of the search cost 
prediction—these preliminary findings  nevertheless highlight that increased online search costs 
may not uniformly enhance susceptibility to online time scarcity promotions.   
Relatedly, it is possible that the market-level changes instigated by the introduction of the 
internet has shifted when in the consumer decision-making process online time scarcity tactics are 
more likely to be effective. Rather than directly influencing purchase likelihood or product 
valuation, for example, online time scarcity promotions may be increasing the likelihood that the 
promoted product is included in a consumer’s consideration set. We conducted a preliminary study 
 
41 Results from a linear regression predicting participants’ reported likelihood of taking the deal without searching as a function of online 
promotion type (control, time scarcity with countdown timer, time scarcity without countdown timer), search costs (high, low), and their 
interaction, controlling for pre-registered covariates, showed no significant promotion type x search cost interaction (F(2,567) = .57,  p = .566). 
Conducting same analysis on WTP similarly showed no interactive effect (F(2,567) = .09, p = .911). 
42 Results from a binary logistic regression predicting participants’ likelihood of taking the deal without searching (1 = purchased with promotion, 
0 = searched for better price) as a function of online promotion type (control, time scarcity with countdown timer, time scarcity without 
countdown timer), search costs (high, low), and their interaction, controlling for pre-registered covariates, showed no significant promotion type 
x search cost interaction (ꭓ2(2) = 1.25, p = .536). 
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testing the prediction that online time scarcity promotions will be more effective than online 
control promotions in increasing consideration of (but not willingness to pay for) the promoted 
product. In this study (https://osf.io/zmrf4), participants (n = 422 MTurkers) imagined shopping 
for a new desk chair and examined an online retailer’s assortment. Holding the discount constant 
across all presented products, one item in the assortment was randomly identified as the focal 
product (promoted with or without time scarcity). With limited product information provided, 
individuals clicked all items for which they desired more detail and then reported their willingness 
to pay for the focal promoted product. Consideration was operationalized as whether a person 
requested additional information about the focal promoted product (0 = did not consider product, 
1 = did consider product). No difference in willingness to pay emerged for those exposed to the 
online time scarcity promotion and the control promotion, consistent with the pattern of results 
summarized in this paper. Exposure to online time scarcity promotions, however, did not increase 
the likelihood of consumers including the promoted product in their consideration set.43 Although 
this preliminarily result suggests that the observed weakened effect of online time scarcity 
promotions on consumer WTP may not correspond to observed increases in consumer 
consideration, future research can test whether such effects emerged with alternative 
manifestations of online consideration.    
We recognize that this paper’s emphasis on time scarcity tactics precludes empirical 
assertions regarding the efficacy of quantity online scarcity promotions or combination (time and 
quantity) online scarcity promotions. Prior research has suggested that scarcity promotions employ 
temporal restrictions more frequently than quantity restrictions (Howard et al. 2007). Anecdotally, 
 
43 Results from a binary logistic regression predicting participants’ likelihood of including the focal promoted product in their consideration set (1 
= selected, 0 = not selected) as a function of online promotion type (control, time scarcity with countdown timer), controlling for pre-registered 
covariates, showed no significant effect of promotion type (ꭓ2(1) = .37, p = .541). Conducting a similar linear regression analysis to predict WTP 
also showed no main effect of promotion type (F(1,415) = .01, p = .906). 
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however, the simultaneous implementation of both time and quantity scarcity appears to be 
increasingly adopted by retailers (e.g., “23% claimed, Ends in 37 minutes: 03 seconds”), with 
limited empirical research. Although our work does not directly test the effectiveness of blending 
multiple scarcity marketing tactics, future research examining the nature of such effects can further 
inform new theory regarding influence of online time scarcity promotions. 
We encourage future research to examine these questions and to undertake broader 
theoretical inquiry regarding online time scarcity promotions. Researchers exploring time scarcity 
tactics can feel emboldened by our work to undertake efforts to articulate a truly new theory of 
online time scarcity promotions, which likely integrates aspects of both past findings and 
contemporary phenomena. We believe that the present work provides a strong theoretical and 
empirical basis to warrant such investments of time, thought, and enthusiasm. 
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Appendix A (Essay 1) Study 1: Stimuli 
Survey Page Content Presented 
Page 1 Imagine the following scenario: 
You receive an email on Wednesday from Apple. The email tells you about an upcoming iphone sale that 
starts on Sunday and runs for two weeks.  
You are really excited because Apple rarely offers discounts! 
  
Page 2 Look at part of the email (displayed below) and consider the discount Apple is offering. 
(You may be asked about details of the email later in the HIT) 
[EMAIL 1 CONTENT] 
  
Page 3 You don't want to miss out on these savings, and decide to purchase a new iphone online from Apple during 
their two-week sale.  
However, Apple's sale hasn't started yet, so you have to remember to make the purchase sometime in the two 
weeks after the sale starts. 
You'd like to buy your iphone before the first week of the sale ends, because that's when you'd get the largest 
discount possible. 
[EMAIL 1 CONTENT] 
  
Page 4 Days pass, and you go about your normal routine. 
  
Page 5 It is now [EMAIL 2 DAY], and you haven't taken advantage of the discount offer.  
When checking your email, you read a NEW message from Apple.  
The email reminds you about Apple's ongoing iphone sale. Look at part of the email (displayed below) 
(You may be asked about details of the email later in the HIT) 
[EMAIL 2 CONTENT] 
  
Page 6 [EMAIL 2 SUMMARY] 
[EMAIL 2 CONTENT] 
INSTRUCTIONS: On the next few pages, complete the items as if you were in this scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 Content Condition Text or Visual Specific to Condition 
Email 1 
Content 
Planning Prompt 
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Email 1 
Content 
Control 
 
   
Email 2 
Day 
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
Friday 
After Optimal 
Deadline 
Monday 
X   
Email 2 
Content 
Planning Prompt 
&  
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
 
Control  
& 
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
 
Planning Prompt 
&  
After Optimal 
Deadline 
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Email 2 
Content 
Control  
& 
After Optimal 
Deadline 
 
   
Email 2 
Summary 
Planning Prompt 
&  
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
SUMMARY: In this scenario, Apple offers a two-week sale: 45% off during week 1 
and 25% off during week 2. You receive an email during the first week of the 
promotion that reminds you to make a plan and take advantage of the 45% off discount 
available. 
Control  
&  
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
SUMMARY: In this scenario, Apple offers a two-week sale: 45% off during week 1 
and 25% off during week 2. You receive an email during the first week of the 
promotion that reminds you to take advantage of the 45% off discount available. 
Planning Prompt 
&  
After Optimal 
Deadline 
SUMMARY: In this scenario, Apple offers a two-week sale: 45% off during week 1 
and 25% off during week 2. You receive an email during the second week of the 
promotion that reminds you to make a plan and take advantage of the 25% off discount 
available. 
Control  
&  
After Optimal 
Deadline 
SUMMARY: In this scenario, Apple offers a two-week sale: 45% off during week 1 
and 25% off during week 2. You receive an email during the second week of the 
promotion that reminds you to take advantage of the 25% off discount available. 
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Appendix B (Essay 1) Study 1: Item and Response Scales 
Index of Perceived Benefit  
(α = .934) 
1. Discount I would get is a great deal. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
2. Taking advantage of the discount would feel like a big gain. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree) 
3. How would you rate the benefit of getting this discount? (1 = Not Beneficial at All, 7 = 
Very Beneficial) 
 
 
Likelihood to Engage in Planning Behavior 
1. Your day is incredibly busy when you receive this email. To take the time to take 
advantage of this discount, you need to plan to do it. For example, you might set a 
reminder, pick a time and place to make the online purchase, or schedule time in your 
calendar. How likely would you be to engage in any planning behavior in order to make 
your purchase? (1 = Not at All Likely, 7 = Very Likely) 
 
 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE) Scale  
(Rosenberg 1965; α = .913) 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree)      
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly 
Agree) *reverse coded* 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly 
Agree) 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
*reverse coded* 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
*reverse coded* 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) *reverse 
coded* 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) *reverse 
coded* 
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Self-Efficacy 
(adapted from Judge, Locke, Durham, and Kluger 1998; α = .922) 
1. I feel confident in my ability to follow-through with what I intend to do. (1 = Not at All 
True of Me, 7 = Very True of Me) 
2. I am capable of following-through with what I intend to do. (1 = Not at All True of Me, 7 
= Very True of Me) 
3. I am able to follow-through with what I intend to do. (1 = Not at All True of Me, 7 = 
Very True of Me) 
4. I feel able to meet the challenge of following-through with what I intend to do. (1 = Not 
at All True of Me, 7 = Very True of Me) 
 
 
Internal Locus of Control (Reduced-Item Scale)  
(used by Hoffman, Novak, and Schlosser 2003; α = .726) 
1. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree) 
2. My life is determined by my own actions.  (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) 
3. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree) 
4. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = 
Strongly Agree) 
5. When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard for it. (1 = Strongly Disagree, 
7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
 
Psychological Distance  
(adapted from Dai, Milkman, and Riis 2015; α = .810) 
1. How far would you feel today (being reminded of the sale) from your past self (when first 
learning about the sale)? Please select the one diagram out of the seven below that best 
reflects your feelings. No overlap means “extremely far away” and complete overlap 
means “extremely close.” *reverse coded* 
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○ 
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2. To what extent would you now (being reminded of the sale) feel distant from your past 
self (when first learning about the sale)? (1 = Extremely Close, 7 = Extremely Far Away) 
3. To what extent would you now (being reminded of the sale) feel different from your past 
self (when first learning about the sale)? (1 = Exactly the Same, 7 = Completely 
Different) 
 
 
Perceived Fairness  
(adapted from Darke and Dahl 2003; α = .864)  
1. Given the discount available to me, the price I'd pay for the iphone is fair. (-3 = Disagree, 
3 = Agree) 
2. Given the discount available to me, the price I'd pay for the iphone is questionable. (-3 = 
Disagree, 3 = Agree) *reverse coded* 
3. Given the discount available to me, the price I'd pay for the iphone is justified. (-3 = 
Disagree, 3 = Agree) 
4. Given the discount available to me, the price I'd pay for the iphone is honest. (-3 = 
Disagree, 3 = Agree) 
5. Given the discount available to me, the price I'd pay for the iphone is unfair. (-3 = 
Disagree, 3 = Agree) *reverse coded* 
6. Given the discount available to me, the price I'd pay for the iphone is a "rip-off." (-3 = 
Disagree, 3 = Agree) *reverse coded* 
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Appendix C (Essay 1) Study 2: Lottery Schedule 
Wave 
End  
Date 
Launch Date 
Number of Lottery Entries for Each Date 
Lottery 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 11/15 11/7 (W) @ 1:30pm EST 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1       11/26 
2 11/16 11/8 (TH) @ 1:30pm EST  20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1      11/26 
3 11/17 11/9 (F) @ 1:30pm EST   20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1     11/26 
4 11/18 11/10 (SA) @ 1:30pm EST    20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1    11/26 
5 11/19 11/11 (SU) @ 1:30pm EST     20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1   11/26 
6 11/20 11/12 (M) @ 1:30pm EST      20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1  11/26 
7 11/21 11/13 (T) @ 1:30pm EST       20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 1 1 11/26 
Note. The survey informing individuals of the lottery was launched at 1:30 pm EST each day of the week for seven days. The entry website was open daily (from 9:00 am until 1:00 pm EST) throughout 
each wave’s eight-day lottery entry window. 
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Appendix D (Essay 1) Study 2: Stimuli 
Day 1: survey launches at 1:30 pm (EST), participant gets code 
Day 2: lottery opens (first day participant can enter) 
Days 2 & 3: 15 entries 
Days 4 & 5: 10 entries 
Days 6 & 7: 5 entries 
Days 8 & 9: 1 entry 
Day 9: lottery closes (last day participant can enter) 
Day 11: drawing for each of the incentive winners; winners emailed 
 
Survey Page Content Presented 
Page 1 Congratulations! 
You are eligible to participate in a lottery to win a $5 [$20] bonus!!! 
(details on next page) 
  
Page 2 [TAGLINE] 
What do I win?  $$$$$! 
A $5 [$20] MTurk bonus! 
What do I have to do? Enter a code! 
A qualtrics survey (titled "BONUS LOTTERY ENTRY") is available online (link provided below). Go to 
this qualtrics link, where you will complete a few brief survey items about yourself, and then enter the code 
below. The survey will be active between 9am and 1pm (EST) every day [START DATE] through [END 
DATE]. By entering your code during this time, you will be entered to win! 
LOTTERY ENTRY CODE: [personalized code] *this is not your HIT code for today's HIT* 
LOTTERY ENTRY LINK: [lottery entry website link] 
Do I only get one entry? No! Entering earlier gets you EXTRA entries! 
You can only enter your code once but entering earlier gets you extra lottery entries. Here's the schedule: 
[LOTTERY SCHEDULE 1] 
Who can enter the lottery? Only MTurkers who complete this HIT. 
The lottery is only open to MTurkers who participated in the HIT you just completed. After the lottery 
closes, one entry will be randomly selected as the winner of the $5 [$20] bonus. 
  
Page 3 [TAGLINE] 
LOTTERY ENTRY CODE: [personalized code] *this is not your HIT code for today's HIT* 
LOTTERY ENTRY LINK: [lottery entry website link] 
[PAGE 2 CONTENT] 
REMEMBER: 
[LOTTERY SCHEDULE 2] 
  
Page 4 [TAGLINE] 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
STEP 1: Copy your personal entry code: [personalized code] 
STEP 2: Copy this link: [lottery entry website link] 
STEP 3: [STEP 3], from 9am - 1pm (EST) one time from [START DATE] to [END DATE]. 
STEP 4: Check your email on 11/26. A winner (hopefully, you!) will be randomly drawn on 11/26 and will 
be notified via email through MTurk on the same day. 
  
Page 5 [TAGLINE] 
Here is a final summary of the critical lottery info.  
BONUS: [$5/$20]  
ENTRY CODE: [personalized code] 
LINK: [lottery entry website link] 
[LOTTERY SCHEDULE 2] 
Entry window closes at 1:00PM (EST) on [END DATE]. Winner will be randomly drawn and notified on 
11/26. 
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 Content Condition Text Specific to Condition 
Tagline Planning 
Prompt 
Your calendar could get crowded--Make a plan to enter early to lock down your chance 
to win! 
 Control Enter early to lock down your chance to win! 
X 
  
Start Date* & 
End Date* 
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
Start Date: 11/8; End Date: 11/15 
 After Optimal 
Deadline 
Start Date: 11/6 End Date: 11/15 
X 
  
Lottery 
Schedule 1* 
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
Enter Code Between: Total # of Entries: 
11/8 and 11/9 15 entries 
11/10 and 11/11 10 entries 
11/12 and 11/13 5 entries 
11/14 and 11/15 1 entry 
  
 
 After Optimal 
Deadline 
Enter Code Between: Total # of Entries: 
11/6 and 11/7 20 entries 
11/8 and 11/9 15 entries 
11/10 and 11/11 10 entries 
11/12 and 11/13 5 entries 
11/14 and 11/15 1 entry 
 
X 
  
Page 2 
Content 
Planning 
Prompt 
The busier you are, the more important it is to plan to enter your code early! The entry 
window opens soon! 
Participants can enter their code as early as [START DATE]. It's a busy time of year, 
so plan on setting aside time to do this! 
Entries can only be made during a specific period of time. This means that prioritizing 
entering your code early could help increase your chances of winning. Make a plan now 
to enter the lottery early! Schedule time on your calendar now to do this tomorrow 
between 9am and 1pm EST! 
 Control The entry window opens soon! 
Participants can enter their code as early as [START DATE].  
Entries can only be made during a specific period of time. Entering your code early 
could help increase your chances of winning. 
   
Lottery 
Schedule 2* 
Before Optimal 
Deadline 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/8 and 11/9 = 15 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/10 and 11/11 = 10 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/12 and 11/13 =  5 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/14 and 11/15 =  1 chance to win [$5/$20] 
 After Optimal 
Deadline 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/6 and 11/7 = 20 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/8 and 11/9 = 15 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/10 and 11/11 = 10 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/12 and 11/13 =  5 chances to win [$5/$20] 
Enter between 9AM and 1PM (EST) on 11/14 and 11/15 =  1 chance to win [$5/$20] 
 
  
Step 3 Planning 
Prompt 
Put a reminder in your phone or your calendar right now to enter the lottery 
 Control Enter the lottery 
* Specific dates presented depended on the day of administration. The dates provided in this table correspond to those presented on the first 
administration day (November 7, 2018). The code entry survey was deactivated outside of 9am EST and 1pm EST each day.   
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Appendix E (Essay 1) Study 3: Email 2 Stimuli 
BEFORE OPTIMAL DEADLINE CONDITIONS 
 
Control Condition Planning Prompt Condition 
  
Subject Line: Haven’t filed FAFSA? You 
HAVEN’T missed the “earliest bird” 
window. 
Subject Line: Haven’t filed FAFSA? You 
HAVEN’T missed the “earliest bird” 
window. Plan to file ASAP! 
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AFTER OPTIMAL DEADLINE CONDITIONS 
 
Control Condition Planning Prompt Condition 
  
Subject Line: Haven’t filed FAFSA? You 
JUST missed the “earliest bird” window. Plan 
to file ASAP! 
 
Subject Line: Haven’t filed FAFSA? You 
JUST missed the “earliest bird” window.  
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Appendix F (Essay 2) Study 1: Sample Online Donation Stimuli 
Recurring Donation Condition 
 
 
One-Time Donation Condition 
 
 
 194 
Appendix G (Essay 2) Study 2: Parallel Mediation Results 
 Consequent 
 M1 (Perceived Size)  M2 (Experienced Happiness)  M3 (Charity Commitment)  Y (Donation Amount) 
Antecedent Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
D1 (Recurring w/not.) -10.4327 3.1766 .0012  .0224 .1900 .9061  -.3973 .3349 .2365  -.0268 .0206 .1947 
D2 (Recurring w/out not.) -8.0797 3.1533 .0109  -.0117 .1886 .9507  .1214 .3324 .7152  -.0335 .0203 .1009 
M1 (Perceived Size) – – –  – – –  – – –  .0012 .0004 .0031 
M2 (Experienced Happiness) – – –  – – –  – – –  .0126 .0075 .0924 
M3 (Charity Commitment) – – –  – – –  – – –  .0122 .0043 .0051 
C1 (Income) < .0001 < .0001 .2699  < .0001 < .0001 .1343  < .0001 < .0001 .5712  < .0001 < .0001 .2592 
Constant 23.2730 2.7492 < .0001  5.3947 .1644 < .0001  5.0258 .2898 < .0001  -.0415 .0385 .2815 
                
 R2 = .0438  R2 = .0080  R2 = .0101  R2 = .1449 
 F(3,283) = 4.3169,  p =  .0054  F(3,283) = .7616,  p = .5164  F(3,283) = .9663,  p = .4090  F(6,280) = 7.9075,  p < .0001 
Note. Conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 4; 10,000 bootstrapped samples) with a multicategorical IV (one-time donation, recurring donation with notification, and recurring donation without 
notification). 
 195 
Appendix H (Essay 2) Study 4: Moderation Results 
 Coeff. SE t p 
X (Recurring Donation) -1.9298 28.4184 -.0679 .9460 
W (Initial Amount) 1.1107 .2838 3.9145 .0001 
Z (Religiosity) 10.7309 5.7906 1.8532 .0660 
XW (Recurring Donation x Initial Amount) -.9623 .3629 -2.6520 .0090 
XZ (Recurring Donation x Religiosity) .9009 8.0333 .1121 -.9623 
WZ (Initial Amount x Religiosity) -.2280 .0705 -3.2357 .0015 
XWZ (Recurring Donation x Initial Amount x Religiosity) .1946 .0868 2.2422 .0266 
C1 (Income) < .0001 < .0001 -.2832 .7775 
Constant -12.1420 20.9188 -.5804 .5626 
     
 R2 = .1932 
 F(8,136) = 4.0711,  p = .0002 
Note. Conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 3; 10,000 bootstrapped samples).  
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Appendix I (Essay 2) Study 5A: Parallel Mediation Results 
 Consequent 
 M1 (Perceived Size)  M2 (Experienced Happiness)  M3 (Charity Commitment)  Y (Donation Amount) 
Antecedent Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (Recurring Donation) 2.4596 4.6381 .5965  .3737 .1745 .0334  .8402 .2874 .0038  -.1697 .4961 .0008 
M1 (Perceived Size) – – –  – – –  – – –  .0004 .0007 .6268 
M2 (Experienced Happiness) – – –  – – –  – – –  .0490 .0257 .0574 
M3 (Charity Commitment) – – –  – – –  – – –  .0158 .1563 .3139 
C1 (Income) .00002 .00003 .5044  -.000001 .000001 .4383  -.000001 .000002 .6897  < .0001 < .0001 .0990 
C1 (Mediator Timing) -9.9893 4.6226 .0318  -.4357 .1739 .0130  -1.0085 .2864 .0005  .0441 .0502 .3800 
Constant 37.6232 3.9678 < .0001  5.8312 .1493 < .0001  6.7205 .2458 < .0001  .0690 .1211 .5693 
                
 R2 = .0250  R2 = .0482  R2 = .0858  R2 = .1028 
 F(3,207) = 1.7711,  p =  .1538  F(3,207) = 3.4909,  p = .0166  F(3,207) = 6.4775,  p = .0003  F(6,204) = 3.8972,  p = .0010 
Note. Conducted using PROCESS 3.0 (model 4; 10,000 bootstrapped samples). Control variables include (mean-centered) income and timing of mediator measurement (0 = after initial donation request, 
1 = after subsequent donation request). 
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Appendix J (Essay 3) Online Time Scarcity Promotion Manipulations 
 
Study 1 Study 2 
  
Countdown timer started at 1 hour: 26 minutes: 40 seconds Countdown timer started at 1 hour: 26 minutes: 40 seconds 
Study 3 Study 4, 5 
 
 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
8 minutes: 40 seconds & 1 hour: 18 minutes: 0 seconds 
Countdown timer started at 1 hour: 26 minutes: 40 seconds 
 198 
Study 6 Study 7 
 
 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
8 minutes: 40 seconds & 1 hour: 18 minutes: 0 seconds 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
8 minutes: 40 seconds & 1 hour: 18 minutes: 0 seconds 
Study 8 Study 9, 10 
 
 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
8 minutes: 40 seconds & 1 hour: 18 minutes: 0 seconds 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
2 minutes: 0 seconds & 2 hours: 0 minutes: 0 seconds 
Study 11 Study 12, 13 
 
 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
8 minutes: 40 seconds & 1 hour: 18 minutes: 0 seconds 
Countdown timer started at a randomly selected time between 
8 minutes: 0 seconds & 24 hours: 0 minutes: 0 seconds 
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Study 14 Study 15 
 
 
Countdown timer started at 8 minutes: 0 seconds or 1 hour: 
26 minutes: 40 seconds 
Countdown timer started at 12 minutes: 0 seconds, 48 minutes: 
0 seconds, 3 hours: 12 minutes: 0 seconds, or 15 hours: 12 
minutes: 0 seconds 
Study 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 Study 22 
 
MTurk HIT Title content varied between 
conditions. 
Countdown timer started at 8 minutes: 40 seconds or 23 
hours: 8 minutes: 40 seconds 
Title read “Only 45 minutes left to participate in this 
consumer behavior study! Click now!” 
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Study 23 Study 24 
 
 
Study 25 Study 26 
  
 Countdown timer started at 20 seconds or 3 hours: 24 
minutes: 20 seconds 
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